The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas by Rogers, C. Paul, III
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2008
The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas
C. Paul Rogers III
Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 895 (2008)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
X. 
XI. 
XII. 
XIII. 
XIV. 
XV. 
XVI. 
THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF JUSTICE 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
C. PAUL ROGERS III' 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 895 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ....................................................... 897 
DOUGLAS AND LEGAL REALISM .......................................... 901 
PRICE FIXING ............................................ ··················· ........ 908 
MONOPOLIZATION ............................................................... 924 
THE PATENT/ ANTITRUST INTERSECTION ............................. 936 
RELEVANT MARKET ISSUES ................................................. 938 
DIVESTITURE ....................................................................... 945 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS .............................................. 948 
BANK MERGERS ................................................................... 954 
POTENTIAL COMPETITION .................................................... 957 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ........................................................ 969 
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT ............................................. 979 
ANTITRUST AND THE REGULATED ECONOMY ...................... 986 
LABOR AND ANTITRUST ....................................................... 995 
CONCLUSION .... ················································· ................... 998 
l. INTRODUCTION 
One cannot study the history of antitrust law without running headlong into the 
opinions of Associate Justice William 0. Douglas. In his thirty-six years on the 
Supreme Court, he authored thirty-five majority opinions and nearly as many 
dissenting or concurring opinions in cases involving antitrust questions or issues. It 
is quite probable that Justice Douglas authored more antitrust opinions, both for the 
majority and in dissent, than any Supreme Court justice in history. And since 
antitrust law is largely case law, it seems axiomatic that Douglas, one of the Court's 
leading liberals, must have had a significant influence on the development of 
antitrust law. The question remains, however. whether this influence was positive or 
negative and. given recent doctrinal changes, lasting. 
In teaching the antitrust course for thirty years, I have annually been surprised by 
the unevenness of the Douglas antitrust opinions. One, United States v. Socony-
"Professor of Law and former Dean. Dedman School of Law. Southem Methodist 
University. B.A. 1970. J.D. 1973. University of Texas; LL.M. 1977, Columbia University. 
The author would like to express appreciation to Julie Patterson Forrester for her unwavering 
support of this project, as well as to a number of very able former research assistants including 
Mark Hanna, Catherine Bright. Jed Franklin, Lila Johnson. Patrick Hanchey, and Daniel 
Gomez. Special thanks also to the always professional and timely research support of Greg Ivy 
and Laura Justice of the Underwood Law Library and to the financial support of the Tucker 
Law Faculty Research Fund. 
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Vacuum Oil Co., 1 has stood the test of time and become a bedrock of antitrust law. 
Many more, however, are quite dated and, dare I suggest, result-oriented.2 Certainly 
Justice Douglas is thought of as one of the leading antitrust hawks of the Warren 
Court era, when the government or private plaintiff seemingly always prevailed.3 
Antitrust law has evolved and changed dramatically over the thirty-three years since 
Douglas finally and most reluctantly retired from the Supreme Court. One can 
almost imagine the good justice's upset as more and more of his opinions are 
discarded or simply ignored by the present day Court. 
Justice Douglas' antitrust philosophy can be easily characterized. He firmly 
believed that "big is bad" and that the Sherman Act was designed to make illegal 
significant concentrations of economic power, no matter how attained. As a result, 
he has been characterized as an economic conservative in apparent contrast to his 
political liberalism.4 He believed in the expansive power of the federal government 
to regulate the economi and thought that the Sherman and Clayton Acts gave effect 
to that authority. There is also significant evidence that Douglas believed that a 
principal aim of antitrust was to protect the viability of small businesses, even at the 
expense of the consumer." Those ideals have arguably all been discarded by 
contemporary antitrust policy. 
Justice Douglas did have a lasting impact on antitrust law, however. He 
understood the havoc that competitor collaboration could wreak on a competitive 
1Unitcd States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co .. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
20thers have come to the same conclusion looking at Justice Douglas' opinions in other 
areas of the law. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the 
Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 46 (1988) (''The doctrinal dimensions of 
judging, for Douglas, were relatively insignificant; what counted were the results in cases and 
the political philosophies that those results signified."). See also Melvin I. Urofsky, William 
0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 134 (1991); Robert J. McKeever, 
The Fall and Rise of' Judicial Activism in the United States: The Case of Justice William 0. 
Douglas, II J. OF LEGAL HIST. 437, 442-45 ( 1990). 
3See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) ("The sole consistency that I can tind is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the 
[g]overnment always wins."). See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 585 
( 1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
4See Alden Whitman. William 0. Douglas is Dead at 81: Served 36 Years on Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1980, at I. 28. 
5This was in stark contrast to his "vittually uncompromising stand in behalf of protection 
for civil liberties against usurpations by federal and state governments .... " G. EDWARD 
WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 246 
(1976). 
"See. e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320-21 (1949) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[W]c can expect that the oil companies will move in to supplant 
[independent stations] with their own stations. There will still be competition between the oil 
companies. But there will be a tragic loss to the nation. The small, independent business man 
will be supplanted by clerks."). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5
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economy, even if he did sometimes take that notion too far. 7 He was a staunch 
advocate of the so-called "price mechanism," believing that the free and open market 
should determine output and price. He authored the seminal opinion on the issue8 
shortly after taking his seat on the Supreme Court and never wavered from the idea 
that any collective interference with the setting of price was illegal. 
With this background, this Article will attempt to further define and refine Justice 
Douglas' antitrust philosophy by examining his written opinions and writings. It will 
then attempt to measure that philosophy's effect on the Supreme Court during his 
tenure and its contemporary impact in the context of the rapidly shifting antitrust 
doctrine of the last thirty years or so. 
II. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
William 0. Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court from the chairmanship 
of the Securities Exchange Commission in 1939 by President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. He was, at forty years of age, the second youngest person ever appointed 
to our highest court. 9 He would become the longest serving justice upon his 
retirement in 197 5. 
Raised in very humble circumstances in Yakima, Washington, he lost his father 
at the age of six. He then contracted polio before working his way through Whitman 
College in nearby Walia Walia by holding three jobs so he could send money home. 
He headed east for law school at Columbia virtually penniless where, after working 
his way through law school, he claimed, to his chagrin, to have graduated only 
number two in his class. 10 He was bitterly disappointed when Supreme Court Justice 
Harlan F. Stone, who each year selected a Columbia law graduate as his law clerk, 
picked the person who had finished first in the class, AI McCormack. 11 
While in law school he worked as a research assistant for Professor Underhill 
Moore who had been commissioned to write a treatise by the trade association for 
the cement industries, one of many trade associations under antitrust attack by the 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 338 n.4 (1969). See 
also United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,636 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
~ScJcony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 150. 
9See JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY- THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 191 
(1980). Only Joseph Story, who was thirty-two when he joined the Court in 1811, was 
younger. ld. 
10WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 148 (1974). Recent 
biographer Bruce Allen Murphy disputes Justice Douglas' claim about his class rank, noting 
that Douglas was not named a James Kent scholar after his first or second years of law school 
and was not selected to the Columbia Law ReFiew staff until the middle of his second year. 
He also managed to make a grade of "C" in his third-year Constitutional Law class. See 
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 49-51 
(2003). 
11 DOUGLAS, supra note I 0, at 149. 
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Justice Department. The work involved legal and economic research and analysis as 
well as travel to interview executives of cement plants in the east. 12 
After graduation, Douglas went to work for the Wall Street firm of Cravath, 
deGersdorff, Swaine, and Wood and taught Bankruptcy, Damages and Partnership 
law as an adjunct professor for Columbia, working himself into exhaustion while 
plagued by stomach problems. 13 He left after two years to return to practice in his 
hometown of Yakima, but after only a few unhappy months, he returned to New 
York to a full-time faculty position at Columbia. 14 The Columbia Jaw faculty was 
the center of the legal realism movement, which was questioning the underlying 
basis for judicial decision-making. Douglas resigned after only two years there in 
protest of University President Nicholas Murray Butler's hiring of a law school dean, 
Young B. Smith, without consulting the law faculty. 15 He was quickly recruited to 
the Yale Jaw faculty by its boy-wonder dean, Robert Maynard Hutchins. He taught 
at Yale for six years, eventually declining Hutchins' invitation in 1930 to move to 
the University of Chicago when Hutchins became president there. 16 To keep him, 
Yale appointed him to the prestigious Sterling Professorship of Law. He was but 
thirty-one years old. 17 
At Yale, he formed many friendships, including a close relationship with 
Thurman Arnold, later to become famous as an aggressive and creative assistant 
attorney general for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 1x He 
12ln his memoirs. Justice Douglas described Moore as having "a cutting edge [mind], 
sharper than any other .... [A] year at his feet was a prodigious experience-in the exactitude 
with which he dealt with minutiae; in the broad dimensions of the practical world where he 
framed his questions; in his concern with the roots of the law and their modem incidence." /d. 
at 145. 
11 /d. at 150. 
14 /d. at 157-5S. 
1
'Butlcr was apparently hostile to the legal reali>m movement and so appointed a dean 
with a more traditional view of law and legal education. !d. at 161. Douglas' two years at 
Columbia have been described as '·among the most famously intense and troubled in the 
history of American law faculties.'' William W. Bratton, Berte and Means Reconsidaed 1lf 
the Ceutury's Tum, 26 J. CoKP. L. 737,743 12001). 
1
"1n his autobiography. Justice Douglas reports that Hutchins characterized him as "the 
most outstanding law professor" in the country when persuading the University of Chicago 
Board of Trustees to offer Douglas two and one-half times the then top law school salary of 
$10.000. DouGLAS, supra note I 0. at 163-64. 
17ld. al 164. 
:s:\rnoJJ was from Laramie, Wyoming. and thus he and Douglas "were conspicuous 
Westerners in an elite eastern institution.'' SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMOND ARNOLD: A 
BIOGRAPHY 48 (:2005). The two also shared a "passion for the regulatory side of the law," 
unlike most of their Yale colleagues whose focus continued to be the courts and the common 
law. /d. On Arnold's impact on the Antitrust Division, sec, e.g., SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION 
TO PROSECUTE ORGANIZATION AND PUHUC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 28-30, 32-36 
( 1077). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5
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became a recognized expert in corporate law, bankruptcy, and financial institutions 
and produced or helped produce seven casebooks in those areas 19 as well as a bevy of 
law review articles. 20 His scholarship "virtually defin[ed] progressive bankruptcy 
theory in the 1930s."21 
Douglas took a one-semester leave in 1934 to conduct a study on bankruptcy 
reorganizations for the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission, which 
laid the groundwork for an extensive revision of federal bankruptcy law.22 Despite 
stated intentions to the contrary, he would never return to Yale. His rise to national 
prominence in the New Deal would be meteoric. 
At the SEC, Douglas worked for Joseph P. Kennedy, the commission's first 
chairman. They were like-minded about a no-nonsense approach to the 
commission's enforcement responsibilities and became life-long friends and allies.23 
With Kennedy's influence, President Roosevelt appointed Douglas as an SEC 
commissioner in 1936 and then as chairman one year later.24 During this time, he 
became a member of President Roosevelt's inner circle, one of his Sunday night 
poker companions, and an unofficial economic adviser. 
During his tenure as chairman, he took the unprecedented step of taking over the 
New York Stock Exchange for a time after disclosures that the former exchange 
president had misappropriated funds. Earlier he had refused the demand of the 
1
"His casebook on the law of financing business institutions contained a substantial section 
on the law of mergers and acquisitions. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FINANCING OF BUSINESS UNITS 844-47 (1931 ). 
c0See. e.g., William 0. Douglas. Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 
HARV. L. REV. 565 (1934); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, Stock "Brokers" as 
Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46 (1933); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The 
Federal Securities Act of 1933,43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); William 0. Douglas & George E. 
Bates, Some Effects of' the Securities Act Upon lm•estment Banking, I U. CHI. L. REv. 283 
(J 933 ); William 0. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of' Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329 
( 1932 J; George E. Bates & William 0. Douglas, Secondary Distribution of' Securities-
Problems Suggested by Kinney v. Glenny, 41 YALE L.J. 949 (1932); William 0. Douglas & 1. 
Howard Marshall, A Faczual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions, 32 
COLUM. L. REv. 25 (1932); William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, The Business Failures 
Pro)eCl- II. An Analysis of Methods (~llnvestigation, 40 YALE L.J. 1034 (1931); William 
ClarJ.., William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, The Business Failures Project- A Prohlem 
in Methodology, 39 YALE. L.J. 1013 (1930); William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, 
Insulation fron; Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations. 39 YALE L.J. 193 ( 1929); William 
0. Douglas. A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673 
(1929). 
"David A. Skeel. Jr .. Vern Cowztrvman and the Path of Progressive (And Populist) 
Bilnkmptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075. 1080 (2000); Bratton, supra note 15, at 
744. 
22 See Bratton, supra note 15. at 744-50. 
2\)ee SIMON. supra note 9, at 140. 
'
4 See. e.g., MURPHY, supra note 10, at 132-33. 
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exchange to close during a steep sell-off period. He reorganized the SEC to better 
protect the interests of the investor and is generally thought to have been an excellent 
administrator. 25 
In early 1939, the Yale Law School selected Douglas as its next dean. He 
expected to return to New Haven to begin his duties later that year. On February I 3, 
however, Justice Louis Brandeis retired from hi~ seat on the Supreme Court. 
President Roosevelt had earlier announced that the next Supreme Court vacancy 
would go to the west coast, which had not had a Supreme Court justice appointed for 
fourteen years. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes was a chief advocate for 
Douglas and, after establishing his bona fides as a westerner, Douglas got the 
nomination. The Senate confirmed him by a vote of sixty-two to four, with the 
dissenters asserting that he was a reactionary who was too friendly to Wall Street. It 
all happened very quickly: Douglas was nominated on March 19, he was confirmed 
on April 4, and he took his seat on the Court on April 17.26 
He came close to leaving the Court in I 944 for the Democratic vice-presidential 
nomination. President Roosevelt dropped incumbent Henry Wallace from his ticket 
and the choice came down to Harry Truman or Justice Douglas. The convention 
chose Truman, who ascended to the presidency when President Roosevelt died in 
1945. Truman offered Douglas the vice presidency on his ticket in 1948 but Douglas 
declined because he believed Truman would lose the election.27 That was his last 
dalliance with elective office. 
He became a leader of the Warren Court uprising in the 1950s and 1960s and due 
to his long recognized expertise with corporations and business, authored many 
antitrust opinions during that period. In I 970. House Republican leader Gerald Ford, 
with the active support of President Richard Nixon, instigated a Judiciary Committee 
investigation of Douglas' relationship to a couple of left-leaning foundations, with a 
view toward impeachment. The inquiry was likely a politically motivated act to rid 
the Court of its leading liberal and give President Nixon another appointment to the 
Court. 2x The committee inquiry exonerated him and the scheme otherwise backfired 
because, although Douglas had been seriously considering retirement prior to the 
investigation, he would stay on the Court five more years.2Y 
25See SIMON, supra note 9, at 165-89. See also Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas: 
Etpositon!f'the Bankruptcy Law. 16 UCLAL. REV. 773 (1969). 
26The speed of the confirmation process 'eems all the more remarkable today when one 
recalls that the Douglas nomination came only two years after FOR's failed Court-packing 
plan. 
27Justice Douglas was widely reported to have said. "I don't want to play second fiddle to 
a second fiddle." See MURPHY. supra note 10, at 254-55. 
2
xSee SIMON, supra note 9, at 406-07; MURPHY. supra note l 0, at 429-38. 
2YJustice Douglas' private life was controversial with four marriages, with two in his 
sixtie' to women in their early twenties. He had an apparently well-known reputation i:1 
Washington as a womanizer well into his eighth decade. See MURPHY, supra note l 0, at 427-
29. After his fourth marriage. an Alabama congressman called for a House investigation of his 
character, but nothing came of it. See Whitman, supra note 4, at 28. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5
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Justice Douglas continued to serve on the Court until failing health from a 
debilitating stroke forced his retirement on November 12, 1975 after thirty-six and a 
half years on the Court. 30 He died on January 19, 1980 at the age of eighty-one. 
III. DOUGLAS AND LEGAL REALISM 
Justice Douglas was a product of the legal realist movement largely emanating 
from Yale and Columbia in the 1920s and 1930s.31 Surprisingly, viewed from today 
when constitutional and social issues dominate the legal landscape, the early realists 
mostly focused on and impacted private law areas like corporate and commercial 
law. 32 At least one commentator has argued that by the late 1930s, as legal realists 
were moving into positions of real executive and judicial influence, antitrust became 
the principal vehicle for economic and social reform for some, with Douglas chief 
among the reformers. 33 
Legal realism was in large measure a rejection of the Langdellian approach, 
which sought to discover fixed, abstract principles from the case law and apply them 
in an ordered, predictable way to new cases. 34 The Langdellian view prized accurate 
30Although physically debilitated by a stroke suffered on New Year's Eve 1974, Justice 
Douglas insisted that his resignation was a necessary formality but that he had not retired and 
was still a member, the tenth member, of the Supreme Court. He further contended, 
unsuccessfully, that he was still a voting member of the Court on all cases pending when he 
resigned, even writing and circulating an opinion in a campaign finance case. See SIMON, 
supra note 9, at 451-54. 
31 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-92 ( 1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); WILFRED J. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968). 
Although Justice Douglas did not specifically refer to himself as a realist in his autobiography, 
he noted that "[a]t Columbia, revolt against the traditional approach to law was now under 
way .... I joined their ranks." DouGLAS, supra note 10, at 159-60. As early as 1931, Karl 
Llewellyn, one of the leading realists, identified Douglas as one of the movement's most 
dedicated proponents. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1227 ( 1931 ). 
32Leading realists Underhill Moore, Wesley Sturges and Karl Llewellyn were all 
commercial law scholars. See KALMAN, supra note 31, at 20-35; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL 
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 128-40 (1973) (describing Llewellyn's 
transformation of sales law). 
33See William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY 
L.J. I, 4, 23-26, 32-34. 38-40 (1995). Thurman Arnold, a Yale law professor who President 
Roosevelt appointed to head the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in the spring of 
1938, was the legal realist who literally transformed antitrust enforcement. See generally 
Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 569 
(2004); Neil Duxbury, Some Radicalism about Realism? Thurman Arnold and the Politics (~l 
Modern Jurisprudence, I 0 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. II, 34-35 ( 1990); Douglas Ayer, In Quest 
o{ t1ficiency: The Ideological Journey of Thurmond Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. 
L. REV. 1049 (1971); Corwin D. Edwards. Thurman Arnold and the Antitrust Laws, 58 PoL. 
SCI. Q. 338 ( 1943 ); Page, supra, at 19-23. 
34See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, II (1983). The 
"heart" of realism has been broadly described as "an effort to define and discredit classical 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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fact-finding and the analytically precise interpretation and application of legal 
principles.·15 To Justice Douglas. the Langdell "so-called case method" was mere 
"library law" that "grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law" by ignoring 
"other psychological, political, economic, business, [and] social factors" that should 
influence the law and the way legal decisions are made.3" 
Realists tried to close the gap between "law in books" and "law in action."37 
Justice Douglas' principal approach was to endorse "functionalism" while debunking 
the more traditional ·'conceptualism" approach to legal reasoning. Functionalism 
emphasized facts over legal principles. Douglas asserted, for example, that a 
corporation is "not a thing. It is a method. It defies definition when removed from 
the background of the purpose attempted to be accomplished and the manner of 
accomplishing it."3x He argued that "analysis has been so conceptualized that the 
attention is too frequently focused on the device used rather than on the function 
which the device is intended to perform."39 He believed that a functional approach 
would increase legal certainty and thus efficiency by focusing on the law's 
operational effects rather than static rules. 40 
Douglas believed that the functional approach depended on facts, so while an 
academic he conducted empirical research to collect data about business failures to 
set the stage for urging reform of the bankruptcy laws. 41 He also applied 
legal theory and practice and to offer in their place a more philosophically and politically 
enlightened jurisprudence." AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xiii-xiv (William W. Fisher III, 
Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas A. Reed, eds., 1993 ). 
35See, e.g., HowARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 41 ( 1992). 
36Jerome Frank, Democracy and Finance. 54 HARV. L. REV. 905, 907-08 (1941) (book 
review) (quoting William 0. Douglas. Education for the Law. Address Before the American 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (April, 1936 ), in DEMOCRACY AND FiNANCE 280 
(James Allen ed., 1940). 
37 See KALMAN. supra note 31, at 9 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 ( 191 0)). Pound is generally described as a "nonrcalist." 
3
xWilliam 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary 
Corporations, 39 YALEL.J. 193. 194 (1929). 
39William 0. Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 
ILL. L. REV. 673, 675 (1929). 
40/d. at 675-76. See also Douglas & Shanks, supra note 38, at 210; Willia~ 0. Douglas & 
1. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions, 32 
COLUM. L. REv. 25 (1932); William 0. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. 
Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591 (1933 ). 
41 See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, Protectivl! Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 
HARV. L. REV. 565 (1934); William 0. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 
YALE L.J. 329 ( 1932); Douglas & Man,hall supra note 20; Douglas & Thomas, supra note 20; 
Clark, Douglas & Thomas, supra note 20; William 0. Douglas & John H. Weir, Equity 
Receiverships in the United States District CourtjiJr Connecticut: 1920-1929, 4 CoNN. B.J. I 
(1930). 
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functionalism to his courses and casebooks, focusing on the life cycle common to 
every business association-beginning with organizing and financing an enterprise, 
moving to managing it, and concluding with bankruptcy and reorganization.42 The 
casebooks required a complete retooling of the corporate law curriculum into a 
sequence of courses titled losses, management and finance. 41 The academic world, 
even populated by realists, was not ready for such a radical change. The casebooks 
found virtually no takers and left little legacy. 44 
The Court Douglas joined in 1939 was controlled by New Dealers, of whom 
Douglas was one.45 The New Deal was, of course, populated by legal realists intent 
on political reform and economic recovery. 46 It fostered the federal government's 
authority to regulate business a!> it deemed necessary, but at least early on antitrust 
and competition were not prominent tools utilized to combat the Depression.47 In 
fact, scholars have described the entire history of the New Deal and competition as a 
study in contradiction.48 President Franklin Roosevelt himself apparently had doubts 
42See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS. CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS 
UNITS-LOSSES, LIABILITIES, AND ASSETS ( 1932); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. 
SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS UNITS (1931 ); 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
FINANCING OF BUSINESS UNITS ( 1931 ); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW Of CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1931 ). 
43See KALMAN, supra note 31, at 85-86. 
44/d. at 86-87. 
45See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 20 I, 234-35 
(1994). 
460ne leading realist argued that legal realists made New Deal liberalism possible. Jerome 
Frank, Realism in Juri~prudence, 7 AM. L. ScH. REV. 1057, 1063-69 (1934). See also LAURA 
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 17 ( 1996 ); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW 
DEAL LAWYERS 6-9 (1982); G. Edward White, From Sociological Juri.1prudence to Realism: 
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 
( 1972); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.. American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and 
the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424, 436-37 (1969). C.f NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 155-58 ( 1995) (expressing skepticism about the 
impact of realists in the New Deal). 
47See, e.g., RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992 112 
(1996); BERNARD STERNSHER, REXFORD TUGWELL AND THE NEW DEAL 342-43 (1964); 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS Of UPHEAVAL 272-394 
( 1960). 
48The early New Deal emphasized the National Industrial Recovery Act, which was 
intended to restrict production and raise prices, and the promulgation of industry codes 
typically sought to control prices. prevent price discounting, legalize open price systems, limit 
production, and minimize non-price competition. See CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN 
AMERICA: EMPIRE BUILDERS AND THEIR ENEMIES fROM JAY GOULD TO BILL GATES 140-43 
(2000); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND 
WAR Ill (1995); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A 
STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 57-60, 123-24, 136 (1966); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
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about the value of unfettered competition.49 Only with his controversial appointment 
of Thurman Arnold in 1938 to head the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice, did the pendulum swing and antitrust begin to be a force to be reckoned 
with.50 
Although Justice Douglas is often viewed as perhaps the most activist judge in 
our history, it would be wrong to assume that the new justice came to the Court with 
that predisposition. For one thing, judicial activism was precisely what President 
Roosevelt wished to avoid. His New Deal social legislation had frequently run 
headlong into the conservative activism of the existing Court, which delighted in 
striking down his New Deal policies on constitutional grounds. Thus, President 
Roosevelt chose for his first nominations to the Court men who had promoted and 
been engaged in New Deal policies. 51 
Further, the evidence suggests that early on Justice Douglas indeed did exercise 
judicial restraint.52 That restraint was surprisingly but arguably consistent with his 
realist predilections. Douglas believed that judging was inescapably subjective. 
Therefore, restraint was necessary to prevent judges from imposing their own values 
and wills on democratically elected officials. 53 Otherwise, judges would be intruding 
on the responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of government. Of 
course, judicial restraint is much easier when the judges in fact agree with the social 
and regulatory agendas of the executive and legislative branches. President 
Roosevelt selected New Dealers for the Court for expressly that purpose. But as the 
substance of the Court's docket changed after World War II, "Douglas found the lure 
of judicial activism irresistible."54 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940, 56-60, 64-70, 163-65, 248-49, 258 
(1963). There is substantial thinking that the New Deal never really followed or adopted a 
single, coherent vision but is better remembered as a time of conflict and compromise or what 
has been described as a "chaos of experimentation." See PERITZ, supra note 47, at 329 
(quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. ( 1955)). 
49See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER's PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 124 (2003); HAWLEY, supra note 48, at 123-24; REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE 
DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT 563 (1957); Wilson D. Miscamble, Thurman Arnold Goes to 
Washington: A Look at Antitrust Policy in the Later New Deal, 56 Bus. HIST. REv. I, 5 
(1982). 
50See Waller, supra note 33; Miscamble, supra note 49. 
51 Roosevelt's first four nominations were New Deal Senator Hugo Black ( 1937), Solicitor-
General Stanley Reed ( 1938), Harvard law professor and presidential adviser Felix Frankfurter 
( 1939) and chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission William Douglas ( 1939). 
52See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (upholding search without a 
warrant); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 336 (1941) (dissenting from majority's 
application of federal law to state primary election fraud); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound 
Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (dissenting from majority's declaring Arkansas state tax 
of gasoline unconstitutional). 
53 See McKeever, supra note 2, at 441 ( 1990). 
54 See id. at 442. 
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True to his realist's roots, during his long tenure on the Court Justice Douglas 
adapted and evolved, as the nation also changed dramatically after World War II 
with the first steps towards integration and then the rampant excesses of 
McCarthyism. 55 He joined the Court as an expert in corporate finance and 
bankruptcy and was not, initially, at the frontiers of the First Amendment.56 He 
became the most ardent civil libertarian of his time and, the evidence suggests, 
shifted dramatically in other areas such as tax and perhaps labor law. 57 One of his 
former law clerks has suggested that Douglas may have changed more while on the 
Court than any other Supreme Court justice with a lengthy tenure. 58 
In contrast, however, and perhaps not surprisingly given his early academic and 
government work in bankruptcy and securities, there seems to be less change in 
those fields. 5Y And it would appear from this study that Justice Douglas was 
predictably consistent in the antitrust field, even though the quality of his opinions 
was uneven at best. 
Justice Douglas' antitrust philosophy was heavily influenced by the man he 
replaced on the Court, Justice Louis Brandeis. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Brandeis were Douglas' judicial heroes, and Brandeis, Douglas claimed, was his 
mentor.60 Douglas himself acknowledged that Brandeis "helped crystallize fmy] 
views" on "the free enterprise system."" 1 Brandeis' influential book, Other People's 
Money,62 became Douglas' economic and political bible."3 In a 1936 letter written to 
55See generally L.A. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendmeni, 
McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 267 (1989). 
56See generally L.A. Powe. Jr .. Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First 
Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371 ( 1974). 
57 See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES ( 1975) (suggesting a profound shift towards the 
taxpayer and perhaps in labor law as well). 
58 See Po we, supra note 56, at 372, 410. 
SYSee John W. Hopkirk, William 0. Douglas-His Work in Policing Bankruptcy 
Proceedings, 18 V AND. L. REV. 663, 698 ( 1965) ("William 0. Douglas' major contributions to 
the field of bankruptcy law are marked by a high degree of continuity in approach and in 
solutions."); see also Vern Countryman. Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law. 
16 UCLA L. REV. 773 ( 1969); Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on 
Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 ( 1964 ). 
60See MURPHY, supra note I 0, at 183. 188. But see id. at 574 (suggesting that Justice 
Douglas' claimed relationship with Brandeis before Douglas succeeded him on the Court was 
overblown or false). 
01 DoUGLAS, supra note 10, at 306. See also WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF 
LIBERTY 187-89 (1954). 
62LoUIS D. BRANDEIS. OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY ( 1913 ). 
63See, e.g., Leon Epstein. Ecollomic Predilections of Justice Douglas, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 
531' 560 ( 1949). 
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Brandeis while Douglas was chairman of the SEC, Douglas described Other 
People's Money as a "monumental work" which "has been a guiding star and 
inspiration .... "64 References to Brandeis would make their way into Douglas· 
judicial opinions more than once.65 
Central to Justice Brandeis' economic philosophy was "the curse of bigness" 
which posited that nothing good and everything bad came from large corporations 
and unchecked corporate growth. To Justice Douglas. this curse was "a blight on the 
industrial world."66 His assumption was that companies gained size "not in the 
interest of efficiency but largely in the interest of monopoly."r'7 According to 
Douglas, large companies cannot be run efficiently because they outgrow the 
competence of management to manage effectively .6K 
Of course, both of those premises are the polar opposite of much of today's 
Chicago School philosophy that growth and even monopoly power is often achieved 
through innovation, the development of new and better products, and because the 
dominant firm is simply more efficient than its competition. Thus, the emphasis. 
they assert, is that antitrust should focus on market performance rather than market 
structure. r'9 
Justice Douglas, however, thought it was just a bad idea, as a matter of policy. to 
permit such wealth and financial power in the hands of so few. In his view. the 
decisions of those few could tip the national scales towards prosperity or 
depression.7° Further, Douglas cautioned that unabated bigness threatened our 
capitalistic and free enterprise system because it threatened competition, individual 
initiative and freedom of opportunity. 71 He believed it would transform "a nation or 
shopkeepers" into ''a nation of clerks," which would stifle individual initiative and 
independence. 72 
64See THE DOUGLAS LETTERS 35 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Philip E. Urofsky eds., 1987). 
65See, e.g., United States v. Columbia. Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534-36 ( 1948) (Douglas, 
1., dissenting) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 
OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 105, 114-15, 120-21 (1934) (discussed infra notes 179-85)). 
66DouGLAS, supra note 61, at 187. 
6s5 ee DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 14 (James Allen ed., 1940); DoUGLAS, supra note 61, at 
187. 
69See, e.g., William G. Shepard, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust Enj(JI"cement, 35 
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 917, 922-23 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School '!{Antitrust 
Analysis. 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). 
70DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE. supra note 68, at 15. 
72/d.; see also DouGLAS, supra note 61, at 187. 
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Even beyond that, Ju;.tice Douglas believed that large corporations fostered 
dishonesty and ·'resulted in ruthless sacrifices of human values."73 They are so 
impersonal and remote from their investors, Douglas argued, that management feels 
free to serve themselves rather than the enterprise they work for. 'There can be no 
question that the laxity in business morals has a direct relationship to the size of 
business.''74 One can almost see him saying "I told you so" after the recent Enron. 
W orldCom and other corporate scandals. 75 
Justices Douglas and Brandeis did part company with respect to resale price 
maintenance. While Douglas favored the per se rule for any type of vertical price 
fixing and cited the historic Dr. Miles decision with approval,76 Brandeis thought that 
Dr. Miles was wrongly decided. He believed, along with Justice Holmes, who 
famously dissented in that case,77 that producers of goods should be able to control 
their prices to market.7x Douglas, in contrast, was concerned about protecting the 
small businessman, who often was a distributor or retailer subject to manufacturer 
price controls.79 
The two also appeared to disagree about the impact on competition of 
information exchanges by competitors. Justice Douglas was so protective of the 
price mechanism that he was likely to find any exchange of price information, no 
matter how informal or infrequent, illegal.xo In contrast, Justice Brandeis believed 
that some data exchange, including price in some instances, could be necessary to 
allow competition to proceed with the lights on.x 1 But those differences do not 
73DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 68, at 15-16. 
74/d. at 16. 
75 But of course. many huge corporations, even monopolists, are free from scamlal and 
many smaller companies are not. 
76See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co .. 390 U.S. 145, 154 ( 1961\) (Douglas, J ., concurring); 
White Motor Co. v. United States. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
77Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 37.3, 412 ( 1912) (Holmes, L 
dissenting) ("!cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this cou1t permitting 
knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair. if 
not to destroy. the production and the sale of articles which it is assumeu to be Jesirahle that 
the public should he able to get."). 
78See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS- A PROFESSION 243, 245. (1914) ("Why should one 
middleman have the power to depreciate in the public mind the value of the maker's hranu and 
render it unprofitable not only for the maker hut for other middlemen'?"). 
79See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (Douglas, J.. concurring): 
White Motor Co. v. United States. 372 U.S. 253 ( 1963): Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United 
States. 337 U.S. 293. 315 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Paramount 
Pictures. Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 (1948). 
xoSee United States v. Container Corp. of Am .. 393 U.S. 333 ( 1969 ). 
x1See. e.g., Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377. 413 (1921) 
(Brandeis. J., dissenting). 
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significantly diminish the influence of Brandeis on Douglas with regard to the evils 
of economic concentration. 
Justice Douglas' business philosophy was also heavily influenced by the 
iconoclastic economist and social critic Thorstein Veblen who viewed financial 
institutions and investors with great skepticism and distrust.82 So did Douglas, 
characterizing as "financial termites" those opportunists who prey on other people's 
money and destroy the legitimate function of finance and investment. 83 Among the 
several factors that provided hospitable conditions for the termites were the curse of 
bigness and the centralization of financial power. 84 
Justice Brandeis and Veblen undoubtedly influenced Justice Douglas' efforts to 
reform Wall Street in the 1930s, where he sought to protect legitimate investors and 
reduce the influence of Wall Street bankers and lawyers, as well as his views on the 
proper goals of the antitrust laws. And while the New Deal is famous (infamous?) 
for the expansion of the federal government as a cure for society's ills, Douglas 
seemed to resist direct government intervention in both areas.85 He believed in the 
merits of capitalism, which was deeply rooted from his boyhood in Yakima, but was 
suspicious of its manifestations and excesses.86 His belief in individual initiative and 
opportunity fostered a view that the antitrust laws should protect competitors. If the 
antitrust laws could not do the job, then he viewed government regulation as 
necessary to cure the curse of bigness. 87 
IV. PRICE FIXING 
It is no small irony that Justice Douglas' first antitrust opinion was his best and 
was most influentia\.88 It came in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.,89 when 
82See, e.g., Max Lerner, Wall Street's New Mentor, THE NATION, Oct. 23, 1937, at 429; 
HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT-HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM 0. 
DOUGLAS AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 45 (1992). Veblen's best known 
works are his The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (1899) and 
The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904). It was he who coined the term "conspicuous 
consumption." 
83DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 68, at I, 8, 44. 
84/d. at 14-15. 
85See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 21, at 1092 ("Douglas's vision for progressive reform meant 
breaking the grip of the Wall Street bankers and lawyers and protecting investors-not direct 
government control."). 
86See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 538. 
87/d. at 560. 
88See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Mr. Justice Douglas' Contribution to the Law-Business 
Regulation, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 366, 366-67 (1974) ("Without doubt, Justice Douglas' greatest 
contribution to antitrust was his 1940 opinion in the Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. case ... that 
opinion ... laid the foundation for the development of an effective antitrust policy for the last 
three decades."); see also PERITZ, supra note 47, at 173 (describing Socony-Vacuum as 
"[p ]erhaps the best known and most ruthless evocation of the consumer"). 
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Douglas had been on the Court scarcely a year. and involved a significant 
government enforcement action against eight major oil companies accused of 
conspiring to increase the so-called spot market price for gasoline.90 The defendants 
sold large amounts of gasoline to jobbers and, in eighty percent of those transactions, 
the price was dependent on the spot market price. An oversupply of gasoline, 
however, resulted in smaller independent refiners dumping surplus or distress 
gasoline on the market, significantly reducing the spot market price. 
To remedy the situation, the defendants agreed to purchase distress gas from the 
independents to stop it from affecting the spot market price. Pursuant to the 
conspiracy, each defendant had "dancing partners," independent oil companies 
assigned to the defendants for the purchase of their distress gasoline. 91 
Justice Douglas' recitation of the complex facts was considerably more detailed, 
forming a substantial part of his nearly 100-page opinion. 92 Although the law was 
anything but settled, Douglas boldly declared the defendant's scheme unlawful per 
se, reversing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a 5-2-2 opinion (Chief Justice 
89United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Thurman Arnold, in his 
second year as head of the Antitrust Division, argued the appeal himself. Arnold, of course, 
would become legendary as the Antitrust Division chief who transformed the division and 
greatly increased government enforcement of antitrust. See Waller, supra note 33. He was 
also Justice Douglas' former colleague, drinking buddy and neighbor when the two taught at 
Yale together in the early 1930s and remained one of Douglas' closest friends in Washington. 
See MURPHY, supra note 10, at 81, 91-92, 507; SIMON, supra note 9, at 116-19, 179 nn.229-
30; DOUGLAS, supra note I 0, at 167-69, 171-72 (describing Arnold as "a brilliant lawyer and 
wild and wonderful companion"). 
One of the ironies of Socony- Vacuum is that Justices Douglas and Arnold, two former 
New Dealers, were so instrumental in its decision, which dramatically cut against the 
underlying policies of the National Recovery Act and the New Deal. See WALLER, supra note 
18, at 98. 
9~he case had a long, tortured history. The original indictments were brought in late 
I 936 and encompassed much of the oil industry. After a number of guilty and nolo contendre 
pleas, twenty-six companies and forty-six individuals went to trial. Over I 00 lawyers 
represented the defendants. The trial court dismissed the case against ten companies and 
sixteen individuals. The remaining defendants were found guilty by the jury, although the trial 
judge granted new trials to some of the defendants and dismissed the charges against some 
others. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 165 n.l. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit granted new 
trials to all the remaining defendants on the grounds that informal arrangement was not illegal 
per se and that the trial judge had thus given improper jury instructions as well as improperly 
excluding much of the defendants' proffered evidence. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 105 F.2d 809, 832-33 (7th Cir. 1930), rev'd, 310 U.S. 150 ( 1940). 
91 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 179-80. 
92Justice Roberts observed that "[t]he opinion fully and fairly sets forth the facts proved at 
the trial, and to its statement nothing need be added." !d. at 255 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
Douglas' former colleague at Yale, Walter Hamilton. was more eloquent in his stylistic praise 
of the opinion: 
The Court may insist upon a clean-cut separation between "the recitation of facts" and 
the "conclusions of law"; and Mr. 1 ustice Douglas may, in an elaborate opinion, which 
is virtually a Papal Bull to the bishops of the judicial dioceses, give a superb 
demonstration of how it is done. 
Walter H. Hamilton & George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 
YALEL.J. 1319, 1370 (1941) (citing Soconv-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150). 
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Hughes and Justice Murphy not participating). In doing so, Douglas made it clear 
that per se price fixing included any agreement or combination formed to affect 
prices, even if the agreement did not fix a specific or uniform price.93 Thus, a 
conspiracy that "tampers with the price structure" is per se unlawful.9• The 
defendants attempt to stabilize the spot market price by reducing oversupply in effect 
created a price floor which was illegal price fixing. Douglas rejected any notions of 
reasonableness or the elimination of so-called competitive evils, noting that to do so 
would open the door to a reasonableness argument in every price fixing case, thus 
emasculating the Sherman Act. which he regarded as Congress' "charter of 
freedom."95 
Although these notions are well settled today, they are so largely because of 
Socony- Vacuum. At that time, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 96 was the 
strongest horizontal price fixing precedent extant, but had fallen short of establishing 
an unequivocal per se rule primarily because the defendants collectively shared 
eighty-two percent of the market. Although the Trenton Potteries Court rejected the 
defendant's reasonable price defense,97 it did limit its condemnation to "those 
controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business."98 Further, the conspiracy 
involved "uniform" prices (prices fixed literally and specifically), rather than the 
type of collective action in Socony- Vacuum which merely influenced prices by the 
removal of part of the market supply. 
Further, at the time of Socony- Vacuum, Justice Douglas had the inexplicable 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States case,99 decided only seven years earlier, to 
contend with. There, in an industry plagued with excess capacity, 137 coal 
producers accounting for twelve percent of the national production and up to 
seventy-five percent of the regional market formed an exclusive selling agent to sell 
their coal "at the best prices obtainable and, if all cannot be sold, to apportion orders 
upon a stated basis .... " 100 Although the defendant apparently sought government 
93Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222. 223 ("Nor is it important that the prices paid by the 
combination were not fixed in the sense that they were uniform and inflexible . . . . Under the 
Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, 
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is 
illegal per se."). 
94/d. at 224. 
95 !d. at 220-21. 
%United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 ( 1927). 
97 !d. at 397. 
<>X ld. at 398. See also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK Of THE LAW Of ANTrTRUST 183 
( 1977). Professor Sullivan also noted that while Trenton Potteries rejects reasonableness as a 
defense to price fixing, it does not exclude the possibility that other non-competitive societal 
goals might sometimes weigh in as a defense. !d. at 184. 
99Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
100/d. at 358. 
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approval before commencing operations. not surprisingly, the Antitrust Division 
responded by obtaining an injunction. asserting that the plan would eliminate 
competition among the individual coal producers and substantially effect the price of 
bituminous coal. 101 
The Supreme Court. in an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes, reversed 
the district court's injunction. 102 It refused to concede that defendants' plan would 
fix prices and held that the government had failed to establish that any affect on 
prices would be "detrimental to fair competition." 103 To justify its conclusion, the 
Court referred to Trenton Potteries. where the defendants had collectively dominated 
the market, to distinguish the situation before it. 104 The Court, however, did leave 
itself an escape clause, holding that since the case was tried in advance of 
implementation of defendants' scheme, the government could return to court if their 
actual operation proved to be an undue restraint of trade. 105 
Thus, in writing the Socony- Vacuum decision, Justice Douglas was faced with the 
seven-year-old Appalachian Coals decision with its clear interpretation that Trenton 
Potteries was limited to situations in which the alleged price fixers dominated the 
market. And while Appalachian Coals is today often written off as an outgrowth of 
the New Deal's National Recovery Act response to the Great Depression, 106 Socony-
Vacuum was born of the same era in a likewise fundamental fuel supply industry 
with an identical problem, overcapacity for the present demand. 107 Although the 
conspiratorial "solution" in the cases differed, both involved plans designed to 
collectively remove excess supply from the market. 
101 United States v. Appalachian Coals, Inc., I F. Supp. 339,349 (W.D. Va. 1932). 
102Justice McReynolds dissented but did not write an opinion. Appalachian Coals, 288 
U.S. at 378. 
103 /d. at 373. The Court went on to say that "Ia] cooperative [e]nterprise, otherwise free 
from objection, which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is not to be condemned as an 
undue restraint merely because it may effect a change in market conditions, where the change 
would be in mitigation of recognized evils and would not impair, but rather foster, fair 
competitive opportunities." !d. at 373-74. 
104/d. at 375. It also ruled that the elimination of competition among the 137 producer 
defendants was not sufficient to violate Section I since most of the coal that defendants 
produced was sold outside their region where they faced additional competition. /d. at 375-76. 
105/d. at 377-78. 
106See, e.g .. C. PAUL ROGERS IlL STEPHEN CALKINS, MARK PATI'ERSON & WILLIAM R. 
ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 246 (4th ed. 2008); STEPHEN F. ROSS, 
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 133 ( 1992). 
107Indeed, in both cases the defendants sought government assistance to develop and 
initiate their plans to reduce serious oversupply problems as pait of the New Deal's National 
Recovery Act. Compure Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 364-65 
(1933) with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 171-73 (1940). In 
Soconv-Vacuum, Justice Douglas flatly rejected the argument that the government's 
(Petroleum Administrative Board) knowledge or even acquiescence in the "dancing partner" 
scheme was a defense. Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-28. 
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Thus, one might assume the second youngest man ever appointed to the Supreme 
Court might be reluctant to draft such a sweeping opinion, given Appalachian Coals 
and the deference such a junior justice would seemingly give his new brethren. Of 
course, New Deal politics suggests otherwise. Much had happened in the 
intervening seven years between the Appalachian Coals and Socony- Vacuum 
decisions. The Franklin Roosevelt presidency had inherited a Supreme Court 
occupied by Justices Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, James C. McReynolds and 
George Sutherland, who together would come to be known as "the Four Horsemen" 
for their ironclad and uniform opposition to the legislative reforms of the New 
Deal. 108 Their obstinacy precipitated President Roosevelt's infamous Court-packing 
plan, which went up in smoke in 1937. 109 As it turned out, however, all was not lost 
as, through normal attrition, President Roosevelt was able to appoint Justice Hugo 
Black in 1937 to succeed the retiring Justice Willis Van Devanter, and Felix 
Frankfurter and Douglas in 1939, to replace Justices Cardozo and Brandeis, 
respectively. 110 Thus, began what is widely referred to as the "Judicial 
Revolution." 111 
In writing the sweeping Socony- Vacuum opinion, Justice Douglas did have to 
deal with Appalachian Coals. He did not do so very convincingly, although that is 
not to say anyone else could have done better in dealing with that aberrant decision. 
According to Douglas, the cases had little in common except for "the presence in 
each of so-called demoralizing or injurious practices." 112 He characterized the 
collective action in each as "quite divergent" since the Appalachian Coals plan "was 
1118See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 5. at 178-99. Learned Hand, in contrast, dubbed Justices 
Brandeis, Cardozo. and Stone, who distrusted the New Deal but did not uniformly oppose it, 
the 'Three Musketeers." /d. at 211. 
1090f course, the mercurial Justice Owen Roberts probably played an important role in 
heading off the Court-packing plan when he switched his vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), resulting in a 5-4 decision upholding the constitutionality of the 
National Labor Relations Act. A year earlier, in a very similar case, he had joined the Four 
Horsemen in striking down the Act. Roberts' position change became known as "the switch in 
time that saved nine." For a full account of the Court-packing plan, see JOSEPH ALSOP & 
TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS ( 1938 ). See also GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE 
JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 161-73 ( 1977); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 205-
19 (1994). 
11110ne Justice Douglas biographer observed that by the time Douglas was sworn in on 
April 17, 1939, "it was clear that Roosevelt had lost the Court-packing plan but won the 
Court." SIMON, supra note 9, at 199. 
111 See Hamilton & Braden, supra note 92. Of course, most of the attention on the "new" 
Court concerned its expansion of civil liberties, shift in constitutional theory, and expansion of 
the role of the federal government. See, e.g., Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., Constitutional 
Interpretation and Judicial Se!rRestraint, 39 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1940); Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Revolution in the Supreme Court, 166 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 85 (1940); Thomas Reed Powell, 
Changing Constitutional Phases, 19 B.U. L. REV. 509 (1939); Frank J. Hogan, Important 
Shifts in Constitutional Doctrine. 25 A.B.A. J. 629 (1939). See also DUNNE, supra note 109. 
112Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 216. 
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not designed to operate vis-a-vis the general consuming market and to fix the prices 
on that market." 113 He further characterized the Appalachian Coal plan as "not only 
incidental but also highly conjectural" because it was entirely prospective. 114 
These are at best make-weight distinctions. It is impossible to explain how a 
scheme to remove distress coal from the supply of coal to be sold to coal consumers 
such as public utilities differs in any meaningful way from a scheme to remove 
distress gasoline from the supply of gasoline sold to jobbers or middlemen. Can the 
effect on the "general consuming market" for gasoline somehow differ from that for 
coal? Further, the so-called prospective nature of the coal scheme is a distinction 
without a difference. Justice Douglas was happy to apply basic economic analysis, 
not to mention general common sense, to the facts of Socony-Vacuum. If part of the 
supply is removed from a market, the price, given constant demand, will tend to 
increase. Application of the same fundamental truths in Appalachian Coals would 
have led inalterably to the same foolproof prediction. 115 
Of course, Justice Douglas' Socony- Vacuum opinion effectively overrules, not 
distinguishes Appalachian Coals. 116 In reality, Douglas dismantled the "excessive" 
competition argument accepted by the Court in Appalachian Coals. 117 In doing so, 
he harkened back to the early cartel cases such as United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Association 118 and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 119 in which the 
Court had early on rejected ruinous competition defenses in favor of the free 
market. 120 According to Douglas, if allowed, competitive abuses would be proffered 
113/d. Justice Douglas' nod to consumers in attempting to distinguish Appalachian Coals 
is not without irony since he so often sought to protect competitors, particularly small 
inefficient ones, at the ultimate expense of consumers. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 
U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 
253 (1963); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); see infra text 
accompanying notes 494-518. 
114Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 216. 
115Jn Appalachian Coals, the whole reason for the plan was to reduce supply and eliminate 
"destructive competition" between 137 coal producers. 288 U.S. at 359. 
116Accord Ross, supra note 106, at 131. 
117Justice Douglas noted that every cartel could proffer a ruinous competition justification 
and flatly rejected the notion that competition could be sufficiently "ruinous" to be against the 
public interest as embodied in the Sherman Act. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 22 I. 
munited States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See also United 
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, I 71 U.S. 505 ( 1898). 
119United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899). 
120Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 332; Addyston Pipe, 85 Fed. at 283. 
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as a justification for every price fixing conspiracy, in direct contradiction to the free 
market philosophy underlying the Sherman Act. 121 
Justice Douglas. however, was not content to end with a reaffirmation of Trans-
Missouri and A;fdvston Pipe & Steel. Instead, in dicta in his now famous footnote 59 
he made it clear that the per se rule for price fixing did not require a showing of 
market power or dominance. 122 With this dictum. Douglas usefully closed the door 
left ajar in Trenton Potteries. m He did not stop there. however, but went on to write 
that a conspiracy that has the purpose or intent to affect prices is all that is necessary 
for Sherman Act condemnation, even where no "overt act" or actual affect is 
shown. 124 Thus, a mere conspiracy to fix prices. as that term is broadly defined in the 
opinion. violates Section I even if effect is lacking. 
As a result of the footnote 59 dicta, the per se rule for price fixing is both 
simplified and significantly expanded. 125 Proof of market power is dispensed with 
and either a purpose (or intent) to fix prices or a purpose and effect on prices brings 
on the per se rule. 126 
With the broad, sweeping dicta of footnote 59, Justice Douglas began to sow the 
seeds of a reputation as an activist judge. Douglas could have written the Socony-
Vacuum decision by reference to Trenton Potteries. Trans-Missouri, and Addyston 
Pipe & Steel and by distinguishing Appalachian Coals, as he unconvincingly tried to 
do. The only doctrinal expansion necessary to support the result in the case had to 
do with expanding the definition of price fixing beyond literal or actual fixed prices. 
In subsequent decisions, Justice Douglas reaffirmed his expansive interpretation 
of price fixing. 127 In his view, "lp]rice fixing in any form is perhaps the most 
powerful of all inducements for abandonment of competition." 128 
121 Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 220-21. 
122/d. at 224 n.59. See also, e.,;., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, 
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 130 (4th ed. 2003). 
12
-'-'il'e sources cited supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
I.' 1"1A I conspiracy to fix prices violates !Section] I of the Act though no overt act is 
shown. though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for 
accomplishment of their objective ... :· Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. 
125See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American and American Business 
Ahmad TodaY. 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251, 1256 ( 1995 ), characterizing footnote 59 as 
"formulating the strictest possible per se condemnation of agreements between competitors 
affecting the pricing mechanism." 
126That leaves so-called ·'effect only"' cases, in which there is no proof of purpose or intent 
to fix prices. as the only pos-;ible circumstances for application of the rule of reason and 
consideration of justifications for the restraint. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys .. Inc., 441 U.S. I ( 1979); Nat' I Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679 (IY78) 
1
''See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143 (1948) (majority 
opinion condemning a horizontal price fixing conspiracy to fix the prices of first run movies); 
United States v. Masonite Corp .. 316 U.S. 265 (1942) (majority opinion holding that 
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He expressed similar sentiments in United States v. National Association of Real 
Estate Roards, in vvhich the Court considered whether real estate commissions fixed 
by a real estate board were simply fees or could be considered wages and thus under 
the labor exemption. 1 "~ Justice Douglas, writing for a six-judge majority with two 
judges not participating, ruled that price fixing prohibitions applied to services as 
well as goods and that prices fixed by the board were fees, not wages, because real 
estate brokers are independent entrepreneurs, not employees. 130 As a result, he 
rejected defendants' assertion that the fixed commissions should fall within the 
statutory labor law exemption. He also took pains to characterize defendants' 
actions as illegal price fixing, even though they were authorized by the board's "code 
of ethics" and were "non-mandatory" in the sense that defendants imposed no 
penalties for deviation from the prescribed fee percentage. 
Justice Douglas also again rejected any consideration of the relevance of a 
reasonableness defense, writing: 
It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular settings price-
fixing serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown either by 
adherence to a price schedule or by proof of consensual action, fixing the 
uniform or minimum price. is in itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no 
matter what end it was designed to serve. 131 
Thus, he at once applied price fixing to the rendering of personal services, again 
shut the door to reasonableness arguments, and made it clear that exceptions were 
not lightly or easily to be allowed. 132 
Justice Douglas took his view that the Sherman Act was "the charter of freedom" 
quite literally, generally refusing to allow the Sherman Act to be displaced by other 
legislation. For example, in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
Douglas, writing for a 6-3 majority, ruled that the non-signor provision in the 
restrictive licensing by patent holder amounted to price fixing); Wayne Pump Co. v. United 
States, 317 U.S. 200. 210 ( 1942) (dissenting against the dismissal of a criminal price fixing 
complaint for insufficiency and indefiniteness). 
12x united States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 ( 1948) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
He went on to state: 
/d. 
[Price fixing] ot'fen, security and stability; it eliminates much of the uncertainty of 
competitive practices; it promises high profits. It is therefore one of the most effective 
devices to regiment whole industries and exact a monopoly price from the public. The 
benefits of competition disappear. The prices charged by the regimented industry are 
determined not by representatives of the public ... but by private parties who incline 
to charge all the traffic will bear. 
129United States v. Nat'! Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950). 
1 w/d. at 490-91. 
111 /d. at 489. 
112See Note. Price-Fixing <!( Sen·ices Under the Sherman Act, 45 ILL. L. REV. 115, 120 
( 1950). 
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Louisiana fair trade law, which purportedly bound all retailers to maintain retail 
prices fixed by a manufacturer once one retailer signed an agreement to do so, was 
not authorized by the federal Miller-Tydings Act, which exempted state authorized 
resale price agreements from the Sherman Act. 133 
The Schwegmann decision, which today because of the repeal of the Miller-
Tydings Act in 1975 is of historical interest only, "was met with banner headlines, 
wailing, rejoicing, and some retail bedlam." 134 It effectively denuded the 
effectiveness of state fair trade price fixing since non-signers could not be bound to 
the established price and could thus cut prices without violating state law. 135 
Schwegmann was decided on May 21, 1951, and by May 28, Macy's Department 
Store in New York City, a perennial non-signer, had cut prices six percent on about 
6,000 consumer items. Long-time rival Gimbel's and every other major New York 
department store quickly followed suit. 136 
Congress, however, quickly acted to rehabilitate state fair trade law, passing the 
McGuire Act in 1952. That Act sanctioned state non-signer provisions, effectively 
overruling Schwegmann. 137 Both the McGuire Act and Miller-Tydings Act were 
133Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The Miller-
Tydings Act was passed in 1937 to amend the Sherman Act in response to wholesaler and 
retailer objections to the condemnation of vertical price fixing under Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). By 1941 all but Vermont, Texas, and 
Missouri had enacted fair trade statutes which provided, in substance, that there was nothing 
illegal about a contract specifying the resale price of a trade-marked or similarly identified 
commodity. The state laws also specified that knowingly advertising or selling a commodity 
at less than the specified price amounted to unfair competition and gave rise to a right of 
action by any injured party. See ROBERT PITOFSKY, ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 643 (5th ed. 2003). 
134 See James A. Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action and the Antitrust Laws: 
Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349, 350 (1951) ("the 
most spectacular trade regulation decision in years"); John P. Frank, The United States 
Supreme Court Term: I950-5I, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 175 (1952) ('The Schwegmann case 
created a sensation."). 
135See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 
147, 156 n.47 (1978). 
136Alfred R. Zipser, Jr., Macy's Cuts Prices 6% on 'Fixed' Items; A 'War' is Foreseen, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1951, at I. Apparently the price war remained front page news for week 
afterwards. See Frank, supra note 134, at 176. Department store retail price-cutting also 
"broke loose" in Detroit and Denver as stores scrambled to reduce high inventories. Rahl, 
supra note 134, at 350 n.S. 
137McGuire Bill, Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat. 632 (1952); 15 U.S.C. * 45 (2006). 
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repealed by Congress in 1975, however, effectively sending state fair trade laws 
packing. 138 
In reaching his conclusion in Schwegmann, Justice Douglas relied heavily upon 
the legislative history of the Miller-Tydings Act in concluding that the Act did not 
include non-signers. That he got it wrong was made clear by the Report of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which accompanied the 
McGuire Act. 139 Even his fellow realist and former colleague at Yale, John Frank, 
found that "as a bit of statutory construction, the case was, to put it sedately, 
novel .... " 140 
A close look at Justice Douglas' statutory construction in Schwegmann does 
reveal some judicial sleight of hand. He begins by noting that the language of the 
Miller-Tydings Act sanctioned only state-authorized contracts or agreements 
prescribing minimum prices for resale. 141 The normal and customary meaning of 
"contracts or agreement," he asserted, does not include non-signers to state-
authorized resale price maintenance schemes. 142 In referring to the legislative 
history, however, he notes the House Report specifically mentioned non-signers as 
within the ambit of the bill. He concludes, however, that the House Report should 
not control because the bill that the report endorsed was later amended before it 
became law. 143 The minor language changes in the amendment had nothing to do, 
138By that time, at least twenty-four state supreme courts had held their state fair trade 
laws unconstitutional in toto or with respect to the nonsigner provision, and six state 
legislatures had repealed at least the non-signer portion of their law. See MILTON HANDLER, 
ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 574-80 (1975). 
139The primary purpose of the [McGuire] bill is to reaffirm the very same proposition 
which, in the committee's opinion, the Congress intended when to enact into law when 
it passed the Miller-Tydings Act. ... The end result of the [Schwegmann] decision has 
been seriously to undermine the effectiveness of the Miller-Tydings Act and, in tum, 
of the fair-trade Jaws enacted by 45 States. HR 5767, as amended, is designed to 
restore the effectiveness of these acts by making it abundantly clear that Congress 
means to Jet State fair-trade Jaws apply in their totality; that is, with respect to non-
signers as well as signers. 
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1437 at 1-2 (1952). See also Hudson Distribs. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 
386,391-92 (1964). 
14
°Frank, supra note 134, at 175. 
141 Schwegmann Bros .. 341 U.S. at 387-88. 
142/d. at 388. 
143/d. at 392-93. 
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however, with the non-signer coverage urged in the House Report, 144 despite 
Douglas' weak attempt to say that it did. 145 
Although fair trade legislation was largely the product of small retailers who 
believed themselves undercut by larger rivals, particularly chain store outlets, 146 
Justice Douglas' aversion to price fixing, even of the vertical variety, was stronger 
than his sympathy for the independent retailer. For it was the larger retailers, such as 
Macy's and Gimbel's, that were likely to be the non-signers. One might conclude 
that in fact Douglas was exhibiting a pro-consumer bias, since by protecting non-
signers he left the way open for continuing price cutting. 147 
Justice Douglas' anathema to price fixing showed itself in patent cases as well, 
although his dislike of the rights flowing from patent law was perhaps even 
stronger. 148 In United States v. Line Material Co., 149 for example, he agreed with the 
Court that a patentee could not use a cross-licensing agreement to control the price of 
another patented article. As he made clear, however, in a concurrence joined by 
144
"[0]ther conditions" was deleted from language which formerly read "nothing herein 
contained shall render illegal contracts, or agreements prescribing minimum prices or other 
conditions for the resale of" specified commodities. /d. at 386. 
145See Frank, supra note 134, at 176 (noting that Justice Douglas' argument was 
"weakened by the fact that the language changes had no perceptible relation to the minimum 
price clauses here in issue"). Justices Jackson and Minton concurred but slammed Douglas for 
his selective use of legislative history to support his result. Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 
395-96 (Jackson. J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Black and Burton, 
vigorously dissented and attached both the House and Senate Reports to establish that 
Congress clearly intended non-signers to be covered. /d. at 397 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
146See, e.g., A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 293-
99 (2d ed. 1970); GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRN W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE 
ENTERPRISE 321-25 (1951 ); Rahl, supra note 134, at 351-52. 
147The decision also suggests that Justice Douglas prefers federal over state economic 
regulation since his reading of the legislative history of the Miller-Tydings Act is that 
Congress needs to be crystal clear when delegating economic regulatory authority to the states. 
Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 395. 
148See infra text accompanying notes 237-55. See also Justice Douglas' majority opinions 
in FunkBrothers Seed Co. v. Kalb lnoculallf Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), General Electric Co. v. 
Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242 (1945), Me1wid Corp. v. Mid-Continent 
Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator 
Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), Cuno 
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941 ). See also Special Equip. 
Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370,380 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting). q: Transparent-Wrap Mach. 
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). See also Epstein, supra note 63, at 558-
59. 
149United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
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three other justices, 150 he would go further and invalidate the ability of the patent 
holder to control the price charged by licensees. 151 
In his view, the patent laws, through their silence on the issue, did not authorize 
price-fixing agreements. 152 The Court had, by permitting the patent holder to fix 
prices, "saddled the economy with a vicious monopoly." 153 According to Justice 
Douglas, when the patentee controls the price charged by licensees, "fc]ompetition 
tends to become impaired not by reason of the public's preference for the patented 
article but because of the preference of competitors for price fixing and for the 
increased profits which that method of doing business promises." 154 
In his concurrence in Line Material, Justice Douglas took pains to characterize 
price fixing as "perhaps the most powerful of all inducements for abandonment of 
competition.'' 155 It is clear that he still felt that way twenty-one years later when he 
wrote for the Court in United States v. Container Corporation of America. 156 That 
case involved a challenge to a practice in the corrugated container industry of 
providing price quotes to competitors when asked. The price exchanges were 
characterized as infrequent and irregular but Douglas, writing for a 5-3-1 majority, 
made short work of finding a violation of Section 1. 157 In doing so, he managed to 
inject great confusion and uncertainly into the state of the law. 
The main difficulty is that the opinion is so vague and conclusive that one is left 
guessing as to whether the Court has just articulated a new per se rule or applied the 
rule of reason. 158 First, Justice Douglas characterized the case as within the per se 
150/d. at 315. They were Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge. 
151 /d. Justice Douglas acknowledged that to do so would necessitate overruling prior 
decisions such as United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), and Bement v. 
National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
152Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 318. 
153/d. at 318. He went on to observe that "[b]y protecting [the patent holder] against 
competition from low-cost producers, it strengthens and enlarges his monopoly." !d. at 319. 
155/d. at 320. See also Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 
281 ("[C]ontrol over prices [of competing patented goods] thus becomes an actual or potential 
brake on competition."). 
156United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 ( 1969). 
157/d. at 335. The majority opinion is about three and a half pages long in the U.S. 
Reporter while Justice Marshall's dissent i' more than twice that length. 
158Law review commentators strained to interpret Container. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust 
Liability for an Exchange of Price Information-What Happened to Container Corporation?, 
63 VA. L. REV. 639, 654 ( 1977) (moditied per se rule established); James M. Kefauver, The 
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ban of Socony-Vacuum. 159 In the very next sentence he seemed to reverse direction 
completely, writing that "[p]rice information exchanged in some markets may have 
no effect on a truly competitive price."160 Reading and rereading the passage, one 
gets the feeling of a letter that is dictated but not read. Further, his subsequent 
cursory analysis of the corrugated container market and finding of an effect on price 
leaves one wondering just when price exchanges might be allowed. 
In the opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the industry was expanding, had excess 
capacity, ease of entry, an inelastic demand and, not surprisingly, downward price 
trends. 161 Nonetheless, he found, seemingly without any supporting evidence, that 
the price exchanges had the effect of slowing the general price decline in the 
industry. 162 His antipathy to any potential interference with price competition or the 
price mechanism was so strong that he was willing to assume an effect on price, even 
when industry conditions suggested otherwise. 163 Douglas ended the brief opinion 
with "[p]rice is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an 
informal manner to restrain competition." 164 
Justice Fortas concurred to attempt to clarify the majority opinion, stating that he 
did not read the majority as enacting a per se rule for exchanges of price 
information. 165 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, wrote a 
pointed, somewhat sarcastic dissent, stating that he "would prefer that a finding of 
anticompetitive effect be supported by 'evidence in the record."' 166 He concluded 
Legality of Dissemination of Market Data by Trade Associations: What Does Container 
Hold?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 785-86 (1972) (no per se rule); Note, Antitrust Implications 
of the Exchange of Price Information Among Competitors: The Container Corporation Case, 
68 MICH. L. REv. 720, 730-31 (1970) (no per se rule). 
15~is exact language is "(t]he limitation or reduction of price competition brings the case 
within the ban, for as we held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., ... interference 
with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per se." Container, 393 U.S. at 337. 
160/d. at 337. 
161 /d. at 336-37. 
162/d. at 336. 
163 Arguably Justice Douglas' approach in Container is at least consistent with Socony-
Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59, in which he posits that a conspiracy to affect prices is unlawful 
even though no effect on prices is shown. 
164Container, 393 U.S. at 338. 
165/d. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
166/d. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also did "not find the inference 
that the exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect as 'irresistible' as 
does the Court." /d. 
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that in the corrugated container market, where total demand was increasing and entry 
was easy, "it [was] just as logical" that competitors would try to capture market share 
by cutting prices as by maintaining them through occasional price exchanges. 167 
Not surprisingly, Justice Marshall interpreted the Douglas majority as 
establishing a per se rule for price exchanges, spending the first four paragraphs of 
his dissent pointing out why the per se rule should be inapplicable to price exchange 
agreements. 16s He noted that the Court had historically refused to apply a per se rule 
to exchanges of price and market information. 169 Douglas, in contrast, had largely 
ignored precedent in his majority opinion, citing the earlier trade association cases 
sparingly, if at all. 
One cannot read the Douglas majority and the Marshall dissent in Container 
without concluding that the dissent is by far the strongest, best reasoned opinion of 
the two. Marshall effectively dismantled the Douglas majority opinion for reaching 
conclusions about the occasional price exchanges' effect on price "[i]n the absence 
of any proof whatsoever." 170 
Nonetheless, Container was now the law and it took the Supreme Court six years 
to clear up the confusion that Justice Douglas had wrought. In United States v. 
Citizens & Southern National Bank, a case involving the dissemination of interest 
rates and service charges by a parent bank to branch banks in which, due to Georgia 
law, the parent could own no more than a five percent interest, the Court stated "the 
dissemination of price information is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act." 171 To support its statement the Court cited two old trade association cases 172 
and Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Container. 
167 /d. at 343. Marshall pointed out that because industry demand is inelastic, price 
changes do not have an immediate bearing on quantities purchased. Given the uncertainty 
about likely effect, he would have required the government to prove an anticompetitive 
purpose or effect. /d. 
168/d. at 340-42. 
169/d. at 341 (citing Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); 
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. Am. 
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 
377 (1921)). 
17
°Container, 333 U.S. at 345. 
The Government admits that the price trend was down, but asks the Court to assume 
that the trend would have been accelerated with less informed, and hence more 
vigorous, price competition. In the absence of any proof whatsoever, 1 cannot make 
such an assumption. It is just as likely that price competition was furthered by the 
exchange as it is that it was depressed. 
/d. at 345-46 (citation omitted). 
171 United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 ( 1975). 
172Maple Flooring Ass'n. 268 U.S. 563; Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, 268 U.S. 588. 
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The Court then concluded that the sharing of information, given the branch 
banking restrictions then in place, did not violate Section I of the Sherman Act. m 
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas joined in a three-judge dissent authored by Justice 
Brennan. 174 The dissent concluded that the government had established a Section I 
violation flowing from the dissemination of interest and fee information. Although 
the dissent did not directly dispute the majority's application of the rule of reason to 
price sharing and exchanges, it did remark that the difficulty of applying the rule of 
reason "has in many cases led us to prefer per se rules." 175 
In spite of Citizens & Southern National Bank's clarification of price exchanges 
as subject to the rule of reason, the fallout from Container nonetheless affected the 
next price dissemination case to reach the Supreme Court. That case, United States 
v. United States Gypsum Co., involved a criminal challenge to a practice of 
interseller price verification within the gypsum wallboard industry.m It is almost 
unheard of for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to criminally 
prosecute an offense subject to the rule of reason; 177 thus, raising the question, why 
did it in U.S. Gypsum? The answer may never be known with certainty but a good 
guess is that, since the U.S. Gypsum prosecution began well before the Court's 
decision in Citizens & Southern National Bank, the Justice Department believed it 
was dealing with a per se case, based on Container.m 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Gypsum decision itself created confusion since one of the 
issues before the Court was whether proof of intent was a necessary element of a 
criminal antitrust violation. The Court held that it was and that the standard was a 
showing that the action was "undertaken with knowledge of its probable 
173Citizens & S. Nat'/ Bank, 422 U.S. at 113-14. 
174/d. at 130 (Brennan, J.. dissenting). 
175/d. at 142. Citizens & Southem National Bank is almost surely a case whose outcome 
can directly be traced to the change in Supreme Court personnel between 1969 and 1975 as the 
Warren Court was transforming into the Burger Court. Chief Justice Burger. and Justices 
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, all new appointees, were pmt of Justice St~wmt's six-judge 
majority. !d. at 86 (majority opinion). Justice Marshall, author of the dissent in Container, 
which Justice Stewart had joined, was the sixth justice in the Citizens & Southern National 
Bank majority. Citizens & S. Nat'/ Bank, 422 U.S. at 86. Further, the three dissenting justice' 
in Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. at 130 (Brennan, J., dissenting), Warren Court 
holdovers Douglas, Brennan and White, were all in the majority in Container.~393 U.S. at 333. 
Thus, with the changes in the Court's makeup, Justices Marshall and Stewart had the vote.-, to 
outtlank Justice Douglas. 
176United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co .. 438 U.S. 422,427 (1978). 
177See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 18. 
178In addition, the interseller price verification in U.S. Gvpsum was much more sy.-,tematic 
and widespread than were the "infrequent" price exchanges in Container, probahly leading the 
Antitrust Division to believe they had a much stronger per se case than even Container. 
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"
179 s· h c · k · · consequences. , mce t e ourt agam too pams to pomt out that price exchanges 
among competitors fell under the rule of reason, 1 ~0 it was uncertain whether the U.S. 
Gypsum intent standard applied to per se offenses as well. 1K1 The circuit courts 
almost uniformly held that it did not. 182 thus rendering that part of the U.S. Gypsum 
decision largely moot, since criminal prosecutions in rule of reason cases are so 
unusual. 
The root of all this uncertainty probably lies with Justice Douglas' poorly drafted. 
poorly reasoned opinion in Container. The government would not likely have 
criminally prosecuted the U.S. Gypsum case had Container provided better guidance, 
and the issue of criminal intent and the litigation it spawned would have been 
avoided. 183 
Justice Douglas certainly understood the anticompetitive consequences that 
collaborations of competitors could have on the market and on consumers. In his 
view. no collective action that might affect the price mechanism should be tolerated. 
As a result. he did not consider countervailing market conditions nor did he require 
that the government establish a strong factual basis for its assertions of 
anticompetitive effect. In reality, he reduced the government'~ burden of proof. The 
Douglas approach certainly was effective in a case like Socony- Vacuum where intent 
was clear and effect irrefutable. But in a closer case such as Container, where intent 
was uncertain and competitive effect problematic, his summary disposition was 
based on nothing more than the effect occasional price exchanges might have on 
price levels rather than any showing of actual effect. 
Jn further contrast to Justice Douglas' careful and thorough Socony- Vacuum 
opinion, his opinion in Container is inexplicably vague and seemingly contradictory. 
While asserting that the price exchanges in Container bring it within the per se 
prohibition of Socony- Vacuum, he in the very next sentence acknowledges that 
179 U.S. Gypsum. 438 U.S. at 444. 
IHOJd. at44J n.J6. 
IHISee, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III. Criminal Intent in Antitrust Prosecutions. Collaraal 
Estoppel, and Section 5(a) of' the Clayton Act, and the Relationship r1j" Standing and Injun- in 
Private Antitrust Suits, 56 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 45 (1980). 
182See, e.fi .. United States v. Brown. 936 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. W.F. 
Brinkley & Son Constr. Co .. 783 F.2d 1157. 1162 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Koppers 
Co., 652 F.2d 290,296 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1335 (4th 
Cir.1979); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541. 545 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Brighton 
Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598 F.2d II 0 I, II 06 (7th Cir. 1979 ). 
183That is not to say that the Supreme Court would not have granted certiorari in U.S. 
Gypsum. That case contained a second issue, the use of the Robinson-Patman Act's meeting 
competition defense to justify an intersellcr price verification program. which alone, might 
have caught the Court's attention. U.S. Gypsum. 438 U.S. at 426. 
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"[p]rice information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly 
competitive price." 184 Of course, the accepted wisdom of per se rules is that a given 
restraint is so labeled only when it is always competitively pemicious. 185 Thus, it is 
little wonder that confusion reigned about what standard, if any, the Container 
decision set forth for price exchanges among competitors. 186 
In Socony-Vacuum, Justice Douglas extended the per se rule against price fixing 
beyond literal price fixing to any collective activity that interferes with the price 
setting mechanism of the market. He recognized that no gray area could exist since 
any affect on price by collective action disrupts the market. He arguably went too 
far in the dicta of footnote 59, however, when he argued against the requirement of 
an anticompetitive effect. In Container, written almost thirty years later, he eagerly 
concluded, based on flimsy evidence at best, that the price exchanges at issue did 
affect price. Thus, one can conclude that Douglas was our staunchest defender of the 
sanctity of the price mechanism. One can as well conclude that his defense was, on 
occasion, overzealous. 
V. MONOPOLIZATION 
Justice Douglas stridently believed that big is bad. In his scorching dissent in 
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., which according to Douglas was "the most 
important antitrust case ... before the Court in years," 187 he rather succinctly set 
forth his views about economic power in private hands: 
We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have 
been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows 
how size can become a menace-both industrial and social. It can be an 
industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against existing or 
putative competitors. It can be a social menace-because of its control of 
prices ... power that controls the economy should be in the hands of 
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial 
oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be 
scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be 
dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional 
184Container, 393 U.S. at 337. 
185See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963). More 
contemporary price fixing "characterization" cases have employed increasingly sophisticated 
analyses, such as the "quick look" rule of reason, to ascertain the likely competitive effect of 
horizontal collaborative conduct. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); 
Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Ariz. v. Maricopa 
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 
441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
186See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text. 
187United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious 
men but respectable and social-minded is irrelevant. That is the 
philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a 
theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great 
that only a government of the people should have it. 188 
At least one does not have to long ponder what Douglas would have thought of 
Microsoft and Bill Gates. 
Columbia Steel turned out to be the leading and most controversial merger case 
of the 1940s. There the government challenged an acquisition by Columbia Steel, a 
wholly owned U.S. Steel subsidiary of Consolidated Steel, a competitor in the 
fabricated steel market. 189 Columbia, the largest steel fabricator in the country, 
controlled thirteen percent of the growing western market while Consolidated had 
eleven percent of the same market. 190 In addition, the acquisition foreclosed U.S. 
Steel's competitors of rolled steel, a raw material needed by steel fabricators, from 
selling to Consolidated. 191 
Columbia Steel acquired the assets of Consolidated, forcing the government to 
sue under Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 192 since the less permissive Section 7 
of the Clayton Act then applied only to stock purchases with horizontal competitive 
effects. 193 The Court, by a narrow 5-4 majority, held that the government had not 
established that the acquisition amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade 194 or 
an attempt to monopolize the fabricated steel market. 195 Justice Douglas' dissent, 
joined by Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge, focused on the vertical rather than 
the horizontal aspects of the merger. 196 As he saw it, U.S. Steel had one-third of the 
country's rolled steel production and, in purchasing Consolidated, had effectively cut 
off thirteen percent of the "plates and shapes" market from competitors. 197 He ended 
188/d. at 535-36. 
189/d. at 498 (majority opinion). 
190/d.at512. 
191 /d. at 507. 
192Colurnbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. at 498 (majority opinion). 
193/d. at 508 n.8. 
194/d. at 530-31. 
195/d. at 533-34. 
196/d. at 539 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
197/d. at 538-40. Consolidated's purchases of rolled steel generally amounted to three 
percent of that market. According to Justice Douglas, "[b]y no standard ... can that 
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with his "big is bad" theme, stating "[t]he least I can say is that a company that has 
that tremendous leverage on our economy is big enough." 1n 
Public and congressional sentiment seemed to be with Douglas. Congress soon 
passed the Celler-Kefauver Act, extending Section 7 of the Clayton Act to asset 
acquisitions as well as vertical mergers. 199 
Justice Douglas did not mellow with respect to his distaste for large companies or 
anything that could be characterized as market concentration. Twenty-five years 
after Columbia Steel, near the end of his long service on the Court, he wrote a 
scathing concurrence in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., a merger case 
involving the acquisition by the country's fourth largest brewery of the largest 
brewery in New England. 21x1 Douglas again quoted Brandeis, this time for the 
proposition that increased business size creates not efficiencies, but inefficiencies 
that simply allow the owner to garner more profits by increasing volume.201 
Justice Douglas went on to lament that the increasing concentration of economic 
power into large corporations was transfening local control of business "to distant 
cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss 
statements before them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or 
no relationship."202 According to Douglas. two of the purposes of the 1950 Celler-
Kefauver Act were to retain local control over industry and protect small businesses, 
goals which had "been largely defeated with serious consequences."203 
percentage be deemed immaterial.'' /d. at 538. He believed, however, that "[a] surer test of the 
impact of the acquisition on competition is to be determined not only by consideration of the 
actual markets reached by Consolidated but also by the actual purchases it makes," hence his 
emphasis on "plates and shape~." !d. 
19R/d. at 540. To support his statement, Justice Douglas quoted a 1940 monograph 
characterizing U.S. Steel as "the giant of the industry" with greater capacity than all the 
German producers combined and more than twice the capacity of Great Britain and France, 
respectively. !d. at 540 n.6 (quoting CLAIR WILCOX. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN 
AMERICAN INDUSTRY, MONOGRAPH 21, at 120 (Comm. Print 1940)). See a/so Page, supra 
note 33, at 24-25. 
199Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184.64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 
21 (2000)). For a review of the legislative history of the act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). 
200United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 539 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring in part). 
201 /d. at 540-41 (quoting Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in 
llllerstatc Commerce: Hearings on S. 98 Be./(Jre the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62 
Cong. 1155 (1912) (statement of Louis D. Brandeis. Attorney at Law)). 
202/d. at 541-42. 
203/d. at 542-43. 
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The result, the Justice wrote, was that local employment suffers. local payrolls 
are reduced, and "responsible entrepreneurs in counties and States are replaced by 
clerks."204 He believed that ''[a] nation of clerks is anathema to the American 
antitrust dream" and, if unabated. "leads predictably to socialism."205 
The Columbia Steel case was announced on June 7. 1948. About one month 
earlier on May 3, 1948, Justice Douglas tied an obscure record by issuing three 
majority antitrust opinions on the same day.206 All involved the motion picture 
industry: United States v. Grijfith, 207 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 20x 
and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 209 Gr(ffith involved monopoly 
leveraging rather than a market foreclosure through acquisition. Douglas succeeded 
in attracting a 6-l majority, with Justices Murphy (who joined the dissent in 
Columbia Steel) and Jackson not participating, and Justice Frankfurter dissenting by 
substantially endorsing the district court opinion. 210 
While the Gr(fflth decision is of doubtful validity today and is largely ignored as 
precedent, it did provide Justice Douglas with another ample opportunity to expound 
on his big is bad theory. In doing so, Douglas drafted language about exclusionary 
conduct by a monopolist that is still considered fundamental to establishing the 
requisite monopolistic intent necessary for a Section 2 violation? 11 
204/d. at 543. 
206In 1898, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham also issued three majority antitrust opinions 
on the same day. See Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Hopkins v. United 
States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n. 171 U.S. 505 (1898). All 
three involved Sherman Act jurisdictional issues. 
207United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
208Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. II 0 (1948). 
209United State' v. Paramount Pictures. Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). The 1947-48 Supreme 
Court Term was perhaps the busiest antitrust term ever. In addition to the four cases listed 
above, the Court also, in opinions written by Justice Black, decided FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 
334 U.S. 37 ( 1948), FTC 1'. Cement but., 333 U.S. o83 (1948), United States 1'. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) and United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). for a 
total of eight antitrust cases. 
21 u.Justices Jackson and Frankfurter were with the majority in United States v. Columbia 
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 497 (1948). 
211 Gri{fith, 334 U.S at 107. Supreme Court opinions sometimes are widely cited for an 
articulated legal principle even though the application of the principle to the facts before the 
Court is highly suspect. When this occurs, the case may often be cited as precedent for the 
principle articulated but ignored as precedent on the merits. An example is Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 ( 1962), one of the most criticized decisions of the Warren Court 
era. See, e.[: .. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr.. The Crisis in Antitrust. 65 COLUM. L. 
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The case involved the use by a regional movie theater chain of its power in towns 
in which it had the sole theater to obtain favorable dates from distributors for films it 
desired in towns in which it faced competition from other theaters. As a 
consequence, competing movie theaters in the so-called open towns were allegedly 
prevented from being able to obtain enough first or second run films to operate 
successfully. 212 
Justice Douglas made short work of this fact pattern. He held that the use of 
one's monopoly position to gain a competitive advantage was all that was necessary 
to violate Section 2.213 The standard set was that one has the power to exclude 
competitors "coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power."214 Douglas' 
distrust of and distaste for big business, however, was apparent in the opinion and he 
arguably came close to establishing a no fault monopoly test when he stated that 
"[s]o it is that monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself 
constitute an evil and stand condemned under [Section] 2 even though it remains 
unexercised. "215 
Thus, apparently the exercise of monopoly power is not required under Section 2 
although proof of purpose or intent to exercise it is necessary.216 While seemingly 
setting a fine line between acquiring or having monopoly power and using it, Griffith 
is consistent with the price fixing test in Socony- Vacuum, in which Justice Douglas 
held that the purpose to fix prices, even unaccompanied by an overt act, is all that is 
REV. 363 (1965); Thomas E. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of 
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1968). Brown Shoe is often cited 
for its analytical construct for analyzing mergers under Section 7 (defining relevant product 
and geographic markets and then measuring the competitive impact of the merger within the 
market), even though the Court's assessment of the competitive impact is more than a little 
suspect. Similarly, Griffith is oft cited for its articulation of exclusionary conduct as a means 
to establish intent to monopolize although its use as a legal precedent on its merits is 
questionable today. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 317 (2d ed. 1999). 
212Griffith, 334 U.S. at 103. 
213/d. at 107. 
214/d. This language gives rise to the two-prong test under Section 2, which requires proof 
of market power plus intent to monopolize. 
215/d. To be fair, this language came in the context of his stating that one did not have to 
show an independent Section I conspiracy to prove the unlawful intent of a monopolist, but it 
nevertheless does seem to eradicate any meaningful intent standard. 
216Justice Douglas acknowledges that "mere size is not outlawed by [Section] 2." ld. at 
I 07 n.l 0. But he warned that size is "an earmark of monopoly power," id., and "carries with it 
an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been 
utilized in the past." ld. (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932)). 
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necessary for a per se violation of Section 1.217 But while "specific intent" is not 
required,218 a more general purpose or intent is, which can, practically speaking, only 
be discerned by looking to the conduct of the monopolist. Thus, Douglas concluded 
that "the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is 
unlawful."219 
Justice Douglas did therefore require some conduct, although it is not certain if 
the mere acquisition of monopoly power met the standard.220 The power and purpose 
to exclude is what it comes to and that test has stood the test of time. Griffith and 
Alcoa are its forebears. 
Griffith falters considerably, however, in the application of the articulated 
standard to the facts before it, as arguably does Alcoa. For Justice Douglas had no 
qualms about condemning the leveraging of market power in one market, the closed 
towns, to a second competitive market, the open towns. 221 First, it is not at all clear 
that the statutory language of Section 2 applies to monopoly leveraging where the 
second market does not result in a monopoly.222 Even if it does, the lower courts are 
currently split about the economic and legal effect of monopoly leveraging on a 
second non-monopolistic market, with some fearing that the application Section 2 
217 Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. See supra text accompanying notes I I 7- I 9. 
218Griffith, 334 U.S. at I 05. 
219Id. at 107. Thus, Griffith is seemingly in step with Judge Hand's famous opinion in 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa) ("[N]o 
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." Griffith, 334 U.S. at I 05 (quoting 
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at432)). 
220He is again true to the Alcoa case, in which Judge Hand observed that "the origin of a 
monopoly may be critical in determining its legality ... . "Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429. Cf CARL 
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 I I, 
265-72 (1959) (arguing that excessive market power, without more, should be illegal). 
221 Griffith, 334 U.S. at I 06-07. Justice Douglas made a similar point, in the context of 
vertical integration and thus leveraging by a monopolist in Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 
I 74, decided the same day as Griffith. Then, four years later, Justice Douglas and Black 
joined a four-justice dissent in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 
628 (1952) (Burton, J., dissenting), arguing that the majority "seeks to avoid the effect of 
United States v. Griffith .... " The majority had reversed a lower court judgment for the 
government in a newspaper tying/monopolization case. According to the dissent, the Times-
Picavune's use of its monopoly power in the morning newspaper market in New Orleans with 
adve.rtisers to gain a competitive advantage over a rival newspaper in the evening newspaper 
market violated the Sherman Act. /d. 
222See. e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc .. 980 F.2d I 71, 203-06 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993). See also 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'JI 652 (2d ed. 2002). 
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might unduly penalize "efficient and natural" monopolies.221 The Supreme Court 
its;lf seems to have vacillated on the issue,224 although the recent Trinko decision 
casts further doubt on the unlawfulness of monopoly leveraging.225 
Thus, with the help of 20-20 hindsight, the Gr(fflth decision appears shaky in its 
application of the law to its facts, although, at least as now generally interpreted, the 
case stands for the now fundamental proposition that one does not have to show a 
separate Section 1 violation to prove an intent to monopolize under of Section 2.2: 6 
In fact, Judge Wyzanski, in his influential opinion in United States v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., believed that Justice Douglas may have gone further in Griffzth 
and, following Judge Hand in Alcoa,227 ruled that a monopolist "monopolizes" 
22\See, e.g .. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548 (9th Cir. 
1991 ). cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 ( 1992); Fineman, 980 F.2d at 205-06. See also Lantec Inc. 
v. Novell Inc .. 306 F.3d 1003, 1024 n.ll (lOth Cir. 2002) (recognizing circuit split but 
refusing to decide issue); Covad Comms. Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1285 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (recognizing leveraging claim); Virgin Atl. Airways v. British Airways, Pic, 257 
F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing potential leveraging claim); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. 
Tex. State Soccer Ass'n. 213 F.3d 198, 206 n.l6 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing circuit split); 
Kerm.otes Mich. Theatres v. Nat'! Amusements. 854 F.2d 135, 137 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(recognizing leveraging claim), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. I 087 (1989); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) C[T]he use of monopoly power 
attained in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of [Section] 2, 
even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second market."), cert. denied, 444 
U.S.l093(19X0) 
22+Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 ( 1992) 
("!Plower gain ell through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or 
business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant position in one 
market to expand his empire into the next."') (quoting Times-Picayune. 345 U.S. at 611 ), with 
Spectrum Sports. Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) ("[Section] 2 makes the 
conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens 
to do so."). 
2
'
5Verimn Comms. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,415 n.4 (2004) 
(noting that the Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it did not require "a 'dangerous 
probability of success' in monopolizing a second market .... " (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 
U.S. at 459)). 
'
2
''See. e.g .. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (0. Mass. 
195:;) ("A more inclusive approach was adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas in ... Griffith. He 
'itated that to prove a violation of [Section] 2 it was not always necessary to show a violation 
or I Section! 1." (citation omitted)). 
'
2
'U nited States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). 
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whenever he does business. "apparently even if there is no showing that his business 
involves an exclusionary practice."m 
Justice Douglas also wrote the opinion in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United 
States, the companion case to Griffith decided the same day. 229 The case is largely 
forgotten today although it did involve, similar to Gr(fflth, the leveraging of 
favorable film distribution and clearances by a chain of movie theaters of sixty 
closed towns into sixteen open or competitive towns. 23u Unlike Griffith, however, 
much of the defendant's conduct in Schine Chain Theatres seemed to be directed 
toward maintaining or acquiring a monopoly as opposed to merely gaining a 
competitive advantage in another market. 231 As such, Schine Chain Theatres may 
not be as much of a pure leveraging case as its companion. 
The opinion does reaffirm, in language more certain than in Griffith, that 
otherwise lawful conduct may, in the hands of a monopolist, establish intent to 
monopolize.232 Otherwise. Douglas' opinion simply repeats key language from 
Gr!ffith233 and adds little to his "big is bad" theme. In a ruling that would be in the 
mainstream today, he does hold that price cutting by a monopolist is not unlawful 
absent a "showlingJ that it was in purpose or effect employed as an instrument of 
monopoly power."234 
mUnited Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 342. The quoted language turned out to be 
dicta because Judge Wyzanski found ample evidence of exclusionary behavior by the 
defendant. 
22Y334 U.S. 110 (1948). As in Griffith, Justices Jackson and Murphy did not participate. 
/d. at 130. Justice Frankfurter, however, concurred in the result although he had dissented in 
Griffith. !d. 
21u/d. at 113. 
231 See, e.g., id. at 119 ("[T]hese agreements were additional weapons in Schine · s arsenal 
of power through the use of which its monopoly was sought to be extended."). See also 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), another majority opinion by 
Justice Douglas decided the same term. !d. at 140. In Paramount Pictures, Justice Douglas 
found that a conspiracy to monopolize the first run movie exhibition market was exclusionary 
in intent and effect and thus violated Section 2. !d. at 170. 
212See, E);., Schine Chain Theatres. 334 U.S. at 119 ("Even an otherwise lawful device 
may be used as a weapon in restraint of trade or in an effort to monopolize a part of trade or 
commerce."). See also id. at 124 ("But any clearance so obtained, though otherwise 
reasonable. would be unlawful. for it would be the product of the exercise of monopoly 
power."'). 
231
·"The mere existence of the power to monopolize. together with the purpose or intent to 
do >O. constitutes an evil at which the Act is aimed." !d. at 130. 
234/d. at 120-21. Today, of course, a monopolist's price cuts would have to meet the 
definition of predatory pricing to be considered unlawful conduct. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221-27 0993); Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort 
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It would be many years before Justice Douglas wrote another majority opinion in 
a Secti0n 2 case, due in large part to the paucity of monopolization cases to come 
before the Court. He did write for the Court in the 1966 United States v. Grinnell 
Corp. decision, which is mostly known for its very suspect relevant market 
analysis. 235 Unfortunately, his conduct analysis is not any better. In the opinion, 
Justice Douglas made very short shrift of the conduct prong, relating that the 
defendant's actions in buying competitors, dividing services provided among the 
companies bought and controlled, setting price according to the amount of 
competition in a market, threatening retaliation against competitors, and the liberal 
use of broad covenants not to compete with officials of acquired companies 
"eliminated any possibility of an outbreak of competition."236 
It is quite certain that Justice Douglas considered the Grinnell defendants to be 
"bad actors," concluding that the conduct analysis "presents no major problem 
here.""7 As a result, however, he spent only one paragraph of the opinion dealing 
with the issue. That paragraph is devoid of real analysis but is rather laced with 
conclusory statements, all of which could stand closer inspection.238 It pales in 
comparison with the careful analysis of conduct issues in at least some modern 
Section 2 cases that determine whether a particular practice by a monopolist has an 
exclusionary effect on competitors and competition.239 
As one commentator has noted, the Grinnell decision is symptomatic of the 
indeterminacy, vacuity, and conclusory nature of the Supreme Court's Section 2 
conduct decisions that have given lower courts and businesses little guidance and left 
juries "to divine the metaphysical difference between" exclusionary conduct and 
competition on the merits. 240 It also illustrates the perils of the big is bad theory run 
of Colo., Inc .. 479 U.S. 104, 117-22 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574,588,595 (1986). 
235United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). See infra text accompanying note 
303. 
236Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 576. 
237The full quotation is: "We shall see that this second ingredient presents no major 
problem here, as what was done in building the empire was done plainly and explicitly for a 
single purpose." !d. at 571. 
238For example, Justice Douglas' condemnation of defendants meeting local competition 
by reducing rates would not be considered exclusionary today absent proof of predatory 
pricing. ld. at 570. 576. 
239See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
2
•
0See. e.g., Einer Elhauge, D~fining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
253, 255, 265-67 (2003). 
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amuck. If that is the Court's normative theory, a result-oriented conduct prong is 
perhaps to be expected. 241 
Equally problematic in Grinnell is that Justice Douglas announced the commonly 
understood test for conduct, derived from Alcoa,242 and then seemed to retreat from 
it. That is, he defined the conduct element as "the willful acquisition or maintenance 
of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."243 Since willfulness 
can certainly attach itself to developing a superior product or using business acumen, 
whatever that means, to gain market share, the two concepts are not mutually 
exclusive.244 One plausible interpretation of the language is that development of a 
superior product or use of business acumen that resulted in monopoly power would 
spare the monopolist from a finding of exclusionary conduct. That, however, was 
not Douglas' reading in Grinnell. In a footnote he found that, based on defendants' 
conduct, "since ... this monopoly power was consciously acquired, we have no 
reason to reach" whether "the burden is on the defendants to show that their 
dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like."245 In other words, a finding of 
monopoly power consciously acquired trumps any consideration of the superior 
product, skill or acumen defense rather than the other way round. 
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas' attitude toward monopoly leveraging did not 
change in his later years on the Court. In Otter Tail v. United States, the government 
challenged a public utility's refusal to sell or "wheel" electric power to 
municipalities wishing to replace Otter Tail as their retail electricity provider.246 
Otter Tail, a vertically integrated power company, produced electricity, transmitted it 
over its own lines, "wheeled" electricity produced by others over its lines, and sold 
power both at wholesale and retail in the Dakotas and Minnesota.247 
In a 4-3 opinion with Justices Blackmun and Powell not participating, Justice 
Douglas quickly ruled that Otter Tail had run afoul of Section 2 by using its 
monopoly power as the dominant electric power source in the area "to foreclose 
potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric power from outside 
241 That is, if the emphasis is on the supposed evil of monopoly power, the standard for 
establishing exclusionary conduct lessens and may be almost superfluous. 
242A!coa, 148 F.2d at 430. 
243Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. 
244See Elhauge, supra note 240, at 261. 
245Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 576 n.7. 
2460tter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973). 
247/d. Otter Tail was the retail electric power supplier for 465 towns in Minnesota, North 
Dakota and South Dakota. !d. at 368. 
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sources of supply. '' 24x Otter Tail attempted to assert that its wheeling contracts with 
the Bureau of Reclamation and certain electrical cooperatives relieved it of any 
obligation to wheel to certain municipalities. Far from a defense, however, Douglas 
viewed the contracts as nothing more than territorial restrictions among potential 
competitors.249 
Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
noted that a monopoly resulted regardless of whether Otter Tail agreed to provide 
wholesale power to municipalities desiring their own retail system. 250 He noted that 
Otter Tail had invested significant resources in constructing power lines throughout 
the region.251 Further, he expressed serious doubt about whether the threat of losing 
business could never be a legitimate business justification for a monopolist's refusal 
to deal with a competitor, as the district court had asserted.252 
Justice Douglas' Otter Tail opinion lacks clarity and it is difficult to determine 
just what the case stands for. 253 It appears to require that a monopolist deal with a 
competitor, even if the result is that the competitor will displace the monopolist with 
its own monopoly. Perhaps, one might argue. such an extension of Section 2 should 
be limited to regulated industries with natural monopolies, but the Otter Tail Court 
imposed no such limits. Further, the decision seems to be quite close to a modern 
"essential facilities" case, although the Supreme Court has purposefully avoided 
recognizing the validity of the essential facilities doctrine.254 
248/d. at 377. Otter Tail had also "sponsored" litigation to delay the efforts of four towns 
to establish municipal systems. /d. at 372. 
249/d. at 378-79. 
250/d. at 388-89 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
251 /d. at 382. 
202ld. at 389-90. Justice Stewart's principal arguments were that Otter Tail was due an 
implied immunity from the antitrust laws due to the extensive Congressional regulation of the 
power industry under the Federal Power Act of 1935 or, at a minimum. the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction should have deferred the adjudication of antitrust issues to the Federal Power 
Commission. !d. at 390-91. 
253For a critical view, see G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, The Otter Tail Power Case: 
Regulation by Commission or Antitrust Laws, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 99. For a positive view of 
the result in Otter Tail, see Ross. supra note 106, at 79-80. Professor Ross views Otter Tail as 
a vertical integration case in which the utility's integration into retail increased its monopoly 
profit opportunities since it was otherwise regulated by the Federal Power Commission. /d. 
Since ninety percent of Otter Tail's income derived from its sale of power at retail, 410 U.S. at 
387 (Stewart, J., dissenting), Ross may be correct. In any event. his analysis is much more 
detailed than the general language of Justice Douglas· opinion in Otter Tail. 
254See Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinka, LLP. 540 U.S. 398,410-
11 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Curp . .472 U.S. 5X5, 611 n.44 (1985). 
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Although lower federal courts have struggled with the breadth of Otter Tail, 
today's Supreme Court has shown an inclination to reel it in. In Veri::.on 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Court took pains 
to distinguish Otter Tail, ruling that since the facts before it did not require that the 
defendant share services already marketed, Otter Tail did not apply. 255 As a result. 
the defendant's alleged reluctance to allow interconnections with its local telephone 
network as required by Congress did not a Section 2 allegation make. The Trinko 
Court also displayed a good deal of hostility to the essential facilities doctrine with 
which Otter Tail is often associated, finding "no need either to recognize it or to 
repudiate [the doctrine] here."256 
In the Section 2 context, Justice Douglas' "big is bad" predilections necessarily 
took center stage. While he reaffirmed the two prong test for proof of 
monopolization, his application of the conduct prong lacked content and came close 
to a no conduct standard. In short, Douglas' (and the Supreme Court's) lack of 
economic analysis and the conclusory approach tended to trivialize and minimize 
exclusionary conduct as a legitimate antitrust standard. The focus was on the 
manner in which the monopolist competed rather than on whether the monopolist's 
actions excluded competitors through use of its market power. Unfair tactics were 
presumed to be anticompetitive.2" 7 
The pendulum has swung in recent years to a heightened standard for labeling 
conduct as exclusionary, largely because of recognition that the indeterminacy of 
Compare United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) with Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. I (1945). Some circuits have recognized the validity of the doctrine. 
See, e.g., Bellsouth Adver. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988), 
rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (lith Cir. 1993); MC! Comms. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Hecht 
v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). 
255Trinko, 540 U.S. 39X, 410. The Trinka Court's distinction of Otter Tail is questionable. 
It involved the alleged failure of Verizon, a local telephone exchange carrier, to share its local 
network with competitors as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Court 
pointed to a new "wholesale market for leasing network elements" to distinguish Otter Tail, 
which "was already in the business of providing a service to certain customers ... and refused 
to provide the same service to certain other customers." !d. In fact. the issue in both cases was 
quite similar: the requirement that a monopolist cooperate with competitors to displace itself, 
at least partially. The purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to provide local 
telephone customers with competition, not to create a wholesale leasing market. 
256Since the 1996 Telecommunications Act granted competitors access to the defendant's 
local exchange network, the Court thought "it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of 
forced access." !d. at 411. 
~57(;{ Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 
{I 993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, 
without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal 
law of unfair competition ... ."'). 
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older exclusionary conduct test may have the affect of chilling desirable, pro-
competitive market conduct.258 Further, there is today recognition that it "is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-term 
anticompetitive effects."259 Thus, if big is not necessarily bad, the paradigm has 
shifted dramatically and the modern federal judiciary, faced with trying to 
distinguish exclusionary from desirable, pro-competitive conduct, is without a 
normative model with any substantive content. Justice Douglas' Section 2 
jurisprudence, unfortunately, is largely to blame. 
VI. THE PATENT/ ANTITRUST INTERSECTION 
Justice Douglas was also quite distrustful of the monopoly power granted a 
patent holder and favored a quite restrictive view of the patent holders rights. Here, 
as elsewhere, his concern was with the effect of the patent monopoly on small 
businesses. Early in his tenure, Douglas was in the mainstream of the New Deal 
Court in limiting the scope of the patent privilege. He voted with a unanimous Court 
in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 260 which outlawed a scheme of patent 
holders fixing resale prices of their product throughout the country. Then, two years 
later Douglas voted with a still-united Court in three patent-antitrust cases, writing 
the opinion in United States v. Masonite Corp. 261 There the Court found unlawful 
price fixing arising from a patent holder's uniform licensing agreements to so-called 
del credere agents authorized to sell the patented product. Douglas wrote that 
"[s]ince patents are privileges restrictive of a free economy," the rights of patent 
holders "must be strictly construed .... "262 
The post-War Court, however, did not go far enough in restricting the use of 
patents as price fixing vehicles to suit Justice Douglas. In dissenting in United States 
v. National Lead Co./63 he took issue with the majority's requirement that a patent 
holder who had engaged in an international cartel to divide and dominate the market 
258See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 
(2007); Brooke Group, Ltd., 509 U.S. at 226 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 
479 U.S. 104, 122 n.l7 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 594 (1986). 
259See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 ( 1993); Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 67-68 ( 1984). 
260309 U.S. 436 (1940). Justices McReynolds and Roberts did not participate. /d. at 461. 
261 316 U.S. 265, 267 (1942). See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942) and B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942), in which the Court struck down 
patent licenses under which patented machines were furnished only on the condition that the 
licensor's own unpatentable product be used exclusively in them. 
262Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 280. 
263332 U.S. 319, 364 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
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for titanium pigment be required to grant non-exclusive licenses at uniformly 
reasonable rates. That was not enough for Douglas, who argued that the defendant 
should be required to issue licenses free of any royalty charge because "strong 
measures" were needed "to provide the maximum opportunity for new ventures to 
compete with the established giants of the industry."264 According to Dou~las, if 
National Lead, the world's leading producer of titanium pigments, would be at a 
competitive disadvantage because of reasonable royalty rates, "what can be the 
probable fate of newcomers or existing independents of small stature?"265 
Similarly, Justice Douglas did not believe that the majority went far enough in 
United States v. Line Materials Co. 266 in striking down the cross-licensing of patents 
as a vehicle to fix prices in the sale of patented goods. Although the decision surely 
limited any interpretation of the landmark United States v. General Electric Co. 
decision,267 which would permit patent licenses to fix competitors' resale prices,26x 
Douglas authored a concurring opinion, arguing that the Court should simply 
overrule General Electric. 269 That opinion countenanced at least some price fixing 
by patent holders and thus was, according to Douglas, in conflict with the 
constitutional protection of inventors and Congress's "faithful" legislation of that 
protection. 270 
Justice Douglas also took issue with the majority in Automatic Radio 
Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, lnc. 271 There the Court 
264/d. at 367-68. See al.w Epstein, supra note 63, at 557-58. 
265National Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 368 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas expressed 
similar sentiments for limiting the rights of copyright holders in his majority opinion in the 
government's massive case against the movie industry, United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law. like the patent statutes, makes reward to 
the owner a secondary consideration."). See also supra text accompanying notes 153-59 
discussing his concurrence in United States v. Line Material Co .. 333 U.S. 287. 315 (1948 ). 
266333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
267272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
268See, e.g., Note, Price Fixing Through Patent Licensing-A Bastion is Undermined. 6 I 
HARV. L. REV. 1427. 1434 (1948); and Note. Legality of Plural Restrictive Licensing, 43 ILL. 
L. REV. 400, 409 (1948 ). 
269Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. at 315-16 (Douglas. J., concurring). Justices Black, 
Murphy and Rutledge joined the concurring opinion. /d. 
270/d. at 316-21. Justice Burton, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter. 
dissented. /d. at 321 (Burton, J.. dissenting). Ironically, Justice Burton argued that the scheme 
that the majority had outlawed was essential to the ability of small patent holders to compete 
with giant patent holders like General Electric. !d. at 35 I. 
271 339 U.S. 827 (1950), overruled hy Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 ( 1969). 
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allowed a patent licensing provision requiring royalty payments of a percentage of 
sales of patented and unpatented goods. Douglas· dissent characterized the case as 
one in which the patent holder "bludgeon[s]" his way into a partnership with the 
licensee. "A plainer extension of a patent by unlawful means would be hard to 
imagine."272 He also took issue with the majority's ruling that a patent licensee was 
estopped to challenge the validity of the patent, arguing that "protection of the public 
interest in free enterprise [was l above reward to the patentee."m 
Justice Douglas did vote with the majority in the International Salt v. United 
States274 and United States v. Lowe's Inc., 275 cases holding that market power is 
presumed when a patented or copyrighted product is at issue. Quite recently, 
however, in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,276 the Supreme Court 
reversed itself and removed the presumption of market power in tying cases 
involving patents. The Illinois Tool Works decision is in keeping with the Court's 
evolving view that tying arrangements are not generally anticompetitive277 and in 
recognition of Congress' 1988 amendment to the Patent Code that removed the 
market power presumption from patent misuse cases.278 It also represents in large 
part the antithesis of Douglas' views about patents and market power. 
Increasingly, contemporary antitrust views big as not necessarily bad, even 
though some competitors may be harmed. Illinois Tool Works is in the same vein 
because market power must now be proved, not presumed. Justice Douglas. with his 
skepticism about the patent monopoly generally and distrust of anything smacking of 
market power, would surely disagree. 
VII. RELEVANT MARKET [SSUES 
Defining the relevant product and geographic market is of course a predicate to 
determining if a market is in fact concentrated and thus suffers from "the curse of 
bigness." Justice Douglas' approach to relevant market definition, no doubt colored 
by his abhorrence to any suggestion of economic power, can perhaps best be 
described as slippery. For example, in the Rome Cable case,279 Douglas wrote a brief 
:>.
72/d. at 836, 838 (Douglas, J .. dissenting). 
271/d. at 839. 
274332 u.s. 392 (1947). 
275371 U.S. 38, 46 ( 1962). 
276524 U.S. 28 (2006). 
277See Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner 
Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
m35 U.S.C. § 27l(d)(5) (1988): 102 STAT. 4674 (1988). 
279United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 ( 1964). 
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majority opinion for the Court and through tortured reasoning held unlawful the 
acquisition by Alcoa, primarily an aluminum wire and aluminum conductor 
producer, of Rome Cable, which was mostly a copper wire and copper conductor 
manufacturer. Douglas initially held that insulated aluminum conductor was a 
distinct submarket from copper conductor, overturning a district court finding to the 
contrary. 280 He then inexplicably concluded that both bare and insulated aluminum 
cable should be in the same submarket, since they both have the general function of 
carrying electricity, even though the government had not so argued. 281 To justify this 
seeming inconsistency and respond to Justice Stewart's dissent, Douglas lamely 
argued that the grouping of bare and insulated aluminum cable was "a logical 
extension" of the district court's findings that aluminum conductor and copper 
conductor generally constitute separate lines of commerce.282 
Of course, Justice Douglas' distorted market definition was arguably nothing 
more than "gerrymandering" to find the market or submarkets necessary to establish 
unlawful concentration levels.m Since Alcoa produced no copper conductor, its 
inclusion in the relevant market would have diminished the market concentration to a 
level beyond the reach of Section 7.284 It was apparently also necessary for the Court 
280/d. at 275-77. 
mid. at 276-77. See also id. at 286 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the very next sentence, 
Justice Douglas noted that copper conductor and aluminum conductor also compete but 
separated the two because "each has developed distinctive end uses.'" /d. It is hard to fathom 
such logical inconsistency in a single paragraph in a Supreme Court opinion. See, e.g .. 
Kauper, supra note 211, at 339-40 (calling Douglas' inclusion of bare and insulated aluminum 
cable in one market in Rome Cable "astonishing" and labeling the market analysis there as 
"cast[ing] doubt on the entire definitional process"'); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARRENS. 
GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 624 (2d ed. 2006) ("iT]he 
Court acted on the irrational proposition that any combination of submarkets could abo 
constitute a relevant product market."). 
2
x
2Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 277 n.4. Justice Stewart characterized .Justice Douglas· 
grouping of the two kinds of aluminum cable as ··repudiation of" the district court's findings 
since the facts established that unlike copper and aluminum cable, bare and insulated 
aluminum cable require "different equipment and engineering skills ... for their manufacture 
and sale." /d. at 2S6 (Stewart. 1., dissenting). 
2
x
3See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281. at 587. 
2
x
4That same term, the Supreme Court arguably engaged in gerrymandering another 
relevant market definition when it lumped glass bottles and metal cans into one market and 
found the acquisition of the third largest manufacturer of glass containers by the second largest 
manufacturer of metal containers a violation of Section 7. United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 
37R U.S. 441 (1964). Justice Douglas voted with the majority in a 7-2 opinion. It would 
appear that the Court could have considered both Rome Cable and Contmentol Can to he 
conglomerate, rather than horizontal, cases. That designation would have obviated the Court· s 
need to manipulate the relevant product market definition and would have enabled it to apply 
potential competition and entrenchment theories to strike down the mergers. At the time these 
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to group insulated and bare aluminum conductor together to gain a market 
concentration level that could support a Section 7 violation.285 
Even with the relevant market manipulation, Rome Cable's l.3% of the 
aluminum conductor market would appear to be de minimus. Not so for Justice 
Douglas, however. He believed that figure was sufficient to trigger a Section 7 
violation since Alcoa with 27.8% of the gerrymandered relevant market was its 
leader.286 According to Douglas, Rome Cable was "the prototype of the small 
independent that Congress aimed to preserve by Section 7."287 
In Rome Cable, Justice Douglas' distaste for anything close to market 
concentration took center stage288 and he took full advantage of the preventative 
language of the Clayton Act. 289 Two months earlier, he had written for the Court and 
struck down the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline by the El Paso Natural Gas 
Company.290 El Paso was the sole out-of-state supplier of natural gas to California, a 
large, rapidly expanding market at the time. 291 Although Pacific Northwest had no 
pipeline into California, since it "was the only other significant pipeline west of the 
Rocky Mountains," Douglas believed "we would have to wear blinders not to see 
that the mere efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into the California market, though 
unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's business attitudes within the 
State."292 
cases were decided, however, the Supreme Court had yet to apply those theories to Section 7 
cases, with the exception of United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) 
decided earlier the same term. El Paso involved a geographic rather than product extension 
merger, see infra text accompanying notes 401-10. The Court's (led by Justice Douglas) 
expansion of Section 7 to product extension mergers was still a few years away. See infra text 
accompanying notes 421-42. 
285 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281, at 624. 
286Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 280-81. 
287/d. at 281. He characterized Rome Cable as "an aggressive competitor" and "a pioneer 
in aluminum insulation" with "a special aptitude and skill insulation, and an active and 
efficient research and sales organization." /d. 
288
"It would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be oligopolistic." /d. at 
280 (emphasis added). 
289For example, he quoted the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act to show 
congressional intent to "prevent accretions of power which 'are individually so minute as to 
make it difficult to use the Sherman Act test against them,"' /d. (quoting S.Rep. No. 81-1775, 
at 5 (1950)). 
290United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
291 /d. at 658. 
292/d. at 658-59. 
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El Paso Natural Gas is thus the first occasion in which the Court focused on 
potential competition, as opposed to requiring an impact on actual competition, to 
invalidate a merger. 293 
Arguably the case is a strong one if, as Justice Douglas asserts, Pacific Northwest 
was the only potential competitor for the California natural gas market in an industry 
with very high entry barriers (the cost of natural gas pipeline construction). 
While El Paso Natural Gas may be defensible, Rome Cable seems typical of 
Justice Douglas' and the Warren Court's seeming result-oriented manipulation of 
relevant market definitions. The most readily criticized along these lines is Douglas' 
opinion for the Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp. 294 There the government 
sued an aggressive, Microsoft-like company (in terms of its conduct) that provided 
accredited central station fire and burglary protection services to businesses, under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Douglas found that the relevant product market was 
that of accredited central station protection services because "for many customers, 
only central station protection will do."295 Then, however, after focusing on the 
customers' needs in defining the relevant product market, he inexplicably found the 
geographic market to be national, ignoring the reality that consumers of protection 
services choose from the options available locally.296 
In economic terms, Justice Douglas shifted from demand side analysis for the 
product market to supply side analysis for the geographic market. He adopted, 
according to the famous line from Justice Fortas' vigorous dissent, a "strange red-
haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification."297 If otherwise 
indefensible, Douglas seems to have at least been consistent on the geographic 
market definition issue in the oft-criticized Von's Grocery decision, joining with 
Justice Black's majority holding that Los Angeles constituted the relevant 
geographic market for retail grocery stores. 29K The major difference between 
Grinnell and Von's Grocery is that the latter is devoid of geographic market analysis 
and simply assumes that Los Angeles is the proper market.299 
293It was certainly not the last time, however. See, e.g .. United States v. Marine 
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Conn. Nat'! Bank, Inc .. 418 U.S. 656 
(1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
294384 U.S. 563 ( 1966). For criticism of Grinnell, see. e.g., Frank Easterbrook. On 
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972,973 n.2 (1986). 
295Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 574. 
296/d. at 575. 
297/d. at 591 (Fortas, J ., dissenting). 
298United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). In his dissent, Justice 
Stewart pointed out that the actual market foreclosure of the merger was less than one percent 
of the total grocery store sales in Los Angeles since the two grocery chains were located in 
different parts of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. !d. at 296 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See 
also C. Paul Rogers, Perspectives on Corporate MerRers and the Antitrust Laws. 12 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 30 I, 304-06 ( 1981 ). 
299Later, in his dissent in the watershed United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 
U.S. 486 (1974), Justice Douglas again applied a supply side analysis by focusing on the areas 
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On the other hand, Justice Douglas also voted with the majority in the infamous 
Brown Shoe decision, agreeing that the proper relevant geographic markets for retail 
shoe sales were each city with a population exceeding 10,000.3txJ Although Brown 
Shoe involved retail goods rather than retail services, it is difficult to see how that 
makes any difference since the purchaser demand for both are decidedly local.301 In 
Grinnell, Douglas argued that corporate planning is on a national level and that the 
certification and inspection of the systems was largely done by national insurers.302 
Justice Fortas' dissent forcefully dismembered that argument, noting that Supreme 
Court precedent and common sense required geographic markets to be defined by 
"where ... a potential buyer look[s] for potential suppliers of the service .... "303 
Justice Douglas' narrowly defined relevant product market of accredited central 
station protection services in Grinnell also drew heavy fire from the separate dissents 
of Justices Fortas and Harlan.30~ Fortas, in particular, noted that the record 
established that customers frequently switch from one form of security system to 
another and that accredited central station services operated at a loss in at least 
twenty cities where alternatives such as watchmen, local alarm systems, proprietary 
systems and unaccredited central stations were available.305 He noted the apparent 
in which the defendant coal companies sold their coal without a mention of from whom coal 
buyers looked to purchase coal. /d. at 511-27 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
300Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 337-39 ( 1962). The decision is not 
infamous for its relevant market definition but for its finding that enhanced efficiencies from a 
merger support a finding of illegality because they tend to squeeze out "viable, small, locally 
owned business." /d. at 344. For criticisms see, for example, John L. Peterman, The Brown 
Shoe Case, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 81 (1975), Kauper, supra note 211, Bork & Bowman, supra note 
21 L and Harlan Blake & Kenneth Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 422,456-57 (1965). 
301 In the product market part of the Grinnell opinion, Justice Douglas makes a feeble 
attempt to differentiate products and service~ in distinguishing Brown Shoe but provides no 
analytical support. Grinnf'll, 384 U.S. at 572 ("First, we deal with services, not with products . 
. . . "). Earlier, in United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 
490-91 (1950), Douglas had ruled that the prohibition against price fixing, at least, applied to 
services as well as to goods. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25. 
302Grinnel!, 3H4 U.S. at 575. 
103/d. at 589 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas noted that "lt]he premises protected do 
not travel" and also that "le]ven the central stations can provide service only within a 25-mile 
radius." /d. at 587-88. In general, he characterized the majority's relevant market analysis as 
"Procrustean-that it has tailored the market to the dimensions of the defendants." Jd. at 590. 
Justice Fortas was a one··time student and former protege of .Justice Douglas at Yale and then 
the SEC. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 10, at 506-07. Although Justices Fortas and Douglas 
remained friends until Douglas' death in early 1980, id., it is interesting to speculate about 
whether Fortas' strident dissent in Grinnf'il may have temporarily jeopardized their personal 
relationship. Perhaps the bond was strong enough that Justice Fortas felt free to use hyperbole 
in his dissent. 
104See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 585 (Fortas, J., dissenting); 384 U.S. at 583 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
305Grinnel/, 384 U.S. at 592. 
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inconsistency with the Court's "reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-
elasticity of demand" tests of earlier cases. 306 
Justice Douglas' relevant product market analysis in Grinnell is indeed difficult. 
if not impossible, to square with other Supreme Court precedent such as United 
States v. E./. du Pont de Nemours & Co .. in which the Court ruled that cellophane 
was simply part of the overall tlexible wrapping materials market even though 
cellophane was of greater quality and two to three times more expensive than the 
alternatives. 307 While Douglas may have had some difficulty following precedent, he 
did maintain internal consistency in Grinnell since he had joined Chief Justice 
Warren's dissent in the DuPont decision. 10~ That dissent argued stridently that 
cellophane should be separated from the market because it was so superior that not 
only did DuPont not consider other flexible wrapping materials to be competitors but 
neither did the producers of those materials who priced their products independent of 
DuPont. 309 
Justice Douglas also voted for the narrower market division in the International 
Boxing case, joining the majority that determined that championship boxing matches 
were separate from non-championship prize fights. 310 Thus, he was in the three 
principal monopolization cases decided by the Warren Court, at least consistent in 
arguing for narrower relevant markets, the better to conclude that the defendant had 
the type of dominant market power needed for the Section 2 case to proceed?'' 
Today Grinnell is still oft cited for establishing the two-prong test for monopolistic 
conduct312 and thus joins the group of Warren Court antitrust decisions such as 
Brown Shoe and Griffith generally discredited for their holdings on the merits but 
306/d. at 592-93. 
307 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1951 ). 
10HDuPont, 351 U.S. at 414 (Wanen, C.J., dissenting). Justice Black also joined the 
WmTen dissent. /d. 
309/d. at 417-19. According to the dissent, buyer~ considered cellophane to be a separate 
product as well. !d. at 417. 
310Int'l Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959). 
111 The relevant market analyse' of DuPonT and Grinnell are difficult at best to reconcile. 
leading some to conclude that the cases are simply result-oriented. DuPont seems to have 
been a relatively benign giant. obtaining their market dominance hy development of a superior 
product while Grinnell was the opposite, buying up competitors and closing them down. Of 
course in today·s more sophisticated Section 2 approach, DuPont might successfully defend 
against the unlawful conduct element. In Grinnell, the government apparently did not believe 
it could construct a strong Section I case; thus. the finding of monopoly power was necessary 
for success against a "bad actor" defendant. See. e.g .. HANDLER, supra note 138. at 230-31 
(suggesting that conduct evidence may influence market power analysis). 
312
"The offense of monopoly ... ha~ two elements: (I) the possession of monopoly power 
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident." Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. See also Mark N. Berry. The 
Uncertaillty of Monopolistic Conduct: A Comparative Rn•iew (if Three Jurisdictions, 32 LAW 
& PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 274 (200 I) ("[T]he Supreme Court in ... Grinnell fashioned a 
general rule for monopolistic conduct that prevails to the cunent day."). 
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well recognized for their articulation of the applicable legal principle or analytical 
standard.m 
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. 
provides interesting insight about the flexibility he and the Warren Court believed 
that "the line of commerce" language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act gave the Court 
in defining relevant markets.314 There the Court reversed a lower court finding that 
the printing of color comic supplements for newspapers that do not print their own 
was a separate market from the printing of color comic supplements for syndicates 
that sold copyrighted comic feature to newspapers.315 Although recognizing that 
"submarkets within this broad market" may exist, Douglas reiterated that a 
submarket does not mean the Court must disregard the larger market.316 
In United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of LexingtoJJ, Justice 
Douglas wrote for the majority in holding that commercial banking was "one 
relevant market,"m following the ruling in Philadelphia National Bank one year 
earlier that the "cluster of products . . . and services . . . denoted by the term 
'commercial banking' ... composes a distinct line of commerce."318 Because he 
determined that the merger was illegal with the market so defined, he avoided 
deciding whether trust department services constituted another relevant market.319 
A consistent thread seems to be present in Justice Douglas' view of relevant 
product issues, articulated in Rome Cable, in which he characterized price as "the 
single, most important, practical factor" in the insulated conductor market.320 Earlier 
he had joined Chief Justice Warren's dissent in DuPont,321 which argued that the 
much higher price of cellophane coupled with its physical superiority created a 
market separate from other flexible wrapping materials. 322 Similarly, the majority 
313See supra text accompanying note 217. See also sources cited supra note 277. 
m402 U.S. 549 (1971). 
315 /d. at 552. 
316/d. at 553. Here Justice Douglas quoted from United States v. Phillipsburg National 
Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970), which held that commercial banking was a line 
of commerce distinct from other types of financial institutions. /d. 
317376 U.S. 665,667 (1964). 
mUnited States v. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). See also Phillipsburg 
National Bank, 399 U.S. at 360. Justice Douglas was in the majority in both Philadelphia 
National Bank and Phillipsburg National Bank. 
319For a further discussion of First National Bank & Trust of Lexington, see infra text 
accompanying notes 395-410. 
320United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276 (1964) (distinguishing 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), which had focused on the style and 
quality of shoes in addition to price). 
1
"
1u · d s 
- mte tates v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 414 (1956) (Warren, 
C.J ., dissenting). 
322The dissent was further troubled by the fact that seventy-five to eighty percent of all 
cigarettes were wrapped in with cellophane rather than other flexible wrapping materials, 
noting that all buyers of a product are entitled to competition. /d. at 424-25. Again there 
appears to be some consistency with Justice Douglas' relevant market definition in Grinnell 
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which he joined in International Boxing Club of New York v. United States323 based 
its distinction of championship boxing matches from non-championship matches on 
the much higher revenue, increased television ratings and ticket prices, and greater 
television, radio and motion picture demand produced by championship fights. 324 
Certainly, effect on price is the key issue in contemporary relevant market 
analysis. 325 Recognition of the practical importance of price, however, does not 
necessarily translate to a cogent, consistent application of price theory. Justice 
Douglas, in fact, vacillated between supply and demand side analyses, even within a 
single decision. About the only real consistency one can find in his relevant market 
analysis is that he was sure to favor the definition of the narrowest plausible market, 
the better to find supposed market power and thus an antitrust violation. As his 
decision in Rome Cable illustrates, he was not even opposed to making it up as he 
went along, even if the government had not briefed it that way. In the hands of 
Douglas and the Warren Court, Section 7 of the Clayton Act (and, one might argue, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act) was indeed a powerful tool to stop "in their 
incipiency" increases in market share through merger. 326 
VIII. DIVESTITURE 
It is not surprising, given his antipathy towards monopoly power, that Justice 
Douglas' favored structural remedies to behavioral ones. In essence, he believed 
divestiture was appropriate for any antitrust offense involving size or the 
accumulation of market power, whether accomplished collectively or independently. 
He was firm in his belief of divestiture as the antitrust remedy of choice and sought 
its use broadly, including cases involving vertical integration,327 conspiracies to 
restrain trade,328 abuse of patent rights in restraint of trade,329 monopolization,330 and 
when he notes "that for many customers, only central station protection will do." Grinnell, 384 
U.S. at 574. 
323358 U.S. 242 (1959). 
324/d. at 250-51. 
325See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
§§ 1.0-1.322 (1992) (identifying a firm's ability to maintain a "small but significant and 
nontransitory" increase in price as proof of market power). 
326See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 & n.32 (1962) (quoting 
"incipiency" language and quoting legislative history). 
327Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1972); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-75 ( 1948). 
328Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1951); Schine 
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. II 0, 126-30 (1948); United States v. Crescent 
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188-90 (1944). 
329United States v. Nat' I Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 364-69 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting in 
part). 
330United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,577-80 (1966); Paramount Pictures, 334 
U.S. at 171-72; Schine Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 126-30; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 
100 (1948). 
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mergcrs. 111 In doing so, he made it clear that his interest was protecting 
competitors 112 and that his fear of size overcame any thought of efficiency or 
consumer welfare that, for example, vertical integration might achieve.333 
Writing for the majority in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., Justice 
Douglas early on employed divestiture to deprive antitrust offenders of "the fruits" 
of their unlawful activity. 114 Thus, "[t]hose who violate the Act may not reap the 
benefits of their violations and avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the plea 
of hardship or inconvenience."135 He thought injunctive relief ineffective because it 
enabled defendants to ''retain the full dividends of their monopolistic practices and 
profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which they had inflicted on 
competitors.'' 136 Surprisingly perhaps, this offensive use of divestiture broke new 
ground and served as the basis for the use of divestiture as a punitive as well as 
remedial remedy. 337 
Justice Douglas had no qualms about taking any opportunity to force a divestiture 
issue. In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co .. 138 Douglas was 
able to persuade a five-justice majority to remand and require divestiture in a case 
before the Court on a Rule 24(a) right of intervention question. 119 The case was a 
continuation of the United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. litigation in which 
Douglas, in a majority opinion for the Court, had three years before found El Paso in 
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and directed the district court to order 
divestiture. 140 The district court had subsequently denied the intervention requests of 
the state of California and two private natural gas companies in the divestiture 
proceedings below. Although divestiture was not briefed or argued, as Justice 
Stewart's stinging dissent pointed out, that did not stop Justice Douglas from 
311 Ford Motor. 405 U.S. at 573-74: United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 
549.556 (1971); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129. 136-43 
I 1967); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 ( 1964). 
'
12Schi11e Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 128. 
"'See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 174. 
1q323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944). 
116According to Justice Douglas, injunctive relief rendered enforcement of the Sherman 
Act '·a futile thing" unless the Justice Department "moved in at the incipient stages of the 
unlawful project:' Schine Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 128. Thus, divestiture or dissolution 
was "an essential feature" of enforcement decrees. /d. 
'"See Note, Standards Govemi11g Relief Under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 97 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2.1+. 244 ( 1948). According to Justice Douglas, divestiture or dissolution served three 
functions: I I) terminating the combination or conspiracy when that was the violation: (2) 
depriving the defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy; and (3) breaking up or rendering 
powerle,;s the monopoly power which the Sherman Act makes illegal. Schine Chain Theatres, 
3.14 U.S. at 128-29. 
"S386 U.S. 129, 129 (1967). 
1
"
1Justices White and Fortas did not participate and Justice Stewart, joined by Justice 
Harlan. dissented. /d. at 143 (Stewart, J .. dissenting). 
Ho'\76 U.S. 651,662. See infra text accompanying notes 401-10. 
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"roamfing] at large. unconfined by anything so mundane as a factual record 
developed in adversury proceedings."341 
In point of fact. Justice Douglas wus very unhappy with the district court's 
handling of the Court's broad divestiture order from the case's previous trip to the 
Supreme Court, and rather than requiring the parties to brief and argue the issue, 
~imply undertook the issue on his own accord. 342 One could characterize the 
Justice's reaffirming of its divestiture order as the reassertion of judicial control over 
a remand seemingly gone ustray or as an example of the judicial activism for which 
Douglas and the Warren Court were so noted. His sua sponte order that the district 
court judge be replaced is certainly an illustration of appellate court pique and 
concomitant activism. 
Today divestiture is used much more sparingly than in the Warren Court heyday 
as skepticism about significant government intrusions into the economy has risen.343 
Even in monopolization cases. structuml relief is unusual as recognition of 
efficiencies and other consumer benefits of size has grown. 344 Further, today high-
tech markets change so quickly, and, in many cases, contain network effects 
necessary for consumer satisfaction, that the enforcement agencies have become 
leery of asking for structural relief.'45 Thus, both a change in markets through 
technological change and a dramatic shift in antitrust thinking have rendered Justice 
Douglas and the Warren Court's broad use of divestiture a remnant of antitrust 
history. 
1
-1
1 Justice Stewart characterized the m(IJOnty as having "rushed headlong into a 
jurisprudential quagmire .... " 386 U.S. at !60 (Stewmt, J .. dissenting). Justice Douglas was 
unhappy that the government had ''knuckled under" to El Paso in agreeing to a proposed 
"settlement" of the case after remand. /d. at 129 (majority opinion). He responded by 
aniculating in detail what the divestiture decree had to contain to assure that El Paso faced 
competition for the California natural gas market. /d. at 136-40. 
1
'
12Douglas even took the extraordinary step of directing that a different district judge be 
assigned to hear the case on this remand, id. at 142-43, a move the dissent characterized as 
··not only unprecedented, but incredible[,]" since no one had requested his replacement at any 
stage. ld. at 161 (Stewart. J., dissenting). 
3~ 3See. e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 02 (2d ed. 200 I). Judge Posner 
argues that structural relief "such as divestiture should be limited to the divestiture of assets 
recently acquired in an unlawful merger.'' /d. As a practical matter, that would effectively 
eliminate divestiture as a remedy since under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification 
Act all mergers of significant size are reviewed by the government enforcement agencies prior 
to consummation. 
1
-1
4Judge Posner characterizes the so-called 1968 Neal Report (officially the White House 
Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in Small Business and the Robinson Patman 
Act. Hearings !Jefi>re the Special Subcommittee of Small Business and the Rohinson-Patman 
Act of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 91 st Cong. 291 (I 969)), which urged 
that highly concentrated markets be forcibly deconcentrated through forms of structural relief 
>uch as divestiture (as well as new legislative solutions), as today "completely off the wall" 
even though its principal authors were at the time largely conservative. POSNER, supra note 
343, at 117. 
145See, e.g., Thomas Piraino, An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic 
NetH'orks. 93 Nw. U. L REv. I (1998). 
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IX. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
The Warren Court came into full bloom in the 1960s, at least with respect to 
trade regulation issues, and decided a plethora of merger and acquisition cases under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 346 In the face of contemporary criticism that "[t]he sole 
consistency that I can find is in litigation under Section 7, the Government always 
wins,"347 Justice Douglas voted for the government in every case, frequently writing 
the majority opinion. In fact, the government did always win. 
The watershed General Dvnamics decision.348 handed down only two years after 
Ford Motor and eight years. after the horrific Von's Grocery decision,349 vividly 
illustrates the impact that the Burger Court had on merger analysis and how left 
behind Justice Douglas and other Warren Court holdovers were by "the New 
Learning" and thinking about industrial concentration.350 In the 1966 Von's Grocery 
case, Douglas joined his crony Justice Black in a 6-2 decision, with Justice White 
concurring, to strike down a merger between the third and sixth largest grocery 
chains in the Los Angeles area that together had a 7.5% market share, as measured in 
retail grocery sales. 
Justice Stewart, joined only by Justice Harlan,351 penned a blistering dissent, 
noting that the majority had blocked a merger resulting in 1.4% of the grocery stores 
in Los Angeles with a market increase of 1.1% of the two largest chains in the 
market and 3.3% of the six largest.352 According to Stewart, even those meager 
346The merger wave of the late 1950s and early 1960s coupled with the passage of the 
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950, which expanded Section 7 coverage to asset as well as stock 
acquisitions are at least partly responsible for the heightened merger enforcement activity. See 
Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 
(2000)). An aggressive Department of Justice and receptive Supreme Court are certainly other 
factors. 
347United States v. Von's Grocery Co .. 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
See also Kauper, supra note 211, at 335-41 (examining growing cynicism of the Supreme 
Court in antitrust cases where the government always wins). 
348United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
349Von 's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270. 
350See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID 
et al. eds., 1974). At the time, General Dynamics was a controversial decision and drew 
substantial criticism from commentators. See James F. Ponsoldt, The Expansion of Horizontal 
Merger Defenses After General Dynamics: A Suggested Reconsideration of Sherman Act 
Principles, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 361, 362 ( 1981) (asserting that General Dynamics 
"dramatically changed horizontal merger litigation in favor of defendants"); Daniel F. Kolb, 
The Impact of Business Realities in Recent Potential Competition and Horizontal Merger 
Cases-The Government Can Lose, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 955 ( 1978); Howard R. Lurie, Mergers 
Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and Its Implications, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213 
( 1978). C.f Miles W. Kirkpatrick & Stephen Paul Mahinka. The Supreme Court and the "New 
Economic Realism" of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Sw. L.J. 821 (1976); Richard A. 
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, 
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Cot.UM. L. REV. 282 (1975). 
351 Justice Fortas did not participate. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 279. 
152 /d. at 281, 302 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stewart pointed out that the 
merger was really a market extension rather than horizontal acquisition because more than 
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statistics were misleading because the acquired firm, Shopping Bag, was on the 
decline with decreasing earnings and profits.m In addition, the lack of entry barriers 
and the ability of small grocery chains to enter and compete suggested that any 
increase in market share was not concomitant with an increase in market power.354 
The Court continued routinely to steamroll any and all mergers after Von's 
Grocer/55 until 1974 when the Burger Court had taken firm root. 356 As a result, that 
year in General Dynamics, Justice Stewart was able to garner a 5-4 majority in 
upholding a merger of a deep shaft coal producer and a strip mine coal company 
competing in one of the four major coal distribution areas.357 Douglas dissented and 
was joined by Warren Court holdovers Brennan, White and Marshall. In effect, the 
four Burger Court appointees joined Justice Stewart to allow the merger in General 
Dynamics, replacing three Warren Court votes to enjoin the acquisition in Von's 
Grocery. 358 
The majority opinion in General Dynamics is strikingly similar to Justice 
Stewart's dissent in Van's Grocery, as both opinions looked beyond statistical 
evidence of potential market foreclosures to consider other market factors such as the 
relative competitive strength of the acquired company. The General Dynamics 
Court noted that United, the acquired company, had very limited uncommitted coal 
fifty percent of the acqumng and acquired firms did not compete with each other for 
customers. As a result, he asserted that the total market foreclosed by the merger was less 
than one percent of the total grocery sales in the Los Angeles area. !d. at 296. 
353 !d. at 298. 
354Justice Stewart noted that the advent of buying cooperatives enabled small chains to 
purchase goods at prices competitive with those paid by the large chains. !d. at 298-99. 
Ironically, four years later the Supreme Court, in another shaky decision in which Justice 
Douglas voted with the majority, applied the per se rule to the market allocation rules of just 
such a purchasing cooperative. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
355See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971) (Douglas majority 
opinion rejecting failing company defense, see infra text accompanying notes 365-67); United 
States v. Phillipsburg Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (bank merger struck down); 
Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (Douglas majority opinion rejecting 
failing company defense, see infra text accompanying notes 351-62); United States v. Third 
Nat'! Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 ( 1968) (bank merger stuck down); United States v. First 
City Nat'! Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967) (Douglas majority opinion holding that 
under the Bank Merger Act of 1966 a court has de novo review of proposed bank merger 
approved by the Comptroller of Currency). 
356Warren Burger had replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice. Justices Blackmun, Powell 
and Rehnquist had been appointed by President Nixon to replace Justices Fortas, Black and 
Harlan, respectively. Justice Marshall had joined the Warren Court as a President Johnson 
appointment subsequent to Von's Grocery, replacing Justice Clark. 
357415 U.S. 486,511-12 (1974). 
358Justice Fortas had not participated in Von's Grocery. Justice Harlan had joined Justice 
Stewart's dissent there but had been replaced in 1967 by Johnson appointee Thurgood 
Marshall, who joined Justice Douglas' dissent in General Dynamics. Warren Court holdover 
Justice White had concurred in Von's Grocerv but joined Justice Douglas' dissent in General 
Dynamics. See generally Rogers, supra note 298. 
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reserves with little hope for acquiring more. 359 Most coal was sold under long-term 
supply contracts to electric utilities, which demanded assurance of future supplies. 
Those were contracts for which United could not effectively bid. As a result, the 
Court found proof of United's past and present market position misleading because it 
did not reflect current competition for new long-term supply contracts.360 
Justice Douglas' dissent. while superior to the majority opinion he joined in 
Von's Grocery,361 did not tackle the majority's assessment of market impact head on. 
It was obviously drafted as a majority opinion as it focuses mostly on the supposed 
errors of the district court and not on the majority opinion.362 In addressing the 
majority, Douglas argued the technical point that proof of United's weak reserve 
position constituted post-acquisition evidence not supported by the district court's 
time-of-acquisition tindings. 363 The majority disagreed, noting that Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act dealt with "probabilities, not certainties" and that the district court was 
"fully justified" in relying on evidence of weak coal reserves because it directly bore 
on the question of whether a future lessening of competition was probable.364 
In addressing the merits of the majority's weak reserve argument, Justice 
Douglas was reduced to arguing that United might in the future develop deep-mining 
expertise to remain a competitive factor, even though it had not extracted deep 
reserves in twenty years.365 He also took issue with the district court's lack of 
finding of market shares at the time of acquisition of uncommitted coal reserves366 
and concluded that affirming the district court's judgment could only reflect "a deep-
seated judicial bias against [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act." 
There is no little irony there since the Supreme Court had not ruled against the 
Justice Department in a merger case since Columbia Steel twenty-six years before 
and then only because the case fell under Section I of the Sherman Act rather than 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As noted, Justice Douglas had vigorously dissented.'67 
359United ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in annual production but tenth in 
reserve holdings, controlling less than one percent of reserve holdings in Illinois, Indiana and 
Western Kentucky. United's reserves were so depleted that it had already closed several 
mines. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 502. 
360 /d. at 501-02. 
361 Von's Grocery, however. is probably the weakest. most poorly analyzed Supreme Court 
antitrust opinion on record. 
3620ne wonders, who was the swing vote? Justices Blackmun and Powell would appear to 
be the most likely candidates based on their later voting records. 
363General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 523-24. 
364/d. at 505 (quoting Bmwn Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 ). 
365/d. at 525. The majority responded by stating that "the hypothetical possibility that 
United Electric might in the future acquire the expertise to mine deep reserves proves 
nothing-or too much'' since that theoretical possibility was available to all "with the 
inclination and the corporate treasury to do so." /d. at 509. 
366/d. at 527. The majority had concluded that the government's prima facie statistical 
case did not establish the likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition in any market. 
/d. at 510-11. 
367 See supra text accompanying notes 179-85. 
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It is probably more accurate to say that Douglas held a deep-seated judicial bias in 
favor of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
It is illuminating to consider General Dynamics and Warren Court decisions like 
Von's Grocery in the context of the Hertindahl-Hirschman Index, the present-day 
index the Department of Justice uses to assess the concentration of a given market 
and the likely competitive impact of a given merger, to illustrate just how out of step 
Justice Douglas and his Warren Court brethren have become.16' Von's Grocery, for 
example, is not a case the government would today pursue and, in fact, probably 
would not get a second request under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification 
Act. 369 The pre-merger index would likely have been under 300 with the increase 
from the merger at only about forty. 370 General Dynamics presented a similar 
picture, even before the lack of coal reserves was factored. 171 Nonetheless, Douglas 
used Von's Grocery and the even smaller market foreclosure in United States v. 
Pabst Brewing Co.m as benchmarks in his General Dynamics dissent. 373 Douglas 
did note that those were cases involving merging ''trends," which, under Warren 
Court doctrine, allowed for more liberal application of Section 7:174 
Consistent with his aggressive use of Section 7 to combat increased market 
concentration, Justice Douglas authored two opinions375 late in his career in which he 
refused to apply the so-called "failing company" defense first recognized by the 
Court in International Shoe Co. v. FTC. 376 In the Citizen Publishing case, Douglas 
upheld a divestiture order for a joint operating agreement between the two daily 
newspapers in Tucson, Arizona. Although the agreement provided for the 
36RSee generally DEP'T of JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4 ( 1997). 
369 !5 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2001). 
370The Guidelines indicate that the government i~ unlikely to challenge a merger in a 
market with a post merger index of under I 000. 
371 See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 495 n.6 ("degree of concentration in two coal 
markets chosen by ... [gjovernment were 'roughly comparable' to those in Von's Grocery"). 
372384 U.S. 546 (1966). 
373The market foreclosure in Von's Groce~y was 7.5% and in Pabst Brewing 4.49%. 
Pabst Brewing was another questionable Warren Court decision, written by Justice Black. 
Worried about industry trends. Justice Douglas concurred. appending an Art Buchwald 
Washington Post column to his opinion ""hich, tongue in cheek, predicted that, due to slack 
antitrust enforcement, the United States would soon be down to one company and that one 
company would then attempt to purchase the United States. General Dynamics, 384 U.S. at 
553. 
374Justice Douglas also acknowledged that "uncommitted reserves or sales of previously 
uncommitted coal would be preferahle indicia of competitive strength," but argued that the 
district court had made no such time of acquisition findings under either standard. General 
Dynamics, 415 U.S. at485. 
375See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138; United States v. Greater 
Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 ( 1971 ). 
376Jnt'l Shoe Co, v. FTC. 280 U.S. 291 (1930). 
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continuing independence of each paper's news and editorial departments, it 
combined circulation, advertising, subscription and other business operations.377 
The defendant asserted the failing company defense since The Citizen had 
operated in the red for many years and sold fifty percent less advertising than its 
competitor, The Star. Justice Douglas quickly ruled that neither requirement for the 
defense-"the grave probability of a business failure" nor proof that The Star was 
the only available suitor for The Citizen-was present.m As a matter of policy, 
Douglas announced that the Court was "confin[ing] the failing company doctrine to 
its present narrow scope."379 
In dissent, Justice Stewart expressed his belief that the majority was in effect 
further restricting the failing company defense by requiring the defendant to 
affirmatively show that it tried to sell to a non-competitor.380 Stewart pointed out 
that the district court had before it "substantial" and "convincing evidence" that no 
outside suitor would have considered purchasing The Citizen because of its "dire 
financial condition."381 According to Stewart, that was all the law required prior to 
the majority's new standard that failing company defendants "prove that they made 
tangible efforts, however futile, to find an outside buyer."382 
In his majority opinion, Justice Douglas does not cite International Shoe, and 
quite rightly so, for the proposition that a failing company defendant must 
affirmatively establish that it was the only available purchaser. Although the 
International Shoe decision mentions parenthetically that the competitor purchaser 
should be the only "prospective purchaser," there is no evidence in that case that the 
distressed company had actually sought other suitors.383 In fact, the Court there gave 
considerable deference to the good faith of the failing company's "officers, 
stockholders, and creditors, thoroughly familiar with the factors of a critical situation 
and more able than commission or court to foresee future contingencies, [who] after 
much consideration, felt compelled to choose the latter alternative."384 
Justice Douglas did drop a "Cf." cite to United States v. Diebold, Inc., a brief 
(one long paragraph) 1961 per curiam decision in which the Court reversed 
summary judgment for a failing company defendant. 385 According to the Court, one 
377 Citizen Publishing, 394 U.S. at 133-34. 
378 !d. at 136-38. Justice Harlan concurred in the result, questioning whether it was 
appropriate for the Court to consider the failing company defense only at the time of the 
original operating agreement (1940) rather than when the agreement was renewed (1953). /d. 
at 140 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
379/d. at 139. 
380/d. at 143 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
381 /d. at 143-44. 
mid. at 143. 
383/d. at 137 (citing Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302-03). 
384The Court went on to say that "[t]here is no ... doubt that in doing so they exercised a 
judgment which was both honest and well informed . . . in the familiar presumption of 
rightfulness which attaches to human conduct in general." Int 'I Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302. 
385369 U.S. 654 ( 1961 ). 
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of the genuine issues of material fact not resolved adequately for summary judgment 
was whether the defendant "was the only bona fide prospective purchaser for HHM's 
b . " 186 Th . " t I . " " h d f' I usmess. · e Issue a east m part was a ea -on actua controversy ... of 
whether other offers for HHM's assets or business were actually made."3x7 
Thus, Justice Douglas, who of course was part of (and probably authored) the 
Diebold per curiam opinion. took the failing company doctrine down a slippery 
slope. Taking the doctrine as he found it in International Shoe, where the distressed 
company's opinion as to whether any non-competing suitors existed was presumed 
to be in good faith and superior to a reviewing court's second guessing, he 
transformed it to an affirmative duty of the failing company defendant to seek those 
suitors, even if futile. That affirmative duty extends beyond Diebold, in which the 
Court did not require evidence of other offers and held they were merely probative of 
whether the defendant was the only viable purchaser of the failing entity. 
The year following the Citizen Publishing decision, Congress passed The 
Newspaper Preservation Act3x8 to validate joint newspaper operating agreements 
under the antitrust laws as long as no more than one of the newspapers entering into 
the arrangement was "likely to remain or become a financially sound publication." 
The Act requires prior written consent of the U.S. Attorney General.3x9 
Justice Douglas also made quick work of the failing company defense two years 
after Citizen Publishing in the Greater Buffalo Press case.190 There he reversed a 
lower court's application of the defense, which had allowed the merger of two color 
comic supplement printers, ruling that the defendant had not satisfied either 
requirement. International Color Printing, the acquired company, had not exhibited 
"the grave probability of a business failure" even though its sole customer was 
threatening to place its business elsewhere.391 International Color Printing had also 
failed to meet its affirmative duty, arising from Citizen Publishing, to contact 
potential buyers beyond Greater Buffalo and King, its sole customer.192 
In sum, Justice Douglas wanted it both ways with respect to Section 7. He was 
responsible both for expanding the reach of the section, as further noted below, and 
for limiting the failing company doctrine so as to restrict its viability as a legitimate 
Section 7 defense. While the affirmative duty requirement imposed in Citizen 
186/d. at 655. 
187/d. 
ml5 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1988). 
389Under the Act, the Attorney General can only give consent if it is found that all the 
newspapers in the joint operating arrangement but one are failing newspapers. § 1803(b). For 
an appellate review of the Attorney General's approval of a merger proposal between 
competing Detroit newspapers. see Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. 
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D. C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 490 U.S. I 045 ( 1989). 
390United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc .. 402 U.S. 549 ( 1971 ). 
391The customer, King Features Syndicate, had not threatened or invoked the six month 
cancellation clause in its contract. Further, the company had increased its profits and was 
planning for expansion. !d. at 555. 
192Not surprisingly. Justice Douglas cited the International Shoe decision for the first 
requirement but not for the second. affirmative duty prong. For that, he cited Citizen 
Publishing. /d. 
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Publishing appears to have stood the test of time,3'n most of the Warren Court's 
Section 7 jurisprudence, led by Douglas, has not. 
X. BANK MERGERS 
The Warren Court, with Justice Douglas playing a prominent role, decided a 
number of cases involving the merger of competing banks. In some ways the bank 
merger cases were sui generis because they often concerned questions about the 
applicability of Section 7 to the banking industry. Not surprisingly, the Warren 
Court always found the means to strike down the targeted merger, although 
sometimes incurring the wrath of Congress. 
The initial bank merger case, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 
decision,194 is famous for establishing the ''presumptive illegality'' standard of 
mergers resulting in undue market concentration. First. however, the Court had to 
travel a tortuous path to determine whether Section 7 even applied to the merger in 
question. The tirst question was whether Section 7. as amended by the 1950 Celler-
Kefauver Amendments, covered bank asset mergers. 195 The Court somewhat 
surprisingly held that it did.396 Second, the Court ruled that the Bank Merger Act of 
1960397 did not impliedly repeal the application of Section 7 to bank mergers.39~ 
Although the Justice Department challenged the Philadelphia National Bank 
merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it sued to enjoin a contemporaneous 
merger between banks in Lexington, Kentucky under the Sherman Act because of 
concerns about the applicability of Section 7 to bank mergers.399 That case, United 
States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington,41m proceeded to the Supreme 
393See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, §~ 
5.0-52 ( 1997). 
394374 u.s. 321 (1963). 
395Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184,64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §~ 18. 
21 (2000)). 
39
"'rhe Celler-Kefauver Amendments plugged the "asset" loophole by extending Section 7 
to asset acquisitions by a "corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission." Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 18,21 (2000)). Since the FTC's jurisdiction specifically excluded banks. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45 (a)(6), the Celler-Kefauver Amendments likewise appeared to exclude banks. The 
Philadelphia National Bank Court ruled, however, that Congress intended to exclude from 
Section 7 "only assets acquisitions by [banks] ... when not accomplished by merger." 
Philadelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 342. 
39774 Stat. 129. 
wxPhiladelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 350. The 1960 Act directed banking regulatory 
agencies to consider competitive factors before approving bank mergers. The Court, applying 
the standard maxim that implied immunity from the antitrust laws "are strongly disfavored[.!" 
ruled that the Act had no impact on the antitrust laws. 
399United States v. First Nat' I Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 673 ( 1994) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
400/d. at 665. 
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Court in the term following the Philadelphia National Bank decision. 4111 The Court. 
with Justice Douglas writing for the majority, had no difficulty reversing the district 
court decision and striking down the merger under Section I of the Sherman Act 
even absent the "prophylactic" language of the Clayton Act. 402 
The merger involved the first and fourth largest hanks in Fayette County, 
Kentucky which resulted in a bank controlling about fifty-two percent of the area· s 
assets and deposits.403 Justice Douglas relied on four forty to sixty-year-old railroad 
cases decided under the Sherman Act in finding that the hank merger met the 
restraint of trade standard.4114 He summarily dismissed the Columbia Steel precedent 
from which he had so vigorously dissented,405 stating that it "must be confined to its 
special facts," 406 with little explanation as to what those special facts might he. 407 
Instead he included a long quote from Columbia Steel, which identified factors that 
support an unreasonable restraint of trade finding40H and simply concluded that "I i]n 
the present case all those factors clearly point the other way, as we have seen."40'J 
In 1966, on the heels of the Philadelphia National Bank and Lexington Bank 
decisions, Congress expressed its displeasure with the Court, as well as clarified the 
applicability of the Clayton Act to bank mergers, by passing the Bank Merger Act 
"exempting existing bank mergers, including those in pending government suits, 
401 The Comptroller of Currency approved the Philadelphia bank merger on February 24. 
1961, Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. at 333. and the Lexington bank merger three days 
later on February 27. 1961. First Nat'! Bank and Trust. 376 U.S. at 667. The Justice 
Department formally challenged both mergers immediately. 
402Firsr Nat'! Bank and Tmst. 376 U.S. at 672-73. The Clayton Act language "may he 
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly" focuses on the probable 
competitive impact on the merger in the future in contrast to the Sherman Act's "restraint of 
trade" language which requires proof of an actual, as opposed to probable. offense. See. e.g .• 
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37.54 (1948). 
~03First Nat'! Bank and Trust, 376 U.S. at 668-69. 
40~United States v. S. Pac. Co .. 259 U.S. 214 ( 1922J; United States v. Reading Co .. 253 
U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R. Co .. 226 U.S. 61 ( 1912 J: N. Sw,. Co. v. 
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). According to Justice Douglas, "[tjhe four railroad cases 
at least stand for the proposition that where merging companies are major competitive factors 
in a relevant market. the elimination of significant competition between them. by merger or 
consolidation. itself ..:on~titutes a violation of l Section] I of the Sherman Act." First Nat'/ 
Bank and Trust, 376 U.S. at 671-72. 
405United States v. Columbia Steel Co .. 334 U.S. 495. 534-40. See sur>ra text 
accompanying notes 118-19. 
406First Nat'! Bank and Trust, 376 U.S. at 672. 
407In describing Columbia Steel. he noted that the Court had ·'observed. inter alia. that 
because of rate structures and the location of United States Steel's fabricating subsidiaries. the 
latter were unable to compete effectively in Consolidated's market." !d. (emphasis added). 
40x!d. (quoting Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. at 527-28). 
409First Nat'! Bank and Trust. 376 U.S. at 672. Justices Brennan and White concurred in 
the result but believed the result was dictated solely on the Columbia Steel precedent. /d. at 
673. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented. as they did with most of the merger decisions in 
the 1960s. /d. (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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from Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act."410 The Act 
specified that future bank mergers were "subject to the Clayton Act scrutiny unless 
their anticompetitive effects were 'clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the 
community served. "'411 
Although the Bank Merger Act of 1966 seemingly provided a new defense for 
the proponents of a bank merger, the Douglas-led Court soon minimized its efficacy. 
In United States v. First City Bank of Houston, decided the term following the Bank 
Merger Act, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court and held that the burden to establish 
"the public interest" defense was on the banks purporting to merge.412 Further, even 
though the Act required the Comptroller of Currency find that the anticompetitive 
effects of a bank merger must be "clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served[,]"413 Douglas ruled that Congress intended that judicial 
review be de novo.414 That meant, according to Douglas, an independent 
determination of the issues by the reviewing court.415 Thus, Douglas rejected the 
argument that the judiciary must sustain an administrative agency's decision unless it 
is not supported by substantial evidence.416 
One term later, in United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville, the Court 
applied the de novo review specified in the Bank of Houston case and overturned a 
district court finding that upheld the merger between the second and fourth largest 
banks in Nashville.417 Although the Court stated that "the legislative history of the 
410 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1966). See United States v. Third Nat'! Bank in Nashville, 390 
U.S. 171, 177 (1968) ("Congress was evidently dissatisfied with the 1960 Bank Merger Act as 
that Act was interpreted in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), 
and in United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964), 
and wished to alter both the procedures by which the Justice Department challenges bank 
mergers and the legal standard which courts apply in judging those mergers.") (citations 
omitted). 
411 § 1828(c)(5)(B). The Act gives the Department of Justice only thirty days to challenge 
bank mergers following approval by the appropriate banking agencies but automatically stays 
any merger challenged, thus preventing the necessity and difficulty of unraveling a 
consummated merger. § 1828(c)(6). 
412United State v. First City Nat' I Bank of Houston. 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967). 
413§ 1828(c)(5)(B ). 
414Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. at 367-70. The statute provided that a court in an antitrust 
action "shall review de novo the issues presented." Justice Douglas rejected the argument that 
the use of the word "review" rather than "trial" indicated a more limited scope of judicial 
review. /d. at 368. 
415/d. 
416/d. at 366-67. Justice Douglas characterized the 1966 Bank Merger Act as "the product 
of powerful contending forces, each of which in the aftermath claimed more of a victory than 
it deserved, leaving the controversy that finally abated in Congress to be finally resolved in the 
courts." /d. at 367. 
417Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. at 173, 192-93 (1968). The Court's opinion by 
Justice White was joined by Justice Douglas and three other justices. /d. Justice Harlan. 
62https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5
2008] THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 957 
Bank Merger Act of 1966 leaves no doubt that the Act was passed to make 
substantial changes in the law applicable to bank mergers[,]" the Court again held 
that it was not bound by an administrative agency's determination of the 
convenience and needs of the community.m According to the Court, the defending 
bank must establish that it could not meet the community's convenience and 
necessity needs without merging with a competitor.419 
In effect, the Bank r~f Houston and Third National Bank in Nashville decisions 
continued to apply standard Warren Court Section 7 analysis to bank mergers, 
undeterred by the 1966 Act.420 Its interpretation of the "convenience and needs" 
standard, placing the burden on the defendant to meet the standard, and giving little 
or no weight to administrative determinations of the standard produced no 
demonstrable change to "pure" antitrust enforcement of bank mergers under Section 
7, irrespective of congressional intent. 421 Justice Douglas and his Warren Court 
brethren made it clear that they were not about to cede Clayton Act enforcement 
authority to an administrative agency absent an unequivocal congressional mandate. 
XI. POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
In the 1960s and 70s, the Warren Court aggressively expanded the application of 
Section 7 to mergers that were not between direct competitors or firms in a vertical 
relationship but involved companies in complementary markets, whether by virtue of 
their products or geography. Not surprisingly, on that Court, Justice Douglas was 
the leading expansionist of Section 7 to what became known as conglomerate 
mergers. 422 He wrote three of the first four Supreme Court opinions applying 
potential competition theory to mergers,421 wrote a dissent in the other,424 and penned 
joined by Justice Stewart, again dissented and Justices Fortas and Marshall did not participate. 
ld. at 192-93. 
418/d. at 177. 
419Poor management was the problem for the Nashville Bank. The Court held that 
defendant had to show that it made reasonable efforts to solve the management problem short 
of merger or that any attempts would have been unlikely to succeed. !d. at 188, 192. 
42<>-r'he Court had commented that the 1966 Bank Merger Act "was more clear and more 
specific in prescribing new procedures for testing mergers than in expounding the new 
standard by which they should be judged." !d. at 178. 
421 See also ROGERS, ET AL., supra note I 06, at 533. 
422Bruce Allen Murphy, Justice Douglas' most recent biographer, points out that in 1962 
with the appointment of Justice Goldberg to replace Justice Frankfurter, Douglas finally had a 
five-vote liberal majority (Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Brennan and Goldberg) 
with which to push his individual rights agenda. (In 1962 President Kennedy also appointed 
Justice White to replace Justice Whittaker but White was not the liberal that Kennedy had 
hoped for). MURPHY, supra note I 0, at 360. It is not perhaps too much of a stretch to suggest 
that the same liberal majority gave Douglas somewhat of a carte blanche to push his hawkish, 
expansionist antitrust agenda. In any event, he produced more questionable antitrust decisions 
in the 1960s and early 1970s than at any other period during his long career on the Supreme 
Court. 
423See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble 
Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
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the only opinion in which the Court has ever ruled that the opportunity for reciprocal 
dealing is sufficient to block a merger between non-competing companies.425 
El Paso Natural Gas was the first Section 7 case to directly consider the impact 
of potential competition on a merger.426 It involved the planned acquisition by El 
Paso Natural Gas, the sole out-of-state natural gas supplier to California, of Pacific 
Northwest Pipeline. the operator of pipelines throughout the west but not in or to 
Ca\ifornia.427 At the time of the merger, Pacific Northwest had tentatively agreed 
with Southern California Edison, the largest industrial user of natural gas in the state, 
to build a pipeline into California to supply Edison with natural gas.m While El 
Paso successfully opposed Pacific's plan to build a pipeline into California 
throughout the regulatory process, it also offered Edison much better gas prices and 
promises of unintetTupted deliveries. 424 
Justice Douglas quickly seized on the impact Pacific had on the California 
natural gas market as a potential, rather than actual, entrant, stating that "[ w ]e would 
have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into 
the California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's 
business attitudes within the State."430 According to Douglas, the fact that Pacific 
Northwest was effectively locked out of the California market and thus had no 
present market share was not relevant because, with the demand for natural gas 
growing by 200 million feet per day,431 it would have future opportunities to 
compete.432 
Justice Douglas did not articulate a test for establishing a potential competition 
claim, although he did suggest that the high entry barriers in the pipeline industry 
and Pacific Northwest's singular position as a potential entrant were important 
factors. 433 The closest he came to language that might have general application was 
424United States v. Penn-Olin Chern. Co., 379 U.S. 158, 177 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
425FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 ( 1965). 
426United States v. El Paso Nat'! Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). The Court in the 
Columbia Steel case, which was brought under Section I of the Sherman Act, had briefly 
considered the impact of potential competition. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 
495. 528-29 ( 1948). Justice Douglas' dissent in Columbia Steel did not deal with potential 
competition. /d. at 534-40. See supra generallv text accompanying note 186. 
427EI Paso supplied more than fifty percent of the natural gas in the state. El Paso Nat '1 
Gas. 376 U.S. at 652 n.2. 
42REd' · " d h . . . 1son pre.erre t at arrangement to contmumg to purchase natural gas from El Paso 
because El Paso was only able to offer interruptible gas service through its distributors. 
Pacific's gas would be non-interruptible and, because no distributors would be involved, less 
expensive than El Paso's. Id. at 654-55. 
424/d. at 655. 
430/d. at 659. 
431 /d. at 658. 
mid. at 660. 
413 /d. at 660-61. El Paso actually took control of Pacific Northwest in 1957. /d. By the 
time the case wound its way to the Supreme Court seven years later, however, two more 
interstate pipelines had entered California. /d. at 661. 
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when he wrote that "[tjhe effect on competition in a particular market through 
acquisition of another company is determined by the nature or extent of that market 
and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company's eagerness to enter 
that market. its resourcefulness, and so on."434 
Although little doctrine comes from El Paso Natural Gas. it is hard to quibble 
with the result since Pacific Northwest's attempts to enter California were certainly 
affecting El Paso's decisions within the market. Further, the decision, the first to rest 
on potential competition. is an innovative one.435 
Only two months later, however, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., the 
Court faced a more difficult application of the potential competition theory.436 The 
government had challenged a joint venture between Pennsalt Chemicals and Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corporation for the purpose of producing and selling sodium 
chlorate in the southeast.417 The majority applied dual potential competition tests: (I) 
determining whether both of the joint venturers were potential entrants to see if the 
joint entry foreclosed the competitive benefits of individual entry and, if not, (2) 
determining whether only one of the joint venturers was a potential entrant and, if so, 
whether the other was a potential entrant that would exert competitive influence "in 
the wings" of the market. 438 Since the district court had not considered the second 
test, the Court vacated and remanded. 
Penn-Olin represents a substantial expansion of potential competition doctrine 
beyond El Paso Natural Gas because it questions whether new market entry through 
a joint venture is as pro-competitive as individual entry might have been.439 Still, 
Justice Douglas did not believe that the majority had gone far enough and dissented, 
joined by his regular ally, Justice Black.440 In Douglas' view, the joint venture was 
434/d. at 660. 
435 Arguably the Warren Court would have been better advised to apply potential 
competition analysis to some of its earlier, questionable ''horizontal" merger cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Von· s Grocery Co .. 384 U.S. 270 ( 1966) (holding there was a horizontal 
merger even though only twenty-five percent of grocery stores of two companies competed); 
United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 ( 1964) (treating metal and glass containers as 
one market in spite of fact that there was little current end use competition between the two 
and Court acknowledged fact that merger involved '·inter-industry" competition). 
43
":l78 U.S. 158 (1964). 
437Pennsalt did not produce sodium chlorate in the southeast; Olin Mathieson did not 
produce sodium chlorate but did market it, although not in the southeast. /d. at 160-203. 
418 /d. at 175-76. See also Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1537-38 (1982); Thomas Piraino, Beyond Per Se. Rule of' Reason or 
Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Venture, 76 MINN. L. REV. I ( 1991 ); 
Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Lmrs: Some Reflections 011 the 
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007 ( 19fi9). 
439Accord Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa. Rethinking the Potential Competition 
Doctrine. 2004 WIS. L. REv. I 035. 1050. Pennsalt had never sold directly in the southeast 
market targeted by the joint venture while Olin had never produced sodium chlorate. although 
it had for the last few years distributed the product in the southeast for Pennsalt to test the 
demand. Cont'l Can, 378 U.S. at 161-62. 
440/d. at 177-184 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices White and Harlan also dissented; 
White without opinion and Harlan with a memorandum opinion. 
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akin to a per se market division between the two since it divided the market "fifty-
fifty" and foreclosed all competition between them.441 He thought it probable442 that 
one of the two, if not both, joint venturers would have entered the market 
independently with the other on the periphery as "a potent competitive factor."443 He 
saw no reason to remand a case when the joint venture "was launched at the very 
threshold of the entry of two potential competitors into a territory."444 
Thus, Justice Douglas took the extreme view that two firms, which had not 
entered a market but might, engaged in what amounted to a per se market division by 
agreeing to enter the market together. Since he placed the per se tag on the activity, 
the concentration of the market, the level of entry barriers, and number of other 
potential competitors were apparently not relevant.445 
Justice Douglas wrote for a six-justice majority in the next potential competition 
case to reach the Court, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,446 decided three years after 
Penn-Olin. There the Court found that Procter & Gamble had violated Section 7 by 
acquiring Clorox, the largest manufacturer of household bleach, because P&G was a 
potential entrant in that market. 
Justice Douglas noted that P&G had considered entering the liquid bleach market 
by internal expansion but had decided that acquiring Clorox, with its fifty percent 
market share, would quickly give it a dominant position.447 He concluded that the 
acquisition produced two likely anticompetitive effects. First, since P&G 
manufactured complementary detergent products marketed and advertised in the 
same manner as liquid bleach, through grocery stores and by mass media, it 
influenced the liquid bleach market as a potential competitor.448 Second, the 
acquisition of Clorox by as large a company as P&G would serve to entrench Clorox 
as the industry leader, discouraging entry by others and effectively raising entry 
barriers.449 In addition, Douglas rejected the notion that efficiency gains resulting 
441 /d. at 182. 
442
"1 Section! 7 deals only with probabilities, not certainties." !d. 
443/d. 
444/d. To allow such a joint venture would be to avoid Section 7 "by sophisticated 
devices." !d. 
445In contrast to the majority opinion which looked to several criteria such as the structure 
and history of the market, the stated reason for the joint venture, actual competition between 
the two firms, and the level of competition in the market but for the joint venture to assess 
whether the joint venture has caused or was likely to cause an anticompetitive effect. !d. at 
176-77. See also Bush & Massa, supra note 439, at I 051. 
446386 U.S. 568 (1967). Justices Stewart and Fortas did not participate and Justice Harlan 
wrote a concurring opinion. 
447/d. at 574. 
44
x/d. at 578. The FTC had found that P&G was the most likely entrant into the liquid 
bleach market. /d. at 580-81. 
449/d. at 578. 
66https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5
2008] THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 961 
from a merger could ever be used as a defense to illegality,450 a point vigorously 
disputed by Justice Harlan in his concurrence.451 
Although the Procter & Gamble Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's dismissal of 
the FTC's complaint Justice Douglas believed that only a summary of the FTC's 
findings was necessary since "the anticompetitive effects with which this product-
extension merger is fraught can be easily seen ... .''452 Justice Harlan and many 
commentators have disagreed that the case was easym and perhaps more telling, 
have asserted that Douglas improperly made assumptions and drew conclusions from 
the facts presented. For example, Douglas' characterization of the liquid bleach 
market as "oligopolistic" and non-competitive, which formed the basis of his finding 
of both likely anticompetitive effects, is suspect.454 Further, his "entrenchment" 
theory, mentioned almost in passing at the end of the Procter & Gamble opinion, 
created a lot of attention but has found little or no favor subsequently.455 
Similarly Justice Douglas' rather cavalier and summary dismissal of efficiency 
gains as a defense to a Section 7 action, harkening back to the misguided Brown 
Shoe opinion,456 is at odds with current thinking.457 Just as in Brown Shoe, the FTC 
450/d. at 580, citing the infamous Brown Shoe decision. Later in United States v. First 
National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665. 669 (1964), Justice Douglas, writing 
for the majority, ruled that a merger of two banks violated Section 7 because "the multiplicity 
of extra services in the trust field which the new company could offer tends to foreclose 
competition." See supra text accompanying notes 392-401. So much for the needs of 
consumers of trust departments in Lexington, Kentucky. 
451 Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 603-04. 
452/d. at578. 
453
"1 consider the case difficult within its own four corners. and beyond that, it portents for 
future administrative and judicial application of Section 7 ... to this kind of merger important 
and far-reaching." !d. at 58 I -82. 
454In addition to Clorox's almost 50% market share, the top two firms controlled 65% of 
the market and the top six 80%. Two hundred small producers accounted for the remaining 
20%. !d. at 575-76. There was no indication, however, that Clorox or the other market 
leaders could have priced above competitive levels or reduced output to increase price, thus 
rendering Procter & Gamble's intluence as a potential entrant a nullity. See ROBERT H. BORK. 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 259-60 (1978); Donald F. Turner, 
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 13 I 3, 1363 
(1965). 
455The entrenchment theory can actually be traced to a vertical merger case, Reynolds 
Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. I 962), a case that Justice Douglas did not cite in 
Procter & Gamble. perhaps in keeping with his sometimes remark to friends that "I don't 
follow precedents, I make 'em." MURPHY. supra note 10, at 340. For examples of subsequent 
cases in which an entrenchment theory has failed, sec FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 
289, 298 (4th Cir.), and Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d 
Cir. 1974). Cf Kennecott Copper Co. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67,78 (lOth Cir. 1972), cert denied, 
416 U.S. 909 ( 1974). See also Lawrence K. Hellman, "Entrenchment" Under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act: An Approach for Analy~ing Conglomerate Mergers, 13 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225 
( 1982) (arguing for use of entrenchment theory in conglomerate mergers if certain conditions 
are present). 
-156See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text. 
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paradoxically viewed the efficiencies that P&G would gain in marketing and 
di~tributing Clorox bleach as anticompetitive.m Douglas, of course, accepted the 
FTC's finding that those efficiencies would raise entry barriers without consideration 
of the fact that they might enhance consumer welfare.4YJ 
Justice Harlan seems to have gotten it right when he lamented that Justice 
Douglas' Procta & Gamble opinion '"leaves the Commission, lawyers, and 
businessmen at large as to what is to be expected of them in future cases of this 
kind."'"0 The decision applies the concept of potential competition without any real 
contours. endorses a questionable new theory, entrenchment, with little analysis, and 
summarily trashes efficiencies as a Section 7 defense. 
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in the next 
conglomerate merger case to reach the Court, Ford Motor Co. v. United States.461 
The case was made to order for Douglas since it allowed for his expansionist theories 
in both vertical and conglomerate contexts.462 Ford Motor's acquisition of Autolite, 
one of three major spark plug manufacturers that together controlled eighty-five 
percent of the market, was in lieu of its entering the market de novo, which it had 
determined would be more costly and would take up to eight years.463 Although the 
main issue before the Court was whether divestiture was the appropriate remedy,464 
Justice Douglas also agreed that the district court had properly found that as a 
potential entrant Ford Motor exacted significant pro-competitive effects on the 
concentrated spark plug market.465 
Ford had argued that its acquisition had actually benefited the spark plug market 
since it would make Autolite, with only fifteen percent of the market, a more 
457See DEr'T OF JUSTICE AND FED'L TRADE COMM'N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
*-+ ( 1997) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm. 
mProcter & Gwnhle Co., Docket 6901,63 FTC 1465, 1580 (1963). 
45YJustice Harlan thought that the question should be asked and that economies in 
advertising could benefit consumers by providing brand identification and quality assurance, 
although he concluded that P&G had not shown any real advertising efficiencies. Proctor & 
Gwnhle, :186 U.S. at 603-04. He was probably conect that advertising efficiencies were 
lacking. See, e.g" John L. Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 12 
J.L. & ECON. 321 (1968) (asserting that Procter & Gamble did not actually have advertising 
cost advantages which could entrench it in the liquid bleach market). Accord BoRK, supra 
note 454, at 254-55. There is a substantial debate about whether conglomerate mergers ever 
produce real efficiencies. at least any that ultimately benefit consumers. See, e.g., Rogers, 
sul'ra note 298, at 312-17: F. M. Scherer, Book Review. The Posnerian Harvest: Separating 
the Wheatfimn the Chajj; 86 YALE L.J. 974, 987-88 (1977). 
4
wProctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 583. Judge Bork wrote that Justice Douglas' '"murky" 
opinion '·makes sense only when antitrust is viewed as pro-small business-and even then it 
dues not make much sense, because small business is protected from Clorox' s cost advantages 
only when they happen to be achieved through a merger." BORK, supra note 454, at 255. 
461 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
4
"
2See s11pra text accompanying notes 414-37; sources cited supra notes 482-96. 
4
',;/d. at 566. 
464The majority. per Justice Douglas. thought it was. /d. at 571-78. 
465 /d. at 574. 
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effective competitor against Champion. with almost a fifty percent share, and 
General Motors, which controlled thirty percent of the market.466 Justice Douglas 
disagreed, in part because the merger would also eliminate Ford as one of the two 
largest purchasers of original equipment spark plugs.467 
More questionable, however. was his quotation from Philadelphia National Bank 
to the effect that choosing between "economic debits and credits" is beyond ')udicial 
competence. "46E Here Justice Douglas is at least consistent with his quick dismissal 
of the relevance of efficiencies in Procter & Gamhle,469 since that would require 
some weighing or judicial choice-making, as well as the anti-Rule of Reason position 
of the Warren and early Burger Courts. 470 Douglas favored bright line per se rules 
generally and in the merger arena, any showing of likely anticompetitive effect was 
enough to render the merger illegal.471 
The Douglas-led expansion of Section 7 into potential competition posited that a 
firm sitting on the sidelines of a market exerted competitive influence on market 
participants who are worried about the threat of new entry. This thinking became 
known as the doctrine of perceived potential competition472 and was the subject of 
further Court scrutiny in three decisions in 1973 and I 974.473 In Falstaff, a sharply 
466/d. at 569-70. 
467 /d. at 570-71. He also believed that Ford would gain access to the spark plug 
aftermarket which would help perpetuate the so-called original equipment tie, the replacement 
of the same brand of spark plugs as the original. !d. at 570. 
468/d. at 569-70 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 
( 1963)). 
469See supru text accompanying notes 415, 438-53. 
+
70See, for example. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which 
established a per se rule the Court overruled ten years later once Justices Douglas and Black 
had retired. See Cont'l T.V .. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc .. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Justice Douglas· 
position in Ford Motor parallels that of the Court in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 
405 U.S. 596 (1972), decided that same year. There, in a 4-1-1 opinion with Justices Powell 
and Rehnquist not participating. the majority. including Justice Douglas, applied the per se 
rule to horizontal non-price restraints, stating that whether they would decide the case the 
same wav under the rule of reason ''is irrelevant to the issue before us." !d. at 609. According 
to Justic~ Marshall, writing for the Court. Congress could overturn per se rules if it so chooses, 
·'Jeav[ingj courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a 
flexible approach." /d. at 609 n.l 0. 
-PI See, e.g., FTC V. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,576-77 (1967). 
472See. e.g., ROGERS. ET AL., supra note 106, at 632-33; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 
28 I. at 659-61. 
473See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp .. 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v. 
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Conn. Nat'! Bank, 418 U.S. 
656 ( 1974l. The Court in those cases also discussed, without ratifying, the actual potential 
competition theory which attempts to predicate Section 7 liability upon a showing that the 
acquiring company would have entered the market de novo or by a "toehold" acquisition if not 
permitted to acquire the company at issue and that such an alternative entry would be 
procompetitive. See, e.g .. BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26-28 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Tenneco. Inc. v. FTC. 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally RoGERS, ET AL., supra note 
I 06, at 630-33. 
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divided Court reversed a lower court ruling that failed to consider the effect of 
Falstaff as a potential entrant to the New England beer market. Falstaff, the fourth 
largest brewer nationally and the largest brewer that did not have a presence in New 
England, had acquired Narragansett, a regional brewer with the largest share of the 
New England market.474 Although Falstaff argued, and the district court found, that 
it would never have entered the New England market de novo, the Court reversed 
and remanded, directing the lower court to consider the probable impact of Falstaff 
on the market as a potential competitor.+75 
The majority opinion drew two strong opposing opinions, one concurring in the 
result by Justice Marshall and the other by Justice Rehnquist dissenting, which both 
argued stridently that the majority had gone too far.+76 Justice Douglas, however, 
was moved to write a partial concurrence arguing that the majority had not gone far 
enough in merely reversing and remanding. 477 In spite of pointed language by 
Marshall and Rehnquist that there was no factual basis for the Court's remand 
order,478 Douglas asserted that the Court should have reversed and rendered. After a 
polemic on the inherent evils of corporate growth by acquisition or merger,479 
Douglas argued that even though Falstaff would not have entered the New England 
market de novo had it not been allowed to acquire Narragansett, it might sometime in 
the future change its mind.48° Further, he opined, that Falstaff was the most likely 
new competitor and that replacing the leading regional brewer with a beer seller 
"with national capabilities increased the trend toward concentration" and was 
sufficient to violate Section 7.481 
With its changing composition, the Court further reigned in the application of 
potential competition in two bank cases decided the term after Falstaff. Although 
Justice Douglas did not participate in the first decision, United States v. Marine 
474Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 528-29. 
475 !d. at 537. 
476/d. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result); /d. at 572 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, 
joined by Stewart, J.). Justices Marshall and Rehnquist both pointed out that the government 
had provided no factual basis on which a court could conclude that Falstaff was a perceived 
potential entrant into the New England beer market; thus the basis for the remand was not 
supported by the record. /d. at 546, 574-75. 
477 /d. at 538 (Douglas, J ., concurring in part). 
478
"Thus, our remand leaves the hapless District Judge with the unenviable task of 
reassessing nonexistent evidence under a theory advanced by neither of the parties." /d. at 546 
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result). "For this Court to reverse and to remand for 
consideration of a possible factual basis for a theory never advanced by the plaintiff is a 
drastic and unwarranted departure from the most basic principles of civil litigation and 
appellate review." /d. at 574-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.). 
479
"The 'rising tide' of concentration in American business" was creating "a nation of 
clerks"' and leading "predictably to socialism." /d. at 540, 543 (quoting United States v. Pabst 
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546. 552). 
480/d. at 544. 
481 /d. at 545. 
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Bancorporation,4x2 he did join Justice White's four-justice dissent in the companion 
case United States v. Connecticut National Bank,483 which was argued and then 
decided at the same time. That dissent took issue with the majority's narrow 
definition of the relevant market as the localized area in which the acquired bank 
operated which precluded the finding of an "in the wings" competitive effect outside 
of that market. 484 
The dissenters in Connecticut National Bank were all Warren Court holdovers,485 
thus illustrating that, by the narrowest of margins, the worm had turned on the 
extension and utilization of potential competition theories under Section 7.486 The 
two bank cases, together with the General Dynamics decision that same term,487 
brought the "government always wins" heyday of Section 7 to an abrupt halt. 
After its flurry of potential competition decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
the Supreme Court has not addressed the topic since.488 Lower courts have found 
that substantial proof and certainty problems plague the use of potential competition 
theories. 489 Commentators have likewise criticized the validity of potential 
competition generally as well as the lack of measurable standards or guidance from 
the Supreme Court.490 Although the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 
482418 U.S. 602 (1974). Marine Bancorporation was a 5-3 decision in which the Court 
held that regulatory barriers precluded both de novo entry and any "in the wings" competitive 
influence by the acquiring bank. 
483418 U.S. 656 (1974). 
484The dissent argued that more than one relevant market could be found as in Pabst 
Brewing Co., harkening to Section 7's "any section of the country" language. /d. at 674. 
485Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, in addition to Justice 
Douglas. 
486The dissenters in the companion Marine Bancorporation decision in which Justice 
Douglas did not participate were also Justices White, Brennan and Marshall. Marine 
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 643. 
487United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See supra text 
accompanying notes 349-58. 
488In fact, the Supreme Court has not selected for review any Section 7 case since its 1974 
term. 
489See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Siemens 
Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980); FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Ohio 1977); FTC v. 
Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 
430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Hughes Tool, Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (D. Cal. 
1976). 
490See. e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 
YALE L.J. I, 26 ( 1977) ("[T]here is no way the judicial process can directly handle concepts of 
this complexity and indeterminancy."); Joseph F. Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: 
The Need for Legislation, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 869 n.8 (1979) (calling potential competition 
"a doctrine of almost metaphysical complexity"); William Allen Alper, Potential Competition: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 431 (1984) ("No objective evidence 
is likely to prove, with the degree of certainty courts must require, those facts that would 
invoke potential competition theory in any real situation."); Joseph P. Bauer, Challenging 
Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and Tomorrow's 
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do consider potential competition as the only viable theory for attacking 
conglomerate mergers,'91 the government has run into a skeptical judiciary and has 
relatively little incentive for challenging conglomerate acquisitions.492 
Although the government has obtained consent decrees in a few cases involving 
potential competition,493 enforcement efforts have been sporadic and uncertain. Its 
future does not seem bright and, as one commentator has suggested, it may soon join 
"the scrap heap of defunct merger theories."494 
Justice Douglas' contributed another theory to that "scrap heap." In FTC v. 
Consolidated Foods Corp. ,495 he wrote for the Court and condemned a merger 
because it facilitated reciprocal dealing with third parties. Consolidated, which 
operated food processing plants as well as retail food stores, had acquired Gentry, 
Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic commonly used in processed 
foods. For the ten years following, Consolidated often urged its processed food 
suppliers to purchase their dehydrated onion and garlic from Gentry. 
The Seventh Circuit had relied mostly on post-acquisition evidence and 
concluded that the probability of a lessening of competition was not established, 
pointing out that while Gentry's share of the dehydrated onion market had increased 
by seven percent, its share of the dehydrated garlic market had decreased twelve 
Legislation, 58 B.U. L. REV. 199, 225-26 (1978); Richard S. Markovits, Potential 
Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers 
Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 658, 664-66 (1975). 
491 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, §* 4.111, 4.112, 4.131, 4.132, 4.133, 4.134 
( 1984 ). The jointly issued 1992 Merger Guidelines apply only to horizontal mergers and 
provide more guidance and specificity with respect to defining the relevant market. See DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM' N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 1.32 (1992). 
492The government often proceeds under the 1992 Guidelines, arguing for a broad market 
definition and avoiding potential competition issues by asserting that the claim is one of 
actual, ongoing competition. It has had a long history of success under this approach. See 
United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 
(D.D.C. 1997). See also Bush & Massa, supra note 439, at 1070-73, 1085. However, the 
strategy does not always work. See, e.g., Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 618 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1980). 
493See cases cited in Bush & Massa, supra note 439, at 1085. See also John E. Kwoka, 
Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and Prospective Competitors, 
52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 174 (2001) (asserting that government enforcement agencies 
have been lax in pursuing potential competition cases). 
494HOVENKAMP, supra note 211, at 570. See also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281, at 
661 (stating potential competition doctrine "has fallen on hard times"). The so-called Actual 
Potential Competition theory, which attempts to measure the likelihood of actual entry by the 
acquiring firm, was never officially embraced by the Supreme Court. Although it has had 
limited success in attacking mergers, see Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC. 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 
1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), and Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 
638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981) (approving doctrine in principle). The "reasonable probability 
of entry in the near future" standard is one that the government has not been able to meet and 
has essentially abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 
1980); FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. 
United Techs. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1285-86 (D. Ohio 1977); United States v. Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976). 
495380 U.S. 592 (1965 J. 
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percent.496 It also noted that reciprocal buying had been unsuccessful on a number of 
occasions.497 
Justice Douglas disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's evaluation of the post-
acquisition evidence, finding that ··rrleciprocity was tried over and over again and it 
sometimes worked."498 He rejected the view, however, that post-acquisition 
evidence was necessary, stating that "the force of Section 7 is in probabilities, not 
what later transpired. "499 It was enough to condemn the merger when the FTC found 
the probability of reciprocity involving an acquired company with a substantial 
market share. 500 
Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, believed that Section 7 required 
"more than a bare potential for reciprocal buying'' to bar a merger and argued that 
"the law requires a more closely textured economic analysis" than provided by the 
majority. 501 He doubted that Consolidated could "strong-arm'' Armour or Swift into 
buying dehydrated onions from Gentry but believed it could influence smaller 
suppliers, which led him to concur in the judgment.502 
Following Consolidated Foods, the use of reciprocity to condemn mergers 
initially found some success in the lower courts. 50' Later decisions, however, 
applying the more closely textured economic analysis urged by Justice Stewart,504 
rejected attempts to challenge mergers on reciprocity grounds.505 The more modern 
496/d. at 598. 
497/d. 
498/d. at 600. According to Justice Harlan's concurrence. Consolidated was able to 
pressure suppliers to purchase from Gentry only seven times in a decade. !d. at 602 (Harlan, 
1., concurring in the judgment). 
499/d. at 598. 
500Gentry controlled thirty-two percent of the combined dehydrated garlic and onion 
market prior to the acquisition. It and industry leader Basic Vegetable Products together 
controlled almost ninety percent of a rapidly expanding market. Consolidated Foods, 380 
U.S. at 595, 600. 
501 /d. at 603 (Stewart, .1.. concuiTing in the judgment). He required more than evidence 
that attempts at reciprocity "sometimes worked." /d. at 604. 
502/d. at 607. 
503 See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1969). 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 ( 1970); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3rd 
Cir. 1963); United States v. White Consol. Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Ohio 1971); United 
States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.Y. 1966). 
50
-I See Note, Reciprocitv as a Basis for Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under the 
Clayton Act, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 4S L 494-97 ( 1981 ). 
505See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. United Techs. Corp .. 19n-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'II 62,393 
(N.D.N.Y. 1978), ajf'd per curiam, !9n-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9[ 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'j[ 73,619 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (regarding 
Canteen Corporation merger): United States v. ITT. 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970) 
(regarding merger resulting from acquisition of stock in Grinnell); United States v. Int'l Tel. & 
Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (regarding stock acquisition in Grinnell and 
Hartford), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971): United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 
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thinking is that the mere opportunity for reciprocity is not enough because 
reciprocity is not necessarily anticompetitive absent evidence of coercion or forcing 
and, further, reciprocal dealing arrangements often enhance efficiency. 506 It appears 
that no reciprocity case has succeeded in well over thirty years. Further, the 1984 
Merger Guidelines do not even mention reciprocity as a basis for a merger challenge 
and the government has not raised a reciprocity issue in many years.507 
Justice Douglas also has the distinction, if that is the correct term, of writing the 
majority opinion in the last vertical merger case decided by the Supreme Court, Ford 
Motor Co. v. United States.50H There the Court struck down the acquisition by Ford 
Motor of Autolite, one of the three leading makers of spark plugs with about 15% of 
the market. Since General Motors owned the AC brand of spark plugs and 
controlled 30% of the market, Champion was the only significant independent spark 
plug manufacturer remaining after Ford's acquisition of Autolite. Champion's 
market share had declined from just under 50% in 1960 to about 33% in 1966. In 
contrast, Autolite's market share had climbed from a pre-acquisition 15% to about 
30%.509 
Justice Douglas characterized the remedy issue as "[tjhe main controversy 
here"510 and quickly found substantively that the acquisition violated "the Jetter and 
spirit of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act."511 He readily upheld the district 
court's findings that the elimination of Ford both as a major customer of Champion 
and as a potential entrant into the sparkplug market de novo rendered the acquisition 
unlawful. 512 Secondly, he agreed with the district court that the merger increased 
entry barriers in the sparkplug industry by foreclosing Ford as a purchaser for about 
ten percent of the spark plug market and, considering General Motors' ownership of 
the AC brand, would transmit to the sparkplug industry "the rigidity of the 
oligopolistic structure of the automobile industry."513 
In Ford Motor, Justice Douglas thus succinctly displays his antipathy to vertical 
market foreclosure and his favor with potential competition theory, both of which 
have now fallen on hard times.514 Indeed, in Ford Motor the defendant argued that 
F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 
1965). 
506See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 211, at 561-63; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281, 
at 626. 
507 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 211, at 563. 
508405 U.S. 562 (1972). Ford Motor Co. also involved potential competition issues and is 
also characterized as a conglomerate merger decision. See supra text accompanying notes 
453-60. 
509Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 566. 
510/d. at 571. 
511 /d. at569. 
512 /d. at 567-68. 
513/d. at 568 (quoting United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372, 375 (D. Mich. 
1970)). 
514With regard to vertical mergers see, for example, Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 
359 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979). in which the court was "unwilling to assume that any vertical 
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the acquisition had actually improved competition in the spark plug market because 
Autolite, with fifteen percent of the market, would be a more effective rival of 
Champion and General Motors, each with about thirty percent market shares. 515 
Douglas refused to see the benefit, however, summarily rejecting the argument and 
characterizing the acquisition as "aggravat[ing] an already oligopolistic market."516 
Today, of course, it is hard to imagine the same result on similar facts. 
Overall, Justice Douglas' expansive use of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to outlaw 
mergers through use of potential competition, entrenchment, and non-coercive 
reciprocity theories has indeed been relegated to the antitrust bone yard. Similarly, 
his sharp dismissal of proposed efficiency gains as ever being relevant in defense of 
a merger is subject to considerable debate, although the bar remains high for 
establishing an efficiency defense. He used Section 7 most aggressively in an 
attempt to protect small business and because of his abhorrence for anything 
resembling corporate growth or power. Today's Section 7 focus, by contrast, is on 
consumer welfare and, as a result, the oftentimes inefficient small business is no 
longer on the antitrust radar screen. Rather, a working marketplace that provides 
competition and innovation for the consumer has taken center stage. 
XII. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
Justice Douglas' populist view of vertical restraints, last articulated in his 1972 
Ford Motor opinion, traces at least back to 1948 when he penned his ringing dissent 
in Columbia Steel and wrote for the majority in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc. 517 It was a close corollary to his distrust of corporate size. Indeed in Paramount 
Pictures he strongly hinted that if it were up to him, vertical integration, at least of 
the production, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures, would be illegal per 
se.518 When reviewing the several restraints present in the case, he frequently 
focused on the adverse impact on the small, independent competitor as a basis for 
finding illegality. 519 
foreclosure lessens competition," and Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. v. £.!. duPont de Nemours 
& Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (virtually rejecting 
foreclosure theory in principle). See also HovENKAMP, supra note 211, at 386 ("Prevailing 
judicial opinion now seems to be that vertical mergers should be condemned only in the most 
extreme circumstances."). 
515Ford Motor Co .. 405 U.S. at 569-70. 
516/d. at 570. 
517334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
518/d. at 173-74. Throughout the Paramount Pictures opinion Justice Douglas uses the 
pronoun "we" when referring to the majority for whom he is writing. Only when, however, he 
notes that vertical integration is not per se illegal does he deviate and refer to the majority by 
name, "(bjut the majority of the Court does not take that view. In the opinion of the majority 
the legality of vertical integration under the Sherman Act turns on .... " /d. at 174. The 
message seems clear; he is acquiescing to his brethren on this point. 
519/d. at 162 ("The trade victims of this conspiracy have in large measure been the small 
independent operators."). 
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Even his majority opinion in White Motor Company v. United States, 520 which 
some might view as a moderation of his normal hard line view since he declined to 
impose the per se rule to vertical territorial restrictions, is rife with his populist 
perspective.521 Although he pointed to the Court's lack of experience in this area 
generally, he noted that vertical territorial restraints may be "the only practicable 
means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business."522 Thus. 
Justice Douglas' seeming reticence to too quickly expand the per se rule is in large 
part because of his fear that to do so might harm small businesses.523 
Justice Douglas wrote a special concurrence five years later in Albrecht v. Herald 
Co., a maximum vertical price fixing case that also involved exclusive dealer 
territories for newspaper distributors. 524 The majority declined to rule on the 
exclusive territories issue since that aspect of the case had not gone before the jury.525 
Douglas viewed the case as "therefore close" to White Motor but noted that. in 
determining the legality of a newspaper distributor's exclusive territory, one would 
normally consider the impact on a newspaper boy who would likely need the 
protection of an exclusive territory to "wage competitive warfare."526 
That same term Justice Douglas voted with the majority in the controversial 
Schwinn case, in which the Court announced a per se rule for vertical customer or 
territorial restrictions when title or dominion of the goods had passed to the 
distributor or retailer.527 The decision attempted to resurrect the common law 
restraint against alienation concept found in the landmark Dr. Miles decision of 
1911, which made resale price maintenance illegal.528 It is not at all surprising that 
Douglas found favor with the majority in Schwinn, which seemingly embraced the 
right of small business to determine its own destiny by determining its price and 
customers free from manufacturer or supplier interference.529 
520372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
521 Justice Douglas also declined to impose the rule of reason. The case arose on appeal 
from summary judgment for the government and the majority believed a trial on the merits 
was required before a rule of law was "designed." /d. at 254, 261. 
522/d. at 263. 
523ln White Motor. Justice Black joined Justice Clark's dissent, along with Chief Justice 
Warren. /d. at 275. It is one of the very few times Justices Douglas and Black split in an 
antitrust case. 
524390 U.S. 145, 154 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
525/d. at 153-54. 
526He noted that here, however, the Court had before it a "large retail enterprise." calling 
into question the legality of the exclusivity. /d. at 155 (Douglas. J., concurring). 
527United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 ( 1967). See C. Paul Rogers III, 
Restraints on Alienation in Antitrust Law: A Past with No Future, 49 SMU L. REV. 497 
( 1996). 
528Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911 ). Here Justice 
Douglas parted company with his reputed antitrust mentor, Louis Brandeis, who was opposed 
to restrictions on resale price maintenance. See BRANDEIS, supra note 78, at 243. 
529See supra text accompanying notes 509-14. 
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Of course, ten years later, or two years after Justice Douglas' retirement, the 
Burger Court overruled Schwinn and installed the rule of reason in vertical non-price 
cases in the landmark Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. decision. 510 
Sylvania (and Schwinn) had the effect of rendering White Motor and Douglas' 
concurrence in Albrecht moot,531 since the rule of reason replaced the uncertainty 
stemming from the lack of judicial experience with vertical non-price restraints in 
White Motor. One might conclude that here Douglas was intluential, or at least in 
the mainstream, since he was reluctant to assert per se rules in this area. 532 Nothing 
could be further from reality, however, since Douglas' leanings toward the rule of 
reason were based on hi" deference to small, independent businesses that should be 
given every opportunity to compete, while Sylvania and later Khan were based on 
efficiency concerns and the promotion of interbrand competition.533 
Justice Douglas' loyalty to the little guy trying to make it in the business world 
was early on apparent in his ringing dissent in Standard Oil Co. of California v. 
United States534 (generally known as Standard Stations), in which the Court. per 
Justice Frankfurter, ruled unlawful exclusive supply contracts required of 
independent retailers by the oil company defendant. While the Court recognized that 
requirements contracts provide at least short-term efficiencies for the parties. it 
concluded that when a substantial share of the market was thereby foreclosed, the 
contracts violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act.'" 
Although one might assume initially that Justice Douglas was happy with this 
seemingly anti-efficiency result, he was anything but. He cared not a whit about 
efficiencies and could not restrain himself from taking a couple of more jabs at the 
majority opinion in Columbia Steel, even though the ink was hardly dry on his 
dissent there. 536 More to the point. however, he viewed the Court's decision in 
Standard Stations to be a formula that ''promises to wipe out large segments of 
5311Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 ( 1977). 
511 More recently the Court overtumcd Alhrecht, holding that vertical maximum price 
fixing should fall under the rule of reason. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 ( 1997). In doing 
so, it eradicated one of the worst antitrust opinions in history. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds 
& Spencer Weber Waller. Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1811, 
1813, 1820 ( 1995) (labeling Alhrecht as "awful" and as "tortur[ing I the concept of agreement 
beyond common sense''). 
532His concurrence in Alhrecht, however, is quite confusing. He begins by saying Alhrecht 
is a rule of reason case. He then states that "[wjhether an exclusive territorial franchise in a 
vertical arrangement is per se unreasonable under the antitrust laws is a much mooted 
question." Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 ( 1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). He 
then notes that the majority "quite properly" refuses to say whether such a vertical restraint in 
the newspaper distribution business is illegal. /d. 
533Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55; Khan, 522 U.S. at 13-15. 
534Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 315 ( 1949) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
mid. at 306-14 (majority opinion). 
536/d. at 318 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Under the guise of increased efficiency hig 
business has received approval for easy growth.") (citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 
334 U.S. 495 (1948)). 
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independent filling-station operators."537 According to Douglas, requirements 
contracts were necessary to protect small, independent service stations from 
"service-station empires" by Standard Oil and other oil companies.538 He viewed the 
requirements contracts as the lesser of two evils and as superior to vertical 
integration by the major oil companies because they maintained the viability of the 
independent service stations. 539 While he recognized that competition between the 
majors would remain if and when they did integrate, he viewed the majority's 
holding as simply legitimizing "the growth of bigness."540 
Although Standard Stations is certainly subject to criticism as an anti-efficiency 
holding,541 Justice Douglas' dissent does not stand the test of time. He not only 
ignored the potential efficiencies to independent stations, as did the majority, but he 
also focused on maintaining the viability of those small independents without any 
expressed concern about the impact on consumers.542 
Justice Douglas actually first showed his antipathy for exclusive dealing 
arrangements four years earlier when he specially concurred in Associated Press v. 
United States. 543 There the Court struck down as an unlawful restraint of trade the 
Associated Press bylaws that forbade its 1200 newspaper members from selling news 
to non-members and also granted each member veto power over the entry of non-
members.544 Due to the collective action of AP members through the bylaws, the 
537/d. at 319. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 
(1948), in which Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, struck down licensing agreements 
between motion picture distributors and theatre "circuits" because "they eliminate the 
opportunity for the small competitor to obtain the choice first runs, and put a premium on the 
size of the circuit. They are, therefore, devices for stifling competition and diverting the 
cream of the business to the large operators." /d. 
538Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
539Justice Douglas lamented that "[t]he small, independent business man will be 
supplanted by clerks." /d. at 321. 
540/d. at 320-21. 
541 See, e.g., William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors 
in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 913,922 (1952). 
542Compare Countryman, supra note 88, at 367, arguing that Justice Douglas' dissent in 
Standard Stations shows that Douglas was not simply a "hopeless" anti-bigness "doctrinnaire 
[sic]." Professor Countryman, a former Justice Douglas law clerk, was regarded, along with 
Professor Fred Rodell of Yale, as Douglas' principal academic defender and champion. See 
Skeel, supra note 21, at I 105-06; see also Vern Countryman, Scholarship and Common Sense, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1980); Vern Countryman, Search and Seizure in a Shambles? 
Recasting Fourth Amendment Law in the Mold of Justice Douglas, 64 IOWA L. REV. 435 
( 1979); Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom of Expression, 1978 U. ILL L.F. 301 
(1978); Vern Countryman, The Contribution of the Douglas Dissents, I 0 GA. L. REV. 331 
(1976); Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, I 6 UCLA L. 
REV. 773 (1969); Fred Rodell, Bill Douglas: American, 61 AM. MERCURY 656 ( 1945). 
543Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. L 23 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
544Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, one of the few times he was not on all fours 
with Justice Douglas in antitrust cases. /d. at 3 (majority opinion). See also White Motor Co. 
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,275 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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majority treated the case as a concerted refusal to deal or boycott case, expressly 
stating that it involved more than a simple exclusive agreement between two 
newspapers or a reporter and a newspaper.545 
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas felt compelled to discuss "the narrow 
compass" of the decision "in view of the broader issues which have been injected 
into the discussion."546 His was, in essence, a slippery slope argument. While he 
acknowledged that a Seattle newspaper and a New York newspaper could agree to 
furnish local news exclusively to each other, he noted that "such an exclusive 
arrangement, though innocent standing alone, might be part of a scheme which 
would violate the Sherman Act .... "547 That, he asserted, was what had occurred in 
the case before the Court.548 
Five years after Standard Stations, Justice Douglas wrote for a 7-2 majority in 
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,549 a little known and completely 
ignored case that is noteworthy only for being one of Justice Douglas' worst 
opinions. Motion Picture Advertising was an exclusive dealing case brought under 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In a decision highly suspect by 
contemporary exclusive dealing standards,550 Douglas struck down the exclusive 
dealing contracts of an advertising motion picture producer/distributor with 
theaters.551 According to the Court, the defendant had exclusive dealing contracts 
with almost forty percent of the theaters in its areas of operation, with the majority of 
the contract terms ranging from one to two years.552 The Court found it significant 
that three competing distributors, all separately sued, also did business via exclusive 
contracts and that collectively seventy-five percent of available outlets for the films 
were under exclusive distribution agreements. 553 
545Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 14. 
546Jd. at 23 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
547/d. 
548In so stating, Justice Douglas seemingly downplayed the collective nature of the 
restraint while the majority opinion emphasized that without the collective action of the AP 
members, a very different case would have presented itself. /d. at 14 (majority opinion). 
549FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953 ). 
550See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 486 U.S. 2, 45-46 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (I st 
Cir. 1993); Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987): 
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380,393 (7th Cir. 1984). 
551 Advertising motion pictures were in effect advertisements that theaters ran in addition 
to the featured motion picture. 
552Some contracts ran for up to five years. Motion Picture Adver., 344 U.S. at 393. 
553/d. at 395. No conspiracy among the distributors was charged, thus each had to be sued 
individually. /d. at 398. 
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Justice Frankfurter. who often was at odds with Justice Douglas,554 vigorously 
dissented, joined only by Justice Burton.555 He characterized the Commission and 
the majority's conclusion that the use of exclusive contracts constituted an 
unreasonable restraint of trade as "dogmatic" and took issue with Douglas' reliance 
upon the seventy-five percent collective market foreclosure absent a Sherman Act 
conspiracy or concerted action charge:'56 Lamenting the lack of specificity in the 
record, Frankfurter noted that apparently more than one-half of the contracts ran for 
only one year.557 Since the Commission's tinding was directed to exclusive contracts 
of more than one year's duration, he concluded that the majority's affirmation of the 
Commission was really based on defendant's "hold" over about six percent of the 
theaters in the country or about ten percent of the theaters that accepted 
advertising. 558 
Justice Douglas did not attempt to rely on the Standard Stations case or any other 
for that matter.559 He did note that "[t]he vice of the exclusive contract in this 
particular field is in its tendency to restrain competition and to develop a monopoly" 
but provided little explanation how either could occur on the facts before the 
Court.560 Instead, in broadly deferring to the FTC's determination of what 
constitutes "unfair methods of competition" under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
Douglas provided a misleading summary of the market (without attempting to define 
what the market was) and mischaracterized the nature and length of the exclusive 
contracts at issue. Indeed, if he was trying to protect some group of competitors, as 
was his want, it is unclear who they were-the theaters that had their choice of at 
least three other advertising film vendors under one year exclusive agreements and 
554See, e.g .. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). On the 
friction and animosity between Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, see, for example. MuRPHY, 
supra note 10. at 187, 300-01, PHILLIP J. COOPER. BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE 
THE SUPREME COURT 25-27,40-41,69-70, 72-73, 80-81, 95, 108-10, 112, 133-35, 145-46 
(1995). and BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 261-68 
(1982). 
555Motion Picture Adver., 344 U.S. at 398 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
556/d. at 399. 
557 !d. at 398. 
558 ld. at 399. Justice Douglas' forty percent market foreclosure figure was based on the 
area in which the defendant did business, which, of course. may or may not have been the 
relevant geographic market. /d. at 393 (majority opinion). 
559Justice Frankfurter, however, made a point of differentiating Standard Stations, 
pointing out, for example, that the bargaining power of the seller vis-a-vis the buyers in the 
two cases varied greatly. In Standard Stations the retail gas stations were dependant on their 
supplier for gasoline. In Motion PiCTures Advertising, however, films containing advertising 
were not the central business of theaters and accounted for only a small portion of their 
revenues. It was thus unlikely that the defendant had any real bargaining power over its 
theater customers. /d. at 402 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
560ld. at 397. There were no allegations of conspiracy among the four advertising film 
distributors. There was also a complete lack of relevant market analysis or market !>hare 
statistics. In other words. Justice Douglas expected one to take it on faith that exclusive 
dealing contracts restrained competition and developed monopoly power. 
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that certainly had substantial bargaining power. or perhaps other unnamed 
advertising film vendors seeking to break into the market. Either way, consumers, in 
this case, moviegoers, were little impacted by which advertisements they had to sit 
through to see the movie of their choice.561 
Seven years later Justice Douglas again dissented in an exclusive dealing case, 
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.5" 2 This time, however, he disagreed with 
the majority's reversal of the lower court's determination that the contracts at issue 
were unreasonable restraints of trade. His joint dissent with Justice Black simply 
stated that they were of the opinion that the lower courts had gotten it right and thus 
should be affirmed.5(>3 
At issue was a requirements contract in which the Nashville Coal Company 
entered into a twenty-year agreement to supply an electric utility with its coal 
requirements, with a stated minimum.564 The utility sought declaratory relief but the 
Supreme Court viewed the market foreclosure as too insignificant to run afoul of the 
rule of reason. even if the relevant line of commerce was bituminous coal.565 The 
lower courts. in contrast had focused on coal consumption in "[p]eninsular Florida," 
700,000 tons previously as opposed to an expected I ,000,000 tons under the 
requirements contract at issue, rather than the sources of supply for those needs, 
which numbered 700 producers in seven states. 5"6 Thus, the majority viewed the 
market foreclosure from the suppliers' perspective rather than just focusing on the 
quantity of the demand. 
What, then. were Justices Douglas and Black thinking? Tampa Electric appears 
to be an easy case, viewed from forty-plus years forward. Most likely. the justices 
were concerned about the foreclosure of rival coal producers from selling to Tampa 
Electric for the twenty-year life of the contract.5" 7 But today the case would likely be 
viewed as enhancing efficiency and keeping energy costs down by providing both 
seller and buyer with long term market guarantees. Given the very small market 
foreclosure, even if coal is considered the relevant product, most antitrust lawyers 
would counsel against even bringing the case today. 
Three years after Tampa Electric, Justice Douglas was again able to gamer a 
majority to protect independent retailers in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. (!f 
561 Most, presumably, would have preferred not to sit through any advertising films at all. 
562Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co .. 365 U.S. 320, 335 ( 1961) (Black, J. & Douglas. 
J ., dissenting). 
563ld. 
564Id. at 321 (majority opinion). 
565Because coal for consumption in Tampa, the location of the utility, came from seven 
states, the market foreclosure caused by the requirements contract at issue was less than one 
percent. ld. at 333. 
566/d. at 330. The Court noted that coal accounted for less than six percent of the fuel 
consumed in Florida (oil and natural gas predominating) but was willing to consider coal as 
the relevant line of commerce. I d. at 330. 331 n.8. 
567 At least that was the concern of the Sixth Circuit. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville 
Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 1960). That court did recognize that requirements 
contracts "may well be of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers." !d. 
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Cal({ornia. 568 This time he found consignment sales unlawful. In doing so, he 
seemingly overruled a forty-year-old precedent569 and created confusion that the 
lower courts are still sorting out. 570 
Simpson was a Union Oil retail gas station lessee. It sued, complaining of its 
consignment agreement with Union whereby Union set the retail prices of gasoline 
consigned to it. In reversing the Court of Appeals, Justice Douglas labeled the 
consignment arrangement, coupled with the station lease, "coercive"571 since it 
"depriv[ed] independent dealers of the exercise of free judgment whether to become 
consignees at all, or remain consignees, and, in any event, to sell at competitive 
prices."572 Although he recognized that consignments "perform an important 
function in trade and commerce,"573 his focus was on the "nominal 'consignees' who 
are in reality small struggling competitors seeking retail gas customers."574 
In his zeal to protect the independent retailer, Justice Douglas was not put off by 
the 1926 United States v. General Electric Co. 575 precedent, which had permitted the 
defendant to set prices on consigned goods. While acknowledging that General 
Electric was not limited to patented goods,576 Douglas nonetheless treated General 
Electric as if it were and held that it was "not apposite to the special facts here."577 
In dissent, Justice Stewart was dumbfounded, calling Douglas' distinction of 
General Electric "specious" and asserting that the majority had in effect overruled a 
doctrine that had stood unquestioned for almost forty years.578 The majority had 
56
xSimpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
569United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
5711See, e.g., Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986), 
after remand, 889 F.2d 751,752-53 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); Ryko 
Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988). 
571 Simpson, 377 U.S. at 17. 
572/d. at 16. 
573/d. at 17. 
574/d. at 21. Justice Douglas also expressed concern that consignment "device" would 
result in the fixing of retail prices because of Union's "vast" distribution system. !d. 
575General Electric, 272 U.S. 476. 
576ln General Electric, Chief Justice Taft had specifically held that "[t]he owner of an 
article, patented or otherwise, is not violating the common law, or the Anti-Trust law, by 
seeking to dispose of his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which his 
agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer." !d. at 488. 
!d. 
577Simpson, 377 U.S. at 23. Specifically, Justice Douglas wrote: 
The Court in the General Electric case did not restrict its ruling to patented articles; it, 
indeed, said that the use of the consignment device was available to the owners of 
articles "patented or otherwise.'' But whatever may be said of the General Electric 
case on its special facts, involving patents, it is not apposite to the special facts here. 
See also Kauper, supra note 211, at 340 (describing the distinction of General Electric 
"far too transparent"). 
578Simpson, 377 U.S. at 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that the 
existence of a patent had no bearing on whether a consignor can control the price at which a 
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taken this drastic step, he noted, even though neither party had challenged the 
validity of General Electric in their briefs or oral argument.579 
In retrospect, one can see that the Union Oil Company stood little chance against 
Justice Douglas in Simpson. The facts of the case presented a double whammy for 
the defendant and allowed Douglas to protect the small business consignee and 
restrict the reach of patent-holder rights in one fell swoop. The decision in Simpson 
also, as Justice Stewart predicted,580 created a good deal of uncertainty in the law. 
For example, later, after GE's patents had expired, a federal district court held that 
the GE consignment system was illegal per se.5x1 
More recent decisions have focused on language in the original General Electric 
decision,582 differentiating between a consignment to a true agent or representative of 
the seller and what amounts to a sale of the consigned goods to the consignee at the 
time of the consignment.5x3 More recently, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp 
Electronics Corp.,584 the Supreme Court verified the so-called agency exception to 
vertical price fixing's then per se rule, thus giving the lower courts more ammunition 
with which to distinguish Simpson. 585 
consignee sells because the consignor's right to set the price derives solely from its ownership 
of the goods. 
579/d. at 29. 
580/d. at 30. 
581 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co .. 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
582United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,485 (1926) ('The validity of the Electric 
Company's scheme of distribution turns ... on the question of whether the sales are by the 
company through its agents to the consumer, or are in fact by the company to the so-called 
agents at the time of consignment. The distinction in law and in fact between an agency and a 
sale is clear."). 
mSee, e.f?., Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986), 
after remand, 889 F.2d 751, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990) 
(holding travel agents are air carriers' agents. thus carriers' price restrictions are lawful); 
Belfiore v. N.Y. Times Co., 826 F.2d 177. 182 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 
( 1988) (finding consignment where publisher paid newspaper distributors on a per paper sold 
basis and picked up unsold newspapers the following day); Kowalski v. Chi. Tribune Co., 854 
F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1988); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1224 (8th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 ( 1988) (finding consignment for independent distributor which 
sold custom made car washes); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding consignment "exception" should apply only if manufacturer bears an unusually high 
proportion of the risk of nonsale). 
584Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733 (1988) (per se vertical 
pricing fixing rule "does not apply to restrictions on price to be charged by one who is in 
reality an agent of ... the manufacturer"). 
585Lower courts had long found that Simpson did not outlaw purported consignments in 
large distribution networks as long as an actual agent was utilized. See, e.f?., Mesirow v. 
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983); 
Hardwick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 589 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 592 F.2d 
1190 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 ( 1979); Pogue v. lnt'l Indus., Inc., 524 F.2d 
342 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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In Simpson, Justice Douglas did recognize the agency distinction 5~6 but failed to 
emphasize it and obfuscated the issue by focusing on the coercive element of Union 
Oil's consignments to its dealers.587 Arguably the Justice's antipathy toward the 
rights of patent holders unduly influenced his dismissal of General Electric. 
Ironically, Douglas could more easily have avoided limiting General Electric to 
patent holders and achieved the same result in Simpson because General Electric 
does require a real agency for antitrust immunity, a requirement that was not present 
in Simpson. 
Instead Justice Douglas took on General Electric even though that decision 
expressly failed to limit its holding to consignments involving patents.588 Thus, 
Douglas' handling of Simpson suggests more than bias but perhaps intellectual 
dishonesty.589 He certainly understood that he could achieve the result he desired 
without limiting General Electric, but that would eliminate the opportunity presented 
to take a swipe at the scope of intellectual property rights for which he had such 
disdain.scJo 
5860ne who sends a rug or a painting or other work of art to a merchant or a gallery for 
sale at a minimum price can, of course, hold the consignee to the bargain ... When, 
however, a 'consignment' device is used to cover a vast gasoline distribution system, 
fixing prices through many retail outlets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the 
"consignment" an agency .... 
Simpson. 377 U.S. at 18, 21. 
587Justice Douglas provides little guidance about what constitutes coercion. stating that "it 
matters not what the coercive device is." !d. at 17. Although Simpson seems to leave open the 
potential for a finding of :my supplier's attempt to impose prices on a consignee as coercive, 
the lower federal courts have tended to distinguish Simpson on the coercion issue. See. e.g., 
Mesirow, 703 F.2d 339, cert denied. 464 U.S. 820. See also Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of 
Vertical Restraints Doctrine. 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 535 ( 1989); Rogers, supra note 527, at 
514-15. 
588Meaning presumably, as Justice Stewart pointed out in dissent, that General Electric 
would seem to apply to consignments of non-patented goods. 
5 ~ 9See William F. Baxter. The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
933, 935 ( 1987) (stating that the Court in Simpson eliminated the agency device, and 
characterizing the decision as ''one of the most dishonest opinions of all time in a field with 
many serious contenders ... "); Kauper, supra note 211, at 340 (Simpson used as illustration 
of a decision which "lacked candor"). Recent evidence documents that Justice Douglas was 
less than veracious in his personal life, often embellishing or even fabricating events, 
including exaggerating his academic record at Columbia In fact, late in his life, his Columbia 
classmates began referring to the Justice as "the Approximate Mr. Justice Douglas" due to his 
penchant for chauging his own history, including his supposed class rank. See, e.g., MURPHY. 
supra note 10. at 474. 
590ln :m earlier concurrence, Justice Douglas had advocated overruling General Electric. 
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring)("' 
would be nd of United States v. General Electric Co. My reasons for overruling it start with 
the Constitution itself."). Taking the easier course in Simpson may have also reduced the 
likelihood of defections among his brethren, such as occurred with Justices Stewart, Brennan 
and Goldberg. For a far less controversial distinction of General Electric by Justice Douglas, 
see United Swtes l'. Masonite Corp .. 316 U.S. 265, 276-81 (1942) (licensing agreements 
among patent holders, which restricted price competition, was not protected by General 
r)el"tric). 
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Simpson is a triumph of competition policy against both intellectual and common 
law property rights. 591 Irrespective of the wisdom of that, the problem, as with most 
of Justice Douglas' antitrust work, is that the competition policy Simpson sets forth 
is anti-consumer and indeterminate at best and incoherent at worst. 592 
Justice Douglas seemingly painted the Warren Court into a corner in the now 
overruled Schwinn decision, in which the Court reasserted the importance of title in 
antitrust analysis, distinguishing between bicycles consigned and sold to authorized 
dealers."'' The former was to be judged under the rule of reason because of the 
constraints of the ancient rule against alienation while the latter was judged to be 
inherently anticompetitive and per se illegal. But what of Simpson, decided only 
three years earlier? The majority, in an opinion written by Douglas protege Abe 
Fortas and joined by Douglas. virtually ignored it, citing it only for the proposition 
that "unreasonably restrictive" agencies or consignments violate Section 1.594 
In sum, one can only conclude that Justice Douglas' impact in the vertical 
restraints area has been almost completely erased. Happily, the Court overruled 
Albrecht in its Khan decision, which instituted the rule of reason for maximum resale 
price maintenance. More recently, the Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS. li1c.,5"5 did away with the per se rule for resale price minimums and 
overruled Dr. Miles, another Douglas favorite. On the negative side, his opinion in 
Simpson remains as a potential significant roadblock to modern antitrust analysis. 
One might point to his White Motor decision as having a continuing impact, as it is 
often cited for the proposition that courts should not too quickly adopt per se rules. 
It does not withstand contemporary scrutiny, however, because Douglas avoided the 
per se rule only to protect the viability of small companies. And in Tampa Electric, 
the one other Warren Court decision in the vertical restraints arena that retains 
modern vitality, he dissented and voted for liability on facts that today likely would 
not survive a motion to dismiss. 
XIII. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 
Justice Douglas' term on the Supreme Court virtually paralleled the first forty 
years of the Robinson-Patman Act. which was passed in 1936 as an amendment to 
the Clayton Act. 596 Critics have long criticized the Act, which prohibits price 
discrimination in certain scenarios, as a protectionist measure similar to the 
591 Sec PFRITZ, supra note 47. at 204 (by elevating competitiOn over the right of 
consignment, the Court "shook loose a cornerstone of common-law property rights secure for 
three hundred years ... "). 
5
"
2See, e.g .. Rogers, supra note 527. at 515. 
593United States V. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
594/d. at 380. Neither opinion contained any market analysis. Schwinn made no effort to 
distinguish Simpson on its facts (e.g. the relevance of the lack of coercion) and thus Simpson 
remained an indeterminate precedent. For criticism of that aspect of Schwinn, see for example 
Kauper, supra note 211, at 340-41 (Simpson and White Motor were "treated in an almost 
inexplicable manner in Schwinn."). See also Page. supra note 33, at 34. 
5
"
5Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc .. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
596 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976). 
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discarded fair trade laws.597 Even more criticism has been levied at the interpretation 
and enforcement of the Act, beginning with the FTC and ending with the Supreme 
Court."J8 
Unsurprisingly, since the Act favors small, independent businesses, Justice 
Douglas was a strident advocate of its enforcement and always sided with the 
government or plaintiff. For example, Justice Douglas voted with the majority in the 
heavily criticized Utah Pie decision599 which protected a local company with a nearly 
dominant market share against larger companies seeking to enter the local market. 
In doing so, the Court equated below cost pricing with the predatory intent requisite 
to establish primary line, i.e., seller, injury but gave no guidance as to how one 
would determine '"cost."600 Earlier, Justice Douglas was also in the majority in FTC 
v. Morton Salt Co.,601 a controversial decision in which the Court ruled that a price 
discrimination affecting competing buyers was in essence prima facie evidence of 
competitive injury to the disfavored buyer.602 
Of course, the Robinson-Patman Act did provide a ready-made platform for 
Justice Douglas to pontificate about the rights of small business and the evils of 
monopoly power. For example, he vigorously dissented in Automatic Canteen Co. v. 
597In general, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination, which often harms 
smaller buyers and disallows volume discounts that cannot be cost justified. As such, it tends 
to "protect" the small, independent purchaser of commodities against the buying power of 
large chain stores. See generally ROGERS, ET AL., supra note 106. at 1177-80; BORK, supra 
note 454, at 382-40]; EARL W. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 8-11 (2d ed.1979); 
FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 3-11 
(1962); CORWIN EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 2-5 (1959). 
598See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH No.4, THE 
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, 3 (1980); Edward F. Howrey, et al., The 
Robinson-Patman Act: How-Not Whether-It Should Be Amended, 22 REC. N.Y.C. B.A. 621 
( 1967); Philip Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for 
Reappraisal, 42 WASH. L. REV. I ( 1966); Davis W. Morton, Jr. & Albert H. Cotton, The 
Robinson-Patman Act-Antitrust or Anti-Consumer, 37 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1953): Frederick 
M. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confitsion, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951). 
599Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 ( 1967). 
60
°For criticisms of Utah Pie, see Daniel J. Gifford, Primary-Line Injury Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act: The Development of Standards and the Erosion of Enforcement, 64 
MINN. L. REV. I (1979), Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie and the 
Consequences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 427 (1978), and Ward Bowman, 
Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 ( 1967). 
601 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 ( 1948). 
602 At issue were discounts in salt given to grocery chains that purchased large quantities. 
The Court affirmed the FTC's finding of proof of a reasonable probability of competitive 
injury even though salt purchases and sales made up a very small portion of a grocery store's 
business. ld. at 48-49. For a more contemporary applications of the Morton Salt rule, see 
Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 191-93 (1st 
Cir. 1996), Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421. 1447. n.l8 (9th Cir. 1995), 
and Stelwagon Manufacturing Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1271 (3d 
Cir. 1995). See also Paul H. LaRue, The Rubinson-Patman Act in the Twentv-First Centurv: 
Will the Morton Salt Rule Be Retired?, 48 SMU L. REV. 1917 ( 1995 ). . . 
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FTC, 603 a case in which the majority restricted the reach of Section 2(f) of the Act, 
which makes it illegal for a buyer to knowingly induce or receive illegal price 
discrimination. 604 The Court held that the Section 2(f) knowledge requirement meant 
that the favored buyer must know that the lower price it induced or received was not 
cost justified for a violation to occur.605 It further held that evidence that the favored 
buyer knew that its price was lower was not sufficient to shift the burden of proof to 
the buyer to prove the seller's cost justification or other defenses. 606 
Justice Douglas emphatically disagreed both as a matter of statutory 
interpretation and as a matter of policy.607 In his view the majority was, in essence, 
catering to the ability of large buyers to coerce suppliers into granting discriminatory 
low prices.608 He noted that "[t]here is no doubt that the large buyers wield clubs that 
give them powerful advantages over the small merchants."609 He believed that the 
language of Section 2(f) as well as the legislative history required that the 
"bludgeon[ing]" buyer "show that the privileges he demanded had cost 
justifications. "610 
Justice Douglas also published a concurring opinion in United States v. Borden 
Co.,611 a case in which the Court significantly narrowed the application of the cost 
justification defense by requiring the showing of actual cost differences to justify 
price discrimination. According to Douglas, however, the majority had not gone far 
enough. He believed that when no centralized purchasing by a large price favored 
chain was involved, cost differentials could be justified only on a store-by-store 
basis. 612 "Otherwise those with the most prestige get the largest discounts and the 
independent merchants are more and more forced to the wall."613 
Justice Douglas went on to say that the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is 
"to control practices that lead to a monopoly and an impoverishment of our middle 
class."614 He viewed restricting the cost justification defense as necessary to 
"preserve ... as much of our traditional free enterprise as possible" because "[f]ree 
603Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). 
604 ! 5 U.S.C. § I 3(f) (1976). 
6050r, in Justice Frankfurter's famous double negative, "not known by him not to be 
within one of those defenses." Automatic Canteen Co., 346 U.S. at 74. 
606/d. at 78-79. 
607 /d. at 82 (Douglas, J .. dissenting) (joined by Justices Black and Reed). 
608 !d. at 83-84. 
609/d. at 84. 
610He thought it unfair that. as mandated by the majority, the FTC was obliged to prove 
that the price discrimination was not cost justified as well as "what lay in the buyer's mind." 
!d. at 85. 
611 United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962). 
612/d. at 475 (Douglas, J.. concurring). 
613/d. 
614/d. 
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enterprise is not free when monopoly power is used to breed more monopoly."615 In 
his view, price discounts and price cutting led to "the aggrandizement of power by 
the chains and the ploughing under of the independents. The antitrust laws ... were 
designed to avert such an inquest on free enterprise."616 
Thus, Justice Douglas' concurrence in Borden succinctly summarized much of 
his views of antitrust policy. It displayed his antithesis and perhaps paranoia to even 
the idea of monopoly power. irrespective of any market share data or any factual 
basis to support such a claim.617 Likewise, his zeal to protect small business 
overshadowed any recognition that price discounts potentially benefit consumers and 
may simply be indicia of vigorous price competition.618 
Somewhat surprisingly, given his position in Morton Salt and later in Automatic 
Canteen and Borden, Justice Douglas joined the majority in the 1951 Standard Oil 
Co. v. FTC decision,614 in which a divided Court ruled that the "good faith" standard 
of the Act's meeting competition defense620 provided an absolute defense rather than 
merely a rebuttable presumption. The decision broadened the defense considerably 
and cleared up confusion from the earlier FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. decision,621 in 
which the Court was unclear whether "good faith" was a substantive or procedural 
requirement.622 Douglas also was with the majority in FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,623 a 
decision, however, that restricted the meeting competition defense to meeting the 
price of the discriminating seller's competitor.624 
In Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.,625 Justice Douglas objected to what he 
perceived was the narrowing of the right of private enforcement of the Robinson-
Patman Act, leading a four-justice dissent over the question of whether a private 
615/d. 
616/d. at 475-76. 
617The Borden opinion is devoid of any market share data for the favored or disfavored 
groceries. It does state that the A&P and Jewel chains had 254 stores combined, compared to 
1,322 independent stores, and that the defendant's volume discounts in favor of the chains, 
created two classes of customers. ld. at 465. 
6180f course, the Robinson-Patman Act is designed to do just that: protect small business 
against price competition. Lower prices are actually made illegal if the product of a price 
discrimination competitively injures a disfavored buyer. 
619Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). 
620 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). 
621 FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). Justice Douglas was in the 
majority of the 7-0 decision with Justice Jackson concurring in the result without an opinion. 
622See 1 MONOGRAPH No.4, supra note 598, at 119. 
623FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 ( 1963). 
624The Sun Oil decision held that the meeting competition defense does not enable a seller 
to reduce its price for one buyer to enable that buyer to meet the lower price of one of its 
competitors. Rather, the Court concluded "that [Section]2(b) of the Act contemplates that the 
lower price which must be met by one who would discriminate must be the lower price of his 
own competitor .... " !d. at 529. 
625 Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co .. 355 U.S. 373 ( 195R). 
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right of action accrued under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act for violations of 
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.626 The majority held that Section 3, which 
criminalized price discriminations when "an unreasonably low price'' and predatory 
intent are involved, was separate and apart from the rest of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, which was an amendment to the Clayton Act.627 Since the private rights of 
action under Sections 4 and 16 accrue only for violations of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts, those sections did not apply to the stand-alone Section 3 of the 
Robinson-Patman Act.62x 
Justice Douglas in dissent disagreed with the majority's reading of the legislative 
history of the Act, particularly since the type of price discrimination targeted under 
Section 3 is more onerous than that of Section 2(a) for which the treble damage 
remedy certainly applies.629 He lamented, further, that the Court's decision 
effectively repealed Section 3, since the Department of Justice had never attempted 
to enforce the criminal statute. He was. it turns out, pretty much correct.630 
During his long tenure, Justice Douglas also joined the majority in two cases 
which assured a liberal application of Sections 2(d) and 2(f) of the Act, which 
prohibit sellers from discriminatorily providing buyers with advertising allowances 
or sales promotional services.631 In FTC v. Hent)' Broch & Co.,632 however. Douglas 
wrote for a 5-4 majority and, perhaps to gain that slim majority, greatly narrowed 
Section 2(c) of the Act. which outlaws the so-called "dummy" brokerage practices of 
large buyers who would allegedly refuse to deal through independent brokers or 
middlemen. 613 
The section was designed to deal with situations in which a seller paid a 
brokerage fee to an intermediary controlled by the buyer or allowed a direct buyer a 
discount because a broker's services were not utilized. 634 Prior to the Henry Broch & 
626 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). 
627Nashville Milk, 355 U.S. at 377. 
628/d. at 378-79. Section 3 was originally the Borah-Van Nuys Bill which was introduced 
by opponents of the Robinson-Patman Act in an effort to logjam its passage. The Senate 
tacked the bills together and passed both. However, Section 3 was not made part of the 
Clayton Act, perhaps because it is a criminal statute and thus enforceable only by the Justice 
Department, whereas the DOJ and FTC otherwise have joint enforcement responsibilities for 
the Clayton Act. See RoGERS, ET AL., supra note 106, at 1288-89. 
629Nashville Milk, 355 U.S. at 383-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
630The Department of Justice did pursue one Section 3 case to the Supreme Court, where 
the statute withstood a challenge that it was unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Nat'! 
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). Justice Douglas voted with the 6-3 majority. Since 
National Dairy, the DOJ has not attempted to enforce the criminal statute. 
631 See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) (a supplier dealing with large 
retailers and wholesalers, who in tum sell to small retailers, must still treat all retailers 
equally); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959) (cost justification not an available 
defense for Sections 2(d) and (e)). 
632FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960). 
633 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976). 
634See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO.4, THE 
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, 32 (1983); KINTNER, supra note 597, at 206-07. 
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Co. decision, lower courts tended to read the seemingly absolute language of Section 
2(c) quite literally to operate as a total ban on brokerage payments or discounts to a 
middleman who had any relationship with the other side of the transaction.635 
In a confusing and poorly drafted opinion, Justice Douglas ruled in Henry Brach 
& Co. that Section 2(c) was violated by a broker reducing its commission to secure a 
sale at a reduced price when a manufacturer would not otherwise agree to a buyer's 
price.636 He noted that Section 2(c) was designed to prohibit large buyers from 
receiving allowances for cost savings in distribution because they often dealt directly 
with the seller and did not need brokerage services.637 Even acknowledging potential 
cost savings, he ruled out application of the cost justification defense.638 Douglas did 
state, however, that "we would have quite a different case" if there was evidence that 
the buyer had rendered actual services to the seller or to the broker to gain a reduced 
brokerage charge.639 He also limited the holding to situations in which a seller's 
broker accepts a reduced commission in order to obtain a "particular" order.640 
Although Justice Douglas may have won the Henry Brach & Co. battle, in doing 
so he appears to have lost the Section 2(c) war. Intentionally or not, the case called 
into question earlier decisions, with the result that both the courts and the FTC have 
severely limited the reach of the statute.641 Also, the viability of the provision as a 
part of the price discrimination law has been called into question. 642 Today, the 
courts have expanded the "for services rendered" exception to Section 2(c),643 pretty 
635See, e.g., Modem Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970, 978 (7th Cir. 1945); 
Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); 
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939); 
Oliver Bros., v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 
687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938). 
636Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. at 171-72. 
637/d. at 176. 
638/d. 
639/d. at 173. 
640/d. at 176. The dissent would have restricted Section 2(c) even further and argued that a 
seller's broker who has agreed on a general commission rate should be able to renegotiate the 
rate with his principal to effect a sale that would otherwise be lost. /d. at 177 (Whitaker, J., 
dissenting). See also KINTNER, supra note 597, at 209. The dissent position has become the 
law as the courts have, post-Henry Brach & Son, substantially narrowed Section 2(c). See 
supra text accompanying notes 613-19. 
641 See, e.g., Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 
(1983); Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963); 
Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962). 
642See 2 MONOGRAPH No. 4, supra note 588, at 34; see also James F. Rill, Brokerage 
Under the Robinson-Patnum Act: Towards a New Certaintv, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337 
(1966). " 
643See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 982 (1979); Central Retailer-Owner Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 
1963); Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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much limiting the statute to situations involving so-called "dummy" brokerages64" 
and in a few instances, commercial bribery."45 
Thus, there is more than a little irony stemming from Henry Broch & Co., for it 
gave life to the services rendered proviso of Section 2(c). Arguably, it also, because 
"its meaning was obscured by the many internal inconsistencies in the opinion,"646 
provided ample interpretative fodder for the FfC and the courts seeking to limit the 
admittedly anti-consumer reach of Section 2(c). Justice Douglas ended up writing 
the watershed opinion for narrowing Section 2(c), a provision designed to protect 
small businesses against the power of large buyers, irrespective of lower prices or 
cost savings.047 It is probably not what he intended. 
Overall, Justice Douglas' Robinson-Patman legacy is one of expansive 
interpretation and application. His record is not surprising, given that the Act is 
designed to protect small, independent businesses against the discriminatory pricing 
practices of large sellers and buyers. He apparently was unmindful that prohibitions 
on price discrimination interfere with the price mechanism which he otherwise 
sought so to protect.648 He also was not troubled by the potential harm to consumers 
that the outlawing of price discriminations brings.649 
644A dummy brokerage typically involves actual unearned brokerage payments to a buyer 
through a fictitious or shell broker set up by the buyer. See, e.g., Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554 
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. I 068 ( 1983 ); Burge v. Bryant Public School District of 
Saline County, 658 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1981 ); Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, 
Inc., 713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
645Commercial bribery in this context generally involves payment of a secret commission 
to an employee of a purchaser or to a state purchasing agent. See, e.g., Harris v. Duty Free 
Shoppers Ltd., 940 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1991 ); Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 
1976 ); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965). cert. denied. 383 
U.S. 936 (1966). Of course. whether commercial bribery should be part of the price 
discrimination law is questionable. See Keller W. Allen & Meriwether D. Williams. 
Commercial Brihery. Antitrust Injury and Section 2(c) of' the Rohinson-Patman Anti-
Discrimination Act, 26 GoNz. L. REV. 16 7 ( 1990-91 ). 
646KINTNER, supra note 597. at 210. For other criticisms of Henry Brach & Co, sec 
FREDERICK ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 330 ( 1962). 
Rill, supra note 642, Note. Beleaguered Brokers: The Evisceration ~~l Section 2(c) of the 
Rohinson-Patman Act, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1308 (1964). and Carl W. Scwarz, Note, Un{air 
Trade Practices-Robinson-Patman Act-Savings Realized on Salesmen's Commissions 
Cognizable Under Section 2( c), 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 137 (1961 ). 
647See 2 MONOGRAPH No.4, supra note 588. at 38. 
648In United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), discussed in Antitrust 
Monograph, supra note 547. at ch. 4, Justice Douglas made known his opposition to any 
interference with the free market's determination of price, whether direct or indirect. Of 
course, a prohibition on price discrimination does interfere with price, to the detriment of the 
favored purchasers, since it renders illegal certain price discounts which the market would 
otherwise allow. 
649Theoretically, at least, a favored purchaser may pass along some or all of the savings 
occasioned by the price discount it receives in order sell more of goods. Consumers, thus, 
may benefit from a price discrimination just as they do from any lower price. The prohibiting 
of price discrimination often results in higher prices to buyers who would otherwise be 
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Recent Supreme Court interpretations have attempted to reconcile the Robinson-
Patman Act with a consumer welfare antitrust model, focusing on competition rather 
than competitors. 650 As a result, the interpretation of the Act has narrowed and it has 
become significantly more difficult to prevail against an alleged price discriminator. 
Justice Douglas would certainly not approve. One can just imagine his reaction to 
the Wal-Marts and CostCos of the marketplace, particularly in smaller towns and 
cities where the locally owned retailers have been squeezed out of business and the 
town squares are largely boarded up. The fact that consumers in small town America 
have a far greater choice of goods and services at lower prices would probably not 
appease him. 
XIV. ANTITRUST AND THE REGULATED ECONOMY 
The tension between antitrust law and governmental regulation of portions of the 
economy created real conflict for New Dealers like Justice Douglas, who believed 
stridently in both the antitrust laws as the guardian of our free market economy and 
government regulation as a cure-all for aberrations in that economy. Congress 
typically refrained from granting explicit antitrust immunity from regulated sectors 
and gave little or no guidance about the continuing reach or role of antitrust in those 
areas, in effect leaving those questions to the judiciary.651 
Not surprisingly, given realist judges, little congressional direction <Jnd 
cont1icting values, the results seem inconsistent. For example, as noted in Part X, 
Justice Douglas and his brethren seemingly emasculated the Bank Merger Act of 
1966. which Congress, in the wake of several controversial Supreme Court decisions 
involving bank mergers, passed to curtail antitrust scrutiny of bank mergers.""2 In 
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., however, Douglas, writing for a six-
justice majority, held that Toolco's agreement to acquire control of TWA was 
immune from antitrust review because the acquisition had been approved by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to the board's authority under the Federal Aviation 
Act.6s3 
favored and thus may affirmatively harm consumers who do not benefit from prices which 
would otherwise be lower. 
650See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC. Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181 (2006) 
("[W]e ... resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to 
the stimulation of competition ... [W]e continue to construe the act 'consistently with broader 
policies of the antitrust laws."') (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993)). See also Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 
(1983); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981 ); Great At!. & Pac. 
Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69,80 n.l3 (1979); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co .. 438 U.S. 422 
(1978). Cf Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990). 
651 See generally Jerome Shuman, The Application of' the Antitrust Laws to Regulated 
Industries, 44 TENN. L. REV. I, 20-28 ( 1976). 
652See United States v. First City Bank of Hou~ton, 386 U.S. 361 ( 1967); United States v. 
Third Nat'! Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); see also supra text accompanying notes 
402-13. 
653Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973). See also Sunshine 
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (where Justice Douglas, writing for an 8-
1 majority, ruled that Congress' grant of rate-making authority to the National Bituminous 
Coal Commission exempted its rates from antitrust scrutiny). "Certainly what Congress has 
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In Hughes Tool, Justice Douglas gave deference to the CAB's determination that 
the acquisition was in the public interest.654 Conversely, in First Cit\' Bank of 
Houston. Justice Douglas held that judicial review of the Comptroller of Currency's 
finding of public interest must be de novo and, further. that the merging banks bore 
the burden to establish the defense.655 
Justice Douglas' general view, shared by his Warren Court brethren, was that 
"[i]mmunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied."656 In California v. 
Federal Power Commission, he applied that notion to dueling administrative and 
judicial proceedings. There, writing for a 5-2 majority,657 Douglas ruled that the 
Federal Power Commission must stay its consideration on the merits of a merger 
application under the National Gas Act in deference to a pending antitrust challenge 
in federal court. Since the Federal Power Commission, unlike other agencies, was 
not specifically authorized to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act, Douglas held that 
it must defer to an antitrust suit. 65~ 
Justice Douglas, again writing for the Court, reached the same conclusion in 
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, a case involving a power company's refusal to 
sell power to municipal utilities.659 The defendant as~erted that since the Federal 
Power Commission had the statutory authority to compel involuntary 
interconnections of power under the Federal Power Act, it should be immune from 
antitrust scrutiny.660 The Court. per Douglas, dismissed that argument, pointing to 
Congress' rejection of a pervasive regulatory scheme under the Act in favor of 
voluntary decision-making about connections with other systems. 061 According to 
forbidden by the Sherman Act it can modify. It may do so. by placing the machinery of pricc-
tixing in the hands of public agencies." /d. at 396. 
654Hughes Tool Co., 409 U.S. at 382. 
655First City Bank ofHouston, 386 U.S. at 366-70. 
656Cal. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 4S5 ( 1962). See also Otter Tail Power Co. 
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321. 
350 (1963); Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341. 357 (1963); Milk Producers Ass'n v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). 
657 Fed. Power Conun 'n, 369 U.S. 482. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dis,ented 
while Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate. /d. 
658/d. at 486. He reached this conclusion even though Section 7 of the Clayton Act did 
provide that "Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated 
pursuant to authority given hy the ... Federal Power Commission ... under any statutory 
provision vesting such power in such Commission," since that "was plainly not a grant of 
power to adjudicate antitmst issues." Not surprisingly, Justice Harlan strongly disagreed. 
asserting that the majority had "in effect, transfer[ed] to the Antitrust Division ... regulatory 
functions entrusted to administrative agencies .... " It did so, according to Harlan, "without 
ad vetting to any legal principle or statute to support its decision" but by "lay[ ing] down a 
pervasive rule born by its own abstract notions of 'what orderly procedure' requires.'· /d. at 
491 (Harlan, .1 •• dissenting). 
6590tter Tail, 410 U.S. 366 (! 973). 
660/d. at 373. 
661 /d. at 374. He also noted the lack of any legislative history which would support the 
granting of antitrust immunity. !d. at 373-74. 
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Douglas, when power companies' interconnection decisions are governed initially by 
their own business judgments, rather than regulatory coercion, "courts must be 
hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental national 
policies embodied in the antitrust laws."662 
As illustrated by Cal(fornia v. Federal Power Commission and Otter Tail Power 
Co. v. United States, the Warren and early Burger Courts usually declined to defer 
antitrust adjudication to administrative or regulatory action, unless it found the 
agency's authority pervasive enough to preempt antitrust law.660 Justice Douglas, 
however, was less likely to defer to regulatory schemes than his brethren, 
particularly in instances in which the Court found that the regulatory control was 
sufficient to provide the relevant agency with primary but not exclusive 
jurisdiction.664 For example, he dissented in Far East Conference v. United States,665 
a case in which the Court ordered the dismissal of a government enforcement suit 
brought before the Federal Maritime Board, which had considered the legality of 
steamship companies' dual system of rates. 666 
The majority's view was that in cases requiring administrative discretion or not 
involving facts within the normal experience of judges "agencies created by 
Congress for regulating the subject matter [rates] should not be passed over."667 
According to Justice Douglas, however, the government should be able to proceed 
on its antitrust challenge because the Federal Maritime Board had never approved 
the dual rate agreement, only a more general agreement that the Conference would 
adopt a tariff of rates.668 In his view, the Conference was "operat[ing] outside the 
law not only because they have failed to submit their schedule of rates to the Board 
but also because the rates adopted would, if approved, be illegal."669 
In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, Justice 
Douglas again took issue with the majority's assessment of a regulatory agency's 
662 /d. at 374. 
663See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); see also Pan 
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Gordon v. N.Y.S.E. 422 U.S. 
659 (1975); United States v. Nat'! Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
664But cf. Epstein, supra note 63. Writing in 1949, Epstein stated that "it is not entirely 
impossible that Justice Douglas' concern for anti-trust law enforcement is merely an 
expression of a desire to have the government regulate business in whatever way happened to 
be available at the moment." /d. 
665Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1951 ). 
666The Far East Conference was made up of steamship companies engaged in outbound 
Far East shipping. They had established a dual rate system which charged shippers a lower 
rate if they agreed to use exclusively the bottoms of the steamships. /d. at 572. 
667 /d. at 574. 
66
Rif the Board had approved the dual rates in compliance with the Shipping Act, Justice 
Douglas acknowledged that it would have exclusive jurisdiction and the rates would be 
immune from the Sherman Act. /d. at 578 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
669/d. at 579. The steamship companies were "therefore, tlout[ing] the law as plainly as if 
they used rates that had been disapproved by the Board." !d. 
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dispute with a regulated entity, here a public power utility.670 The case is perhaps 
mostly notable for being one of the very few times that Justices Douglas and Black 
disagreed in a case involving antitrust issues.671 It involved the FPC's order to Penn 
Water & Power Company to reduce its rates in response to complaints by Maryland 
officials that Penn Water had been gouging a purchaser utility in Maryland. Penn 
Water alleged that the order required it to continue performing a contract illegal 
under the Sherman Act.6n The Court refused to set aside the Commission's order, 
holding that the agency was merely acting under its ratemaking authority and was 
not compelling Penn Water & Power to perform illegal contracts.673 According to 
Black, the plaintiff was attempting to use the Sherman Act to nullify a rate reduction 
order issued under the FPC's authorized regulatory power. 674 
Justice Douglas saw the issue quite differently, stating that "[t]here is lawless 
conduct that overshadows the evils of extortionate rates."675 The contract that 
eliminated competition between the two public utilities was a "greater evil" than 
"[t]he desire to reduce excessive rates."676 According to Douglas, the FPC had 
approved and thus sought to perpetuate an "unholy alliance" between the utilities.677 
While the Court in Pennsylvania Water & Power thought that the FPC was doing 
its job in reducing excessive rates, Justice Douglas believed that the majority was 
missing the forest for the trees. He would have imposed on the regulatory agency 
not only the job of benefiting consumers by lowering rates but, presumably, also of 
untangling the underlying "unholy alliance" contract that divided markets.67x It was 
not enough that regulatory agencies they regulated rates; in his view they should also 
assure that the competition was alive and well within their regulated sphere. 
Justice Douglas also dissented in Ricci v. Chicw;o Mercantile Exchange, a 5-4 
decision in which the Court ruled that antitrust proceedings should be stayed pending 
the Commodity Exchange Commission's review of the respondent's allegedly 
670Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm"n, 343 U.S. 414 ( 1952). 
671 Justice Black wrote the opinion for the six justice majority while Justice Douglas was 
joined in dissent by Justice Reed. Justice Frankfurter was ill and did not participate. !d. at 
424. 
672Apparently Penn Water's contract with the Maryland public utility, Consolidated Gas 
Electric Light and Power Company of Baltimore, divided markets and insured that the two 
would not be in direct competition. See Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Consol. Gas, Elec., Light & 
Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950). 
673Pa. Water, 343 U.S. at421-22. 
674/d. at 424. 
675/d. (Douglas. J., dissenting). 
676/d. at 424-25. 
677 /d. at 425-26. 
6nOr at a minimum Justice Douglas believed the Commission should not act to indirectly 
support a private restraint of trade. He would have reversed and remanded the case to the 
Commission "with directions that the Commission build its rate order on the powers that it has 
under the Federal Power Act. not on the unholy alliance that these utilities created and that the 
Commission has sought to perpetuate." !d. at 426. 
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unlawful conduct.67~ He joined Justice Marshall's four-justice dissent and added an 
additional statement of his own.('80 Marshall would have struck the balance between 
administrative and judicial proceedings in favor of immediate court action when a 
private plaintiff had uncertain access to the administrative process.681 Douglas added 
that he would tip the scales even more toward judicial action, particularly when the 
administrative agency, as in the case at hand, has not acted to enforce the alleged 
wrongdoing on its own.682 
Much earlier in De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, Justice 
Douglas had objected to the Court's overturning of a preliminary injunction granted 
by a district court against foreign defendants charged by the Justice Department with 
a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize gem and industrial diamonds.681 The 
injunction forbade the seven corporate defendants from removing, transferring, or 
selling any assets located within the United States during the pendency of the 
litigation. The five-justice majority viewed the injunction as an unlawful 
sequestration of defendants' property prior to the entry of ajudgment.684 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Murphy ahd Rutledge, objected to the 
Court's hearing of what he termed an interlocutory appeal.685 He could see no 
extraordinary circumstances warranting the taking of the appeal, characterizing the 
actual hardship upon the defendants from the issuance of the injunction as "no more 
than the cost of procuring of a bond."686 One would doubt whether Douglas would 
have supported a similar injunction if issued against small U.S. companies struggling 
to compete but nonetheless the target of an antitrust suit. It is hard to imagine that he 
would have then hidden behind a procedural disinclination to hear interlocutory 
appeals when the effective sequestration of property prior to judgment was at issue. 
But he did not see a problem in an antitrust enforcement action against foreign 
defendants. 
Thus, even more than the hawkish Warren Court, Justice Douglas favored 
generous application of the antitrust laws, whether procedurally or substantively. 
And while he joined the Court in finding that the constitutionally protected right to 
petition the government trumped the antitrust laws and thus created antitrust 
immunity for certain types of collective action,687 later in California Motor Transport 
679Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1972). 
680/d. at 308-09 (Douglas, J., Marshall. J., dissenting). 
681 /d. at321. 
682/d. at 308-09. 
683De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945). 
684/d. at 222. The Court suggested that if the preliminary injunction should stand, any 
plaintiff would be able to seek a similar injunction in equity which would in effect sequester 
any defendant's assets pending a later judgment on the merits. /d. at 222-23. 
685/d. at 223-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
686/d. at 224. 
687 E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127, 135-45 
( 1961 ). 
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Co. v. Trucking Unlimited."xx Douglas was the architect of the so-called "sham 
exception" to what had become known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.w> In 
Cal(fornia Motor Transport, one group of motor carriers sued another, claiming that 
the latter had conspired to monopolize trade by filing a series of repetitive, meritless 
federal and state actions to contest plaintiffs' applications to acquire operating rights 
to transport goods. 690 
Writing for the Court. Justice Douglas referred to dicta in Noerr in holding that 
the antitrust immunity arising from the right to petition did not extend to "a mere 
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with 
the business relationships of a competitor ... .''691 In activating the Noerr dicta, 
Douglas sought to distinguish between legitimate attempts to influence public 
officials and attempts "to bar ... competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory 
tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process."692 Accordingly, "a pattern of 
baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that 
the administrative and judicial processes have been abused."693 
Thus, even when confronted with a purported constitutionally protected right, 
Justice Douglas seemed reluctant for the antitrust laws to be supplanted. At a 
minimum, he wanted an appropriate balance and did not want parties hiding behind 
the Noerr-Pennington immunity while they abused the system for competitive gain. 
For example, writing for the Court in Otter Tail Pov.·er Company v. United States,694 
he remanded a district court decision to determine whether the sham exception 
applied when defendants sponsored litigation for the purpose of delaying or stopping 
the establishment of competing municipal electric utility systems.695 
The Supreme Court's view of the reach of the commerce clause and thus 
Sherman Act jurisdiction expanded significantly during Justice Douglas' tenure.6Y6 
688Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-16 (1972). 
689Justice Douglas had written a separate concurring opinion in United Mine Workers of 
A me rim \'. Penninf{ton. 381 U.S. 657, 672-74 (1965), applying the second prong of the Noerr-
Pennington immunity, but on the labor exemption issue in the case. For a brief history of the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Rogers, supra note 135, at 169-73. 
69
°Ca/. ,'l,fotor Transport Co., 404 U.S. at 509. 
69 1 /d. at 51 I (quoting E. R. R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144 ). 
692/d.at511-l2. 
643/d. at 513. Not surprisingly, the sham exception has generated a good deal of litigation 
as courts attempt to draw the line between legitimate access to government tribunals and abuse 
of the system. Sec. e.g .. Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Picture' lndus .. Inc., 
508 U.S. 49 (1993 ); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. lnc .. 499 U.S. 365 (199! ). 
6940tter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 ( 19Tl). 
695The district court had ruled that the Noerr-Pennington immunity could not apply to 
issues concerning access to the judicial branch. as opposed to the legislative and executive 
branches. Calijinnia Motor Transport, decided after the district com1 decision in Oller Tail, 
had held otherwise but raised the specter of the sham exception. Thus. the district court may 
have reached the correct result but for the wrong rea,on. /d. at 379-80. 
696See. e.g., United States v. lnt'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 ( 1955); Lorain Journal Co. v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Mandeville island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 
U.S. 219 ( 1948): United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 ( 1947); United States v. Sec. 
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Douglas was in the forefront, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court in Moore v. 
Mead's Fine Bread.697 There the plaintiff was a bakery in Santa Rosa, New Mexico 
competing locally with a bread company which also sold bread in Farwell, Texas, on 
the Texas-New Mexico border. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had cut 
prices in Santa Rosa, forcing it out of business in violation of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. Douglas held that the defendant's act of sending a truck to Farwell each day to 
sell bread was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, even though plaintiff was not itself 
engaged in interstate commerce.69R He later acknowledged that finding that "the 
destruction of a local competitor by purely local tactics" conferred antitrust 
jurisdiction was "probably as far-reaching as any decision under the Commerce 
Clause."699 
Justice Douglas' view of Sherman Act jurisdiction was ultimately even more 
expansive than the rest of the Court's. Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas dissented in 
Flood v. Kuhn, a case that upheld professional baseball's long-standing exemption 
from the antitrust laws.7011 In doing so, he admittedly changed his position from 
almost twenty years before when he had voted to uphold baseball's judicially created 
antitrust exemption.701 
In Flood, the majority rigidly applied stare decisis to uphold the 1922 Federal 
Baseball decision that had held that organized baseball was not involved in interstate 
commerce. 702 The Court in Federal Baseball had ruled that there could be no 
Sherman Act jurisdiction involving organized baseball, since Congress' ability to 
legislate was constrained by the commerce clause. In the intervening fifty years, the 
Court's notion of interstate commerce had greatly expanded703 and the antitrust laws 
had been readily applied to other professional sports.704 Justice Blackmun, writing 
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944): Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). For 
Justice Douglas' view of the Supreme Court's expansion of the commerce clause as applied to 
the antitrust laws see WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES: STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND 
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA 210-217 (1956). 
697Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). 
698/d. at 119. 
699DoUGLAS. supra note 696, at 216-17. 
711
°Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 ( 1972). 
7111 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). In his words, "I have lived to 
regret it; and I would now correct what I believe to be [Too/son's] fundamental error." Flood, 
407 U.S. at 286, n.l. 
7112Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore. Inc. v. Nat'! League of Prof) Baseball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200, 209 (1922). 
7
l
13See United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Lorain Journal Co. v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 143 ( 1951 ): Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 
U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. Sec. 
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). 
704See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat' I Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Int'l 
Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Deesen v. Prof') Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966 ); Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 1958 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 'll 69,106 (S.D.N.Y.) (hockey); Wash. Prof! Basketball Corp. v. Nat'! Basketball 
Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402,408-
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for the Flood majority, 705 nonetheless held that congressional silence in the years 
since the Federal Baseball decision and organized baseball's long reliance on its 
antitrust exemption mandated that the Court "adhere" to its earlier decisions.706 
The year before Flood, Justice Douglas had, as Circuit Justice for the Ninth 
Circuit, reinstituted an injunction that allowed Spencer Haywood, who was 
challenging the NBA's so-called four-year rule, to play in the NBA playoffs.707 In 
doing so, Douglas noted in passing, without citing authority, that professional 
basketball was not exempt from the antitrust laws. 708 In his dissent in Flood, he 
argued, correctly it seems, that the Court, not Congress, should overturn Federal 
Baseball since the Court, not Congress, penned the decision.709 He also made it clear 
that he believed organized baseball's reserve clause, which bound a player to his 
team beyond the term of the contract but for the player's entire playing career, was 
an unreasonable restraint of trade.710 
09 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., concurring opinion) (labeling Federal Baseball "an impotent 
zombi"); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 ( 1955) (refusing to apply Federal Baseball to 
theatrical business). 
705Part I of Justice Blackmun's opinion, captioned 'The Game," was a panegyric to 
baseball, quoting Grantland Rice and George Bernard Shaw, among others. Blackmun also 
included a long list of baseball's legendary names including Tris Speaker, Rogers Hornsby, 
Wahoo Sam Crawford, Amos Rusie, Three-Finger Brown, Smokey Joe Wood, Wee Willie 
Keeler, Lefty O'Doul, Old Hoss Radbourne, Goose Goslin, Dizzy Dean, Dazzy Vance, Iron 
Man McGinnity, Stuffy Mcinnis, Eppa Rixey, Pie Traynor, Nap Lajoie, Rabbit Maranville, 
Big Ed Delahanty, Honus Wagner, Christy Mathewson, Grover Cleveland Alexander, Babe 
Ruth, Ty Cobb, Lou Gehrig, Walter Johnson and many more. Flood, 407 U.S. at 262 n.2. 
Blackmun was later heard to lament that he had neglected to include Van Lingo Mungo. 
Interestingly, two justices. White and Burger, voted with the majority and concurred in all but 
Part I of Blackmun's opinion. Perhaps Justice White, a former football All-American at the 
University of Colorado (whose football nickname was "Whizzcr" White) did not share 
Blackmun' s view of baseball as the National Pastime. 
706F/ood. 407 U.S. at 283-85. See generally C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation 
of Statutes: The Example of' Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REV. 6 I I ( 1977). In 
I 998 Congress finally did act, at the behest of the baseball owners and players' union, to strike 
down baseball's antitrust immunity with respect to activities affecting the employment of 
players. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub.L.No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824. The Act retains the 
status quo with regard to franchise relocation, the amateur baseball draft, and the relationship 
of major league baseball and the minor leagues. /d. 
707Haywood v. Nat'! Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). The four-year rule 
restricted a player from entering the NBA until four years after his graduation from high 
school. 
708/d. at 1205. 
709Justice Douglas characterized Federal Baseball as "a derelict in the stream of the law 
that we, its creator. should remove." Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
710 According to Justice Douglas, "[t]he equities are with the victims of the reserve 
clause ... since a contract which forbids anyone to practice his calling is commonly called an 
unreasonable restraint of trade." /d. at 287. On the reserve clause, see, e.g., C. Paul Rogers 
Ill, Napoleon Lajoie. Breach of Contract and the Great Baseball War, 55 SMU L. REV. 325 
(2002), ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 64-69 (1998), G. EDWARD 
WHITE. CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF 1903-1953 275-
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Jn his last term, Justice Douglas dissented in two other antitrust jurisdictional 
decisions, arguing for a more expansive interpretation of the "in commerce" 
requirement of the Clayton Act. In Gu(f Oil Corporation v. Copp Paving 
Companv71 1 and United States v. American Building Maintenance lndustries,712 the 
Court held that the Clayton Act's "in commerce" language must be read more 
narrowly than the Sherman Act's "in or affecting commerce" language, thus 
narrowing the jurisdictional reach of the Clayton Act to actions "in the flow" of 
commerce. Douglas reasoned, to the contrary, that since the Clayton Act was 
intended to complement the Sherman Act by curtailing anticompetitive practices in 
their incipiency, the Court should not "lightly assume'' that Congress intended the 
jurisdictional reach of the Clayton Act to be narrower than the Sherman Act.713 
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas favored allowing states to enforce the antitrust 
laws through Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. Writing for a narrow 5-4 
majority in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Justice Douglas ruled that 
the State of Georgia could bring suit as parens patriae for its citizens for injunctive 
relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act against twenty railroads accused of 
conspiring to fix rates. 714 Then, twenty-seven years later in Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
of Caliji>rnia, the Court held that a state could not recover damages for injury to its 
general economy in a parens patriae suit.715 Douglas vigorously dissented, 
characterizing the majority's approach to remedies as "miserly" and asserting that he 
saw '"no way of distinguishing the instant case from Georgia v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company.''716 
Justice Douglas also joined Justice Brennan's lengthier dissent, which pointed 
out that in the earlier case Georgia was denied damages only because its recovery 
might have violated the Keogh doctrine as an illegal rebate.717 Brennan and Douglas 
both favored allowing the State of Hawaii to recover damages as parens patriae for 
overcharges paid by its citizenry because of an oil company price fixing 
conspiracy. 718 
315 ( 1996). and BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 75-137 (Spencer Weber Waller, 
Neil B. Cohen & Paul Finkelman, eds., 1995). 
71 1Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 ( 1974). 
712 United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Ind., 422 U.S. 271 ( 1975 ). 
711Gu/f Vii. 419 U.S. at 206 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Am. Bldg., 422 U.S. at 286 
(Douglas. J .. di,senting). In what perhaps was some vindication ti1r Justice Douglas' position, 
in I 980 Congress broadened Section 7 of the Clayton Act to cover mergers "affecting 
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1980). 
71 
'Gcurgia v. Penn. R.R. Co .. 324 U.S. 439 ( 1945). 
'
1
-;Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251.264 (1972). The Court held that a stz.te 
could recover damages for injury to its commercial interests under Section 4 of the Clayton 
Act. !d. 
71
''/d at 266-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
717 /d. at 270. 272 (Brennan. J., dissenting). The contested rates in Georgia 1'. 
Penns_v!l'aniu Railroad Co. had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
arguably bringing it within Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). 
m!fmmii v. Standard Vii, 405 U.S. at 277. 
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In his separate dissent, Justice Douglas acknowledged that there "are doubtless 
rationales that express a prejudice against liberal construction of the antitrust 
laws."719 His solution was to let the case to go to trial and to leave it to Congress to 
decide if states should be restricted under Section 4 of the Clayton Act to their own 
proprietary interests.720 In acknowledging his "liberal" construction and punting to 
Congress if they did not like it, Douglas reaffirmed his position as the leading 
antitrust hawk on the Court. 721 
Thus, the record establishes that Justice Douglas favored a more expansive 
application of the antitrust laws than even his liberal brethren. Although as a New 
Dealer he could hardly be said to oppose government regulation to boost the 
economy, he certainly believed that the antitrust laws should trump regulatory 
schemes whenever possible, even if Congress suggested otherwise. If an implied 
antitrust immunity was necessary, he was sure to impose limits. Subject matter 
jurisdiction was to extend to the full, some would say exaggerated, reach of the 
commerce clause. 
Was this liberal application of the antitrust laws because of his abiding belief in 
the free market economy? That is certainly part of the answer. But a more accurate 
assessment would posit that Justice Douglas was concerned about loss of judicial 
control over the economy. He wanted to apply his brand of antitrust, including its 
use to protect small, independent businesses and to regulate the economy, rather than 
to cede authority to agencies with other regulatory concerns. The antitrust laws are, 
at bottom, nothing less than a kind of government regulation of business conduct. 
The Sherman and Clayton Acts, written as generally as they were, necessarily have 
required the courts to play a large role in their interpretation and enforcement. 
Douglas was not only loath to give any part of that responsibility away but sought to 
expand it whenever possible. 
XV. LABOR AND ANTITRUST 
Although Justice Douglas was most assuredly pro-labor,722 his zeal for antitrust 
enforcement must have caused him considerable anxiety when the two came into 
conflict. In fact, his opinions in the area seem somewhat schizophrenic. He was at 
his contrarian best in dealing with the labor exemption, almost always dissenting, 
writing no majority opinions and rarely voting with the majority.723 He dissented 
when he thought the majority was expanding the exemption and when he believed 
the Court was applying it too strictly. The sole consistency seems to be that he never 
agreed with his brethren about where the line should be drawn.724 
71
''td. at270. 
721 0ne wonders why Justice Douglas penned a separate dissent from Justice Brennan since 
they agreed on the construction of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. and the reach of 
Section 4, other than to display his independence on this issue. 
722See. e.g., SIMON. supra note 9, at 267-68. 270-71. 
723See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.3. Int'1 Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 
(1945). 
7240ne exception is United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 
485, 490-91 ( 1950). There, writing for a 6-1 majority, with Justices Frankfurter and Clark not 
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He sometimes believed that the majority was interpreting the non-statutory labor 
exemption to allow organized labor too much intrusion into the marketplace. An 
example is his dissent in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & 
Butcher Workmen of N.A. v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., in which a divided Court held that 
an agreement between a trade association of food retailers and local unions 
restricting the operating hours of fresh meat departments was exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny. 725 
The plaintiff had resisted a union proposal to restrict operating hours to 9 a.m. to 
6 p.m., which a large trade association of 1,000 merchants and 300 meat dealers had 
agreed to under the duress of a strike vote.726 Justice Douglas in dissent argued that 
"unions can no more aid a group of businessmen to force their competitors to follow 
uniform store marketing hours than to force them to sell at fixed prices."727 As he 
viewed it, the unions had "induced a large group of merchants to use their collective 
strength to hurt others who wanted the competitive advantage of selling meat after 6 
[p.m.]."m In sum, he believed that a conspiracy between a union and a large number 
of merchant-employers to impose competitive conditions on other merchant-
employers should not be shielded from antitrust under the rubric of collecting 
bargaining. 
Justice Douglas also felt compelled to concur in United Mine Workers of 
America v. Pennington,729 decided the same day as Jewel Tea. There the Court held 
that the participation of a union in an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement 
whereby employers and the union agreed on a wage scale, which forced some small 
employers out of business, was not within the nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption. 
Justice Douglas' concurrence was motivated by the fact that the conspiracy imposed 
high wages to drive "the small, marginal companies" out of business.730 He noted 
that Congress is "ft]he only architect of our economic system." Thus, the Court is 
correct "in adhering to [our] free enterprise system as expressed in the antitrust 
laws ... until the Congress delegates to big business and big labor the power to 
remold our economy in the manner charged here."731 
participating, Justice Douglas ruled that real estate commissions fixed by a real estate board 
were simply fees and were not wages falling under the labor exemption. 
725Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea 
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965). The Court concluded that the hours of operation were "well 
within the realm of 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' about 
which employers and unions must bargain." /d. 
726/d. at 680-81. 
727/d. at 737 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justices Black and Clark. Justice 
Douglas believed that the Court had failed to follow the well-established Allen Bradley Co. 
decision, which had outlawed unions from combining with employers and manufacturers of 
goods to restrain competition in or to monopolize the marketing of the goods. 
mld. 
724United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 672 (1965) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). He was joined by Justices Black and Clark. 
730/d. at 675. 
731/d. 
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Earlier, in Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States,732 
Justice Douglas had disagreed with the Court about the appropriate remedy for 
activity among "grease peddlers" who fixed prices and allocated territories under the 
guise of union activity. While the full range of antitrust remedies was available 
against the defendants, Justice Douglas disputed that the Court had the authority to 
expel them from the union under the Norris-LaGuardia Act for their restraint of trade 
activities. 733 He was willing to interpret "labor dispute" under the Act broadly so as 
to protect the right of small, independent contractors to maintain union membership 
even when the defendants were not engaged in actual collective bargaining. 
He also dissented in Ramsey v. Leon Nunley Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of 
America,734 disagreeing with the majority in a 5-4 decision about the standard of 
proof necessary to establish an antitrust violation by a union under Section 6 of the 
Norris LaGuardia Act.735 He argued that the statute required "clear proof' rather 
than a preponderance of the evidence of the union's complicity in the illegal 
scheme.736 The union had allegedly joined with major coal producers to set wages 
and other conditions of employment at a level that would force smaller producers out 
of business. 737 Justice Douglas agreed that the allegations, if true, would subject the 
union to antitrust liability. He was wary of accurately differentiating, however, 
between the union's best efforts to increase the wage scale industry-wide, which is 
what a union lawfully seeks to accomplish, and its conspiring with some employers 
to set wages at levels that would drive some producers from the market and thus 
benefit the conspiring producers.738 To make that distinction, he argued, a clear 
proof standard was needed.739 
Justice Douglas also disagreed with the majority in Connell Construction Co. Inc. 
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,740 arguing that the Court had 
construed the non-statutory exemption too narrowly, in contradistinction to his 
earlier dissents in Jewel Tea and Pennington. In Connell the Court ruled that a 
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement that required general contractor 
employers to contract only with subcontractors who also had agreements with the 
same union was not protected by the non-statutory exemption. Douglas joined 
Justice Stewart's four-justice dissenr141 but also dissented separately.742 Stewart 
732Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 
(1962). 
733 /d. at 108, 112 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The decision was 8-1. 
734Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971). 
735 /d. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
736/d. at 315-16. 
737/d. at 304. 
738/d. at 318-20. 
739/d. at 319-20. 
74
°Connell Const. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 
(1974). 
741 /d. at 638 (Stewart. J., dissenting). 
742 fd. (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
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argued that Congress did not intend for secondary boycott activities like those 
engaged in by the union to be subject to the antitrust laws.741 Douglas agreed, but 
noted the lack of a conspiracy allegation between the union and union subcontractors 
to force nonunion subcontractors from the market which was, for him, "the 
determinative feature of the case."m 
Thus, at the labor-antitrust juncture, Justice Douglas was capable of asserting the 
antitrust laws and restricting the labor exemption if he was convinced that small 
competitors were being squeezed by unions in collaboration with large employers 
such as in Jewel Tea and, more particularly, Pennington. But he was concerned that 
labor unions not face antitrust liability too readily or too easily. From his pro-labor 
stance, grease peddlers should not be expelled from a questionable union affiliation 
because they divided markets and fixed prices. Clear proof and specific conspiracy 
allegations should be required for union liability under the antitrust laws. 
Justice Douglas' antitrust philosophy, deeply rooted in populism, favored the 
small competitor. His labor philosophy favored the worker and his right to unionize 
and collectively bargain for higher wages and better working conditions. Small, 
independent businesses tend to pay lower wages and are not necessarily noted for 
their working environment. The collision of interests is inevitable and, given his 
strong beliefs and values, Justice Douglas' apparent inconsistency in drawing the 
line between antitrust and labor was perhaps predictable. 
XVI. CONCLUSION 
So at the end of the day (and in Justice Douglas' case it was the longest "day" 
ever on the Court) what kind of antitrust report card did the Justice earn? If one were 
to be most generous, one might label his antitrust record as mixed, given his stellar 
opinion in Socony- Vacuum. There he unequivocally recognized and made 
preeminent the importance of the price mechanism to a competitive market, a 
position from which he never wavered. One good, perhaps great opinion, however, 
cannot counterbalance the many stinkers he produced. If one attempts to be 
objective in light of both contemporary developments in antitrust law and the 
frequent confusion he generated in his own time, one must give Douglas a failing 
grade. Although Douglas, historically viewed, led the way in the expansion of the 
antitrust laws, the precedents he created have not, with the exception of price fixing, 
stood the test of time. 
The intrinsic inconsistency of his antitrust philosophy is palpable. While Socony-
Vacuum has been characterized as "[p ]erhaps the best known and most ruthle~s 
evocation of the consumer,'' 741 most of his opinions are patently anti-consumer. If 
nothing else, his opinions demonstrate that a coherent antitrust policy cannot protect 
both small business and the C(lnsumer. The former reduces the Sherman Act to the 
protection of the opportunity to compete, rather than the protection of competition 
itself. The incoherency of Justice Douglas' approach produces an antitrust law 
without form and with little ~ubstance. 
743/d. at 654-55. 
744/d. at 638. 
745
PERITZ, supra note 47, at 173. 
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Justice Douglas must rate as the leading antitrust hawk in our history and, with 
his brethren on the Warren Court. is re~ponsible for an unprecedented expansion of 
the antitrust laws. If Douglas had had his way, the expansion would have been even 
more dramatic. His fervor against big business and for the small businessman has 
not stood the test of time, however, at least not for a body of laws that seeks to 
enhance consumer welfare. There i~ irony in the fact that Douglas, who was so 
passionate about individual civil rights and liberties, actually harmed consumers in 
his populist attempt to protect small busines!-.. 746 
Indeed, it is unclear whether Justice Douglas recognized the inherent conflict 
between the protection of small business and consumer welfare. More likely, he did 
see it at some level but was simply resolute in his determination to frame the antitrust 
laws to protect the opportunity to compete, rather than as the watchdog of 
competition. The Warren Court and Douglas seemingly tipped their hand in the 
Brown Shoe decision when, despite their rhetoric, small business protectionism 
trumped consumer welfare. 
Equally problematic is the poor quality of his opinions in his later years on the 
Court. Even in the areas of horizontal restraints where the law has changed less, 
Justice Douglas issued opinions containing generalized, non-specific language with 
the lack of any real factual analysis. They often read like they were written by 
someone in a rush to do something else. With that approach, he managed to muck 
up and create uncertainty in the law for years to come. In merger and 
monopolization cases, his opinions were simply result-oriented and the government 
did always win if he had anything to say about it. He and the Warren Court not 
infrequently posited legal principles or standards while then proceeding to misapply 
those principles to the facts before them. 
One can argue that Justice Douglas' antitrust record is of a legal realist and 
functionalist run amuck. Legal realism posits that judges will be influenced by their 
own predilections and Douglas certainly was. The difficulty is that indeterminacy 
may result and precedent may be subverted if a judge goes too far. Douglas' 
abhorrence of market power and domination and concern for small business provided 
all too predictable results but no boundaries since he so often, even in the days of the 
Warren Court, argued to extend the reach of antitrust beyond his liberal brethren. 
Justice Douglas' functionalism was supposed to be fact-dependent and lead to 
greater certainty and efficiency in the law. In a superficial sense, it did since under 
Douglas the government always won. But as Douglas' time on the Court wore on, 
his antitrust opinions became less fact dependent and more doctrinaire. Often his 
fact analysis was superficial and incomplete, the precise opposite of what his 
functionalism preached. 
Another irony is that one can make a case that, in the antitrust arena, Justice 
Douglas, the product of humble circumstances who literally cleaned up Wall Street 
during the New Deal and who lived his life with a profound distrust of 
accumulations of economic wealth, came close to abusing his power on the Court in 
746 Another contradiction stems from the fact that despite Justice Douglas' earned 
reputation as an expansive libertarian and populist who distrusted all exhibitions of power, he 
was by all accounts a tyrant to work for and commonly was abusive to his law clerks and 
secretaries. Most of his law clerks, for example, endured several "firings"' and Justice Douglas 
typically took no interest in their personal lives or careers. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 10, 
at 407-15, 422-25; SIMON, supra note 9, at 224-27. 
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combating economic power. He did so by issuing opinions that were not fact driven 
but were instead fueled by ideology rather than economic and legal analysis. He 
further sought to protect and extend judicial control of competition policy by 
refusing to cede antitrust authority to other government entities and by expansively 
asserting Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction. 
While Justice Douglas' antitrust record is there for all to consider and critique, 
the more difficult and ultimately more speculative questions center around the 
underlying reasons for his flawed legacy. Initially, it is difficult to argue that the 
lack of sophistication in his later antitrust opinions emanated from a mediocre mind. 
Douglas was perhaps not as brilliant as he made himself out to be, but certainly he 
had a first-rate legal mind. He was also a prodigious writer747 and, as an academic 
early in his career, a "star" by any measure.748 He was a man in a hurry with many 
interests and passions, and one cannot help but wonder when reading some of his 
poorer opinions where his mind really was that day. 
One should also consider that Justice Douglas, even with his irascible 
personality, had considerable political ability and even greater political ambition. 
Within the confines of the Court, he certainly had influence and no doubt knew how 
and when to exercise it to get votes on issues important to him. It may be that 
compromise sometimes "made a camel out of a horse" but he was in fact an 
influential voice during his four decades on the Court. 
His distrust of concentrations of economic power that so fueled his antitrust 
philosophy most likely had its roots in his impoverished childhood and college years. 
His academic work with financial institutions and his path-breaking role in reforming 
the SEC in the 1930s, where he was privy to greed and manipulation by corporate 
insiders, must have solidified his distrust of big business. Certainly he was 
influenced by Justice Brandeis, who he acknowledged "helped crystallize my views" 
of "the free enterprise system," as well as the economist Veblen. They gave voice to 
his own experience dealing with the SEC. Thurman Arnold, his colleague and close 
friend at Yale, must have been influential as well. Both appeared to leave the New 
Deal's ambivalence about the value of competition, as opposed to government 
regulation, in their wake. 
Certainly Justice Douglas' populism caused him to focus on the small business 
owner as antitrust's principal beneficiary. In fairness, the disconnect between 
consumer welfare and small business protectionism was not as well understood 
during Douglas' years on the Court, although cases like Brown Shoe showed that the 
Court could simultaneously utter totally inconsistent policies. Nor had the pro-
competitive utility of efficiencies or the primacy of interbrand over intrabrand 
competition yet been given their due. Wealth maximization as an antitrust goal was, 
for the most part, not in the lexicon. Further, the uneven antitrust terrain Douglas 
inherited contained the property concept of restraints against alienation as an 
747Douglas wrote, excluding casebooks, thirty-six books or monographs during his life, 
including his two-volume autobiography. Many were on outdoor or travel topics not related to 
law. 
7481n his short full-time academic career at Columbia and Yale, Douglas produced nine 
law review articles, mostly co-authored and many based on empirical research, and seven co-
authored casebooks, prodigious scholarly production by any contemporary or historical 
measure. 
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antitrust goal and precedent like Appalachian Coals. But the fact remains that 
Douglas and his Warren Court brethren did not advance the antitrust ball in any 
coherent or lasting manner. 
Ultimately perhaps the most telling observation of Justice Douglas' antitrust 
legacy is that the Socony- Vacuum decision, the first antitrust opinion of the longest 
sitting Supreme Court justice in our history (and the Justice who authored more 
antitrust opinions than anyone on the high Court), is the only lasting antitrust 
precedent flowing from Douglas' pen. Unfortunately, it was all downhill after that. 
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